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Abbreviations and definitions
ASF African swine fever
BT Bluetongue disease
BTV Bluetongue virus
ETT Finnish Association for Animal Disease Prevention
EU European Union
Evira Finnish Food Safety Authority
FABA The Finnish Animal Breeding Association
FMD Foot-and-mouth disease
FMDV Foot-and-mouth disease virus
Luke Natural Resources Institute Finland*
MAF Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
Mela The Farmers’ Social Insurance Institution
MTT MTT Agrifood Research Finland*
MVO Municipal Veterinary Officer
OIE World Organisation for Animal Health 
PVO Provincial Veterinary Officer
FGFRI The Finnish Game and Fisheries Research Institute (RKTL)
TIKE Information centre of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry*
* As of 1 January 2015, MTT, the Finnish Forest Research Institute, the Finnish Game and 
Fisheries Research Institute, and the statistical services of the TIKE were merged to form Natural 
Resources Institute Finland (Luke).
Definitions
AI
Artificial insemination: a technique for placing semen from a male in the reproductive 
tract of a female by other means than natural service.
Case of FMD
An individual animal infected by foot-and-mouth disease virus (FMDV).
Coefficient of variation (CV)
The standard deviation divided by the mean; can be given as a percentage, which 
then indicates the proportion of the standard deviation from the mean.
Competent authorities
The authority of a member state competent to carry out veterinary checks.
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Consumer’s surplus
The excess of the benefit a consumer gains from purchases of goods over the amount 
paid for them. Typically obtained by integrating the area below the inverse demand 
curve minus the market value of goods purchased at market price.
Demand curve
A graph relating the demand for a good or service to its price. Its reverse is the inverse 
demand curve, which represents the price as a function of the quantity of a good.
Detection time
The time between the introduction of a virus and the positive diagnosis of a disease 
on a farm.
Direct costs
Costs of implementation of disease eradication and preventive measures after an 
infection has been observed at a farm. In this study, direct costs mainly refer to 
expenditures that are paid by tax payers.
Endemic disease
The constant presence of disease within a given population or a geographical area.
Epidemic
The introduction of a contagious pathogen into a susceptible population followed by 
the spread of the pathogen within the susceptible population.
Epidemic outbreak
The introduction of a contagious pathogen into a farm, followed by the spread within 
the farm and to other farms.
Export shock
A situation where importing countries prohibit the importation of animals and 
products originating from animals from a country where FMD, ASF has been 
observed. Consequences of the shock are referred to as trade distortions.
Farrowing farm
A farm mainly producing piglets to be sold to finishing farms.
Farrowing-to-finishing farm
A farm producing piglets and raising all or a proportion of the piglets until slaughter.
Finishing farm
A farm purchasing piglets from farrowing farms and rearing them until slaughter.
Heifer
A cattle female less than three years of age that has not given birth to a calf.
High-risk period
The time period between the release of FMD, ASF or BT virus into the susceptible 
population and the execution of the first restrictive measures due to a suspicion of 
disease. The high-risk period includes the incubation period.
Incubation period
The time period between the exposure of the animal to the pathogen and the occur-
rence of the first clinical signs of the disease.
The effects of structural change in agriculture on the spread of animal disease in Finland
10
Indicator
A variable that has a value of 1 when the argument is true and otherwise has a 
value of 0.
Indirect costs
Indirect costs – or consequential costs – include all other economic effects of a disease 
outbreak except direct costs. Trade losses, business interruption losses on farms 
located in restriction and surveillance zones, and the costs of breeding new animal 
stock after the outbreak are examples of indirect costs.
Iteration
One simulated outcome starting from a case of FMD, ASF or BT infection on one farm 
to the end of an outbreak. In this report, an iteration is a Monte Carlo simulated 
outbreak.
Monitoring
Ongoing programmes to detect changes in the prevalence of disease in a given 
population.
Neighbourhood spread
Disease transmission between herds in close proximity, where no other means of 
transmission of the disease can be identified.
Outbreak of FMD/ASF/BT
FMD/ASF/BT virus has been introduced into a farm and caused more than one case 
of disease after introduction.
Partial equilibrium
A situation where the demand and supply in a certain sector are equal, and the 
buyers and sellers are in agreement over the prices required for the transaction. In 
the equilibrium, changes in this particular sector would not increase the net benefit 
to consumers and producers. However, changes in other sectors could contribute to 
the net benefit.
Percentile
An approximate value of a cumulative distribution located on a given percentage of 
the distribution, whereby the same percentage of the population is either smaller 
than or equal to the given value.
Probability of epidemic outbreak
Simulated estimate of how probable it would be that an epidemic outbreak 
(>1 infected farm) would occur.
Probability of large outbreak
Simulated estimate of how probable it would be that an epidemic outbreak would 
include more than 17 infected farms.
Protective vaccination
Emergency vaccination is carried out in holdings in a designated area in order to 
protect animals of a susceptible species within this area against contagious animal 
disease. The animals are intended to be kept alive following vaccination (2003/85/
EY) (“vaccination to live”).
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Protection zone
An area around an infected herd with a minimum radius of 3 km.
Risk
The likelihood of occurrence and the likely magnitude of the consequences of an 
adverse event for, in this report, animal health in a specified area during a specified 
time period.
Relative variation in epidemic outbreak size
Coefficient of variation of the size of an epidemic outbreak = (standard deviation of 
size/ mean of size)
Risk assessment
In this report, risk assessment includes the evaluation of the biological and economic 
consequences of the entry of a pathogenic agent into the cattle and/or pig popula-
tion in Finland.
Semi-connected transports
Semi-connected means that either end of a transport (i.e. a farm) has stopped oper-
ating in 2033 and the corresponding number of animals needs to be transported from 
or to another farm still operating in 2033 in the simulation.
Simulation
A set of iterations that have been carried out with a certain set of parameters, in 
order to estimate the mean and variance of outcomes of iterations. Simulation typi-
cally includes several thousands of iterations.
Size of epidemic outbreak
The number of farms with infected animals of a certain contagious disease at the end 
of an outbreak.
Stamping-out
Killing of infected herds and/or other herds that have been exposed to infection by 
direct animal-to-animal contact, or by indirect contact likely to cause the transmission 
of disease. All carcasses of killed animals are destroyed by burning or burial, or by 
any other method that will eliminate the spread of infection through the carcasses or 
products of the animals killed.
Suckler farm
A farm with a herd of cattle composed of dams and their young calves up to the point 
of weaning.
Surveillance zone
A surveillance zone includes an area around an infected herd with a minimum radius 
of 10 km, excluding the protection zone.
Weaner calf farm
A farm where 1- to 2-week-old calves are moved and raised until they are 5–6 months 
old.
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1 Introduction
The structure of Finnish agricultural production has changed rapidly during the last 
decades. The most notable changes have been an increase in the average farm size 
and a reduction in the number of farms. For instance, in 2000, only 3% of dairy cows 
were located on farms having more than 50 cows, but in 2007 this percentage had 
already reached 15%. Correspondingly, the percentage of sows on farms having more 
than 200 sows increased from 17% to 41% during the same time period (Eurostat 
2008). During recent decades, the number of farms has decreased approximately by 
half per decade.
Changes in the production structure may affect the risk of spread of animal diseases 
and economic consequences of diseases. Risk management in a changing situation 
is more difficult, as the impacts of the increasing farm size and decreasing number 
of farms, the concentration of production and the impacts of specialised production 
are not properly known. Sow pools, the three-stage breeding of cattle, multi-site pig 
farming and the rise in sheep and goat production all influence the future potential 
for animal disease spread and the effectiveness of risk management measures. An 
increasing farm size can increase animal disease risks, but the potential to invest in 
biosecurity measures may also simultaneously increase. It is important to assess how 
much the risks are increasing and what means are available to reduce the negative 
impacts of structural change.
Structural change is a set of irreversible investment decisions and decisions to exit 
the industry. The animal disease risk should be taken into account in investment 
decisions, because the costs of the risk may reduce the potential benefits of structural 
change. Therefore, it is important to know whether the structural change will require 
changes in risk management. For instance, one should know whether precautionary 
efforts should be targeted towards new network-type production units that have 
great importance in the supply of domestic animal products.
Epizootic diseases are controlled by European Union directives and domestic legisla-
tion. Different management options are used to combat these diseases in case of an 
outbreak. Stamping out, restrictions on animal movements and emergency vaccina- 
tion, to mention a few, are among the options used depending on the disease 
and decision-making context. It is important to know whether these management 
options remain relevant when the production structures changes.  Finnish livestock 
production differs from that of many other regions in Europe. For instance, while the 
average farm size in Finnish animal production is equivalent to that of central Europe, 
the farm density in Finland is very low compared to many other regions in Europe.
The effects of structural change in agriculture on the spread of animal disease in Finland
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Three animal diseases were used to illustrate the impacts of changing production 
structures and their consequences on the spread and control of disease. Foot-and-
mouth disease (FMD), African Swine Fever (ASF) and Bluetongue (BT) are diseases 
that are not currently observed in Finland, but which could spread to Finland at any 
time. Finland has been free from FMD since 1959, and ASF and BT (serotype 8) have 
never been detected here. FMD is a disease of all cloven-footed animals such as pigs 
and ruminants. ASF is predisposed to pigs, while BT is a disease of ruminants only. 
FMD and BT can, in other words, additionally affect sheep and goats. Therefore, it is 
important to also assess the influence of sheep and goat production on the risk of 
disease spread.
It is possible to reduce the disease risk with on-farm biosecurity. Knowledge of the 
biosecurity level is crucial in order to determine whether it needs to be improved and 
in what sense. Economic incentives might be a way to stimulate farmers to improve 
and implement biosecurity measures.
The aim of this study was to assess how changes in the structure of animal production 
impact on animal disease risks and the economic consequences of diseases. FMD, ASF 
and BT were used as examples to reflect how production structures and changes in 
them affect the animal disease risk on farms and the risks for the whole country. The 
spread of diseases was simulated in the predicted future production structures (three 
different scenarios) and compared with reference simulations that were performed 
by applying the production structure of the year 2009.
Additionally, specialized production types and the importance of sheep and goat 
production to disease spread were examined under 2009 conditions. The implemen-
tation frequencies of biosecurity measures were estimated to identify sections that 
could be improved within each production sector and to study factors influencing the 
implementation frequency.
The effects of structural change in agriculture on the spread of animal disease in Finland
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2 Materials and Methods
In this study, we projected future scenarios for structural change in Finnish livestock 
production and simulated the spread and impacts of animal diseases in the Finnish 
livestock sector. The year 2009 was chosen to represent a reference point against 
which the future scenarios were compared. The same simulation models were 
applied for the 2009 situation and then modified and applied to reflect future 
scenarios in the year 2033. 
Epidemiological simulation models (FMD, ASF, BT) were developed to simulate the 
spread of infectious diseases between the pig, cattle, sheep and goat farms in 
Finland. The models were parameterized using data from 2009. The models were 
network models, which means that the spread was partially simulated in real, 
historical networks. The models for the spread of FMD and ASF resemble models such 
as InterSpread (Sanson 1993; Mourits et al. 2002; Stevenson 2003; Velthuis & Mourits 
2007), NAADSM (Harvey et al. 2007) and the earlier Finnish Classical Swine Fever 
(CSF) (Raulo & Lyytikäinen 2005) and FMD models (Lyytikäinen et al. 2011). The 
simulation of BT spread was performed with the same framework, but applying the 
models of Koeijer et al. (2011) and Turner et al. (2012a and 2012b). The spread of 
the disease between farms was simulated using the Monte Carlo approach. The 
models were programmed in the Matlab environment. Sampling from distributions 
(other than normal and uniform) was performed using functions of the Econometrics 
Toolbox (Le Sage 2002).
The models describe how the virus can spread between farms through different types 
of contacts. Relevant contacts are those that have occurred during an infective period 
on a farm, and are dependent on the simulated disease. Because the models used 
detailed historical data (from databases, as described later) in defining contacts, they 
can be considered as network models that describe potential networks connected 
with infected farms in a given time. Using registry data also meant that the models 
were mainly non-parametric, i.e. the contact processes were not parameterized, but 
described as they existed in the databases. This approach was complemented by 
adding parameterized data on contact types obtained from questionnaires. Part of the 
spread is initiated by spatial processes (FMD and BT). Contact type-specific infectivity 
and the duration of the infectious period prior to the first detection of the disease in 
the country are two major parameters of the model that were parameterized using 
existing models of the same type and other information sources (see Appendix 3).
In FMD and ASF models, the detection time was shortened by administrative 
actions taken on farms other than the primary infected farm: an infected farm can be 
The effects of structural change in agriculture on the spread of animal disease in Finland
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detected earlier if it is located in the control, protection or surveillance zone of the 
infected farm, or if it is traced as a contact farm. These routes may shorten the detec- 
tion time and infective period of a farm. Farms are subject to restrictive measures 
if they are traced as contact farms, or they are located in the control, protection or 
surveillance zone. Consequently, no contacts are formed from infected farms 
during the period of restrictive measures, even if the disease has not been detected 
on them. Our simulations continued until no new disease transmission arose. In the 
BT model, the simulations took into account the end of the vector-active period.
Economic losses caused by FMD and ASF were simulated by using the model 
presented by Lyytikäinen et al. (2011). The estimated direct costs due to the disease 
were updated to correspond to price ratios observed in 2009–2011. These data were 
collected from various statistics, and market price data were enquired from various 
sources such as service providers. For some cost items, 2009 data were not available 
and data from 2010–2011 were used instead. Market implications due to disease 
outbreaks were simulated using the same partial equilibrium stochastic dynamic 
programming model as described by Lyytikäinen et al. (2011) and Niemi and 
Lehtonen (2014). The model used to produce the current results was calibrated against 
data from 2009 and 2006. The model was extended by unpacking the stochastic 
results (the result of the dynamic programming model was previously packed and 
reported as the expected value, and this result was unpacked to represent the distri-
bution implicitly included in the results).
Estimates regarding the costs of BT were based on epidemiological simulations, 
Finnish regulations, past surveillance programmes and guidelines, and BT out- 
breaks recorded in the Netherlands and Belgium during the past years. One of the 
main sources of data was the study of Velthuis et al. (2010). Regarding BT, the 
impacts of disease on the markets were not simulated, because previous research 
and the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code did not suggest the disease to have sig-
nificant impacts on dairy and meat markets in Finland.
Future projections were incorporated into the models to resemble various scenarios 
that present optional production structure alternatives in the year 2033. For future 
projections, the baseline model was used, because it allowed us to compare economic 
results between the baseline and future scenarios. The economic benefits of the 
structural change in agriculture were examined separately from the sector model, 
because changing production costs in the epidemiological-economic model did not 
fully allow analytical comparison of the different effects of structural change.
The probability of a livestock farm continuing production in the future was estimated 
by using a logit regression model and data obtained from the Finnish farm register. 
The same data were used to assess how farm size has changed over time at farms 
belonging to different farm size categories. These estimates were used to determine 
the probability of continuing production and the range of farm size growth in a Monte 
Carlo simulation model that projected the structure of pig and poultry farming in 
2033.
The effects of structural change in agriculture on the spread of animal disease in Finland
16
3 Results and discussions
3.1 Reference simulations - The spread of diseases under the 
conditions of 2009
Reference simulations (Table 1, Appendix 5) indicated that an FMD outbreak would 
be more likely to escalate to an epidemic outbreak than an ASF or BT outbreak in 
Finland. Of these diseases, FMD can be expected to cause the largest outbreaks. FMD 
outbreaks may involve more species than outbreaks of other diseases. However, an 
FMD outbreak is more likely to be contained within the cattle sector when the primary 
infected farm is a cattle farm than within the pig sector when the primary infected 
farm is a pig farm.
The coefficient of variation (CV) of the epidemic outbreak size was largest in FMD and 
lowest in ASF simulations. This indicates that there is inherently a more unevenly 
distributed spread potential in FMD outbreaks, probably due to the higher number of 
spread routes and larger number of susceptible farms. This higher variation makes 
the prediction of a single outbreak more difficult. The consequences of an outbreak 
may also be more variable than for other diseases. The probability of a large out- 
break was over ten times higher for FMD than for the other two diseases, also indi-
cating a higher potential for extreme consequences.
Spatial spread was more important for BT than for FMD due to vector transmission. 
It is noteworthy that spread by other contact types also has a spatial component, 
e.g. animals are more likely to be transferred to nearby farms than to farms located 
further away. For instance, approximately 20% of animals are transported to farms 
that are less 20 km from the source farm according to the Finnish animal movement 
registry for 2009. This means that for all three diseases, control, surveillance and 
protection zones capture a proportion of the infected contact farms before they 
are even identified as contact farms. This increases the efficiency of official risk 
management measures and acts as an additional insurance against failing to trace 
contact farms – at least when they are located near (<10 km) the infected farm.
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Table 1. Outcomes of reference simulations: the spread of three diseases applying the data of 
2009 and estimated economic losses (€ million on average).
Variable FMD ASF BT
Mean size of epidemic  outbreak (number of farms) 11.91 2.60 2.80
CV of epidemic size 1.71 0.46 0.75
P(epidemic outbreak) 0.63 0.23 0.24
P(large outbreak) 0.10 <0.01 <0.01
Economic losses 27.7 10.5 4.8
Range of economic losses (95%) 11.6–74.4 4.6–22.7 2.8–9.0
Indirect influences of an outbreak (measured as the number of involved, 
non-infected farms) were the largest in BT outbreaks and smallest in ASF out-
breaks. BT outbreaks result in large control, protection and surveillance zones. A 
typical BT outbreak would cause over 1/3 of Finnish cattle farms to be in control, 
protection and surveillance zones.
ASF shows a low ability to spread in Finland. This result is consistent with the 
study of Nigsch et al. (2013), in which the typical outbreak size in Finland was 
predicted to be 1–2 infected farms.  Although we did not simulate a situation 
where the Finnish wild boar population would be infected, the results indicate 
that even if ASF entered the domestic pig population, the spread would be 
moderate and there would be a low probability for an epidemic outbreak. 
However, there is still some potential for further spread. The disease manage-
ment should therefore be swift and effective for our prediction to be applicable. 
We assumed that there are no time lags in addition to those mentioned in 
Appendix 3. It is unlikely that even a moderate increase in time lags would 
markedly alter the expected outcome, because the spread potential is so low.
There are definite spatial differences in the outcomes. An epidemic outbreak of BT 
would be two times more likely to start in the Vaasa PVO district than in any other 
PVO district. By comparison, the probability of an epidemic outbreak of FMD would 
also be high in the Oulu and Kuopio PVO districts, in addition to the Vaasa PVO district. 
An epidemic ASF outbreak would be most likely if the primary infected farm was 
either in the Turku or Kuopio PVO district. These results indicated that contingency 
planning requires adaptation to the specific characteristics of the district and the 
disease.
Distances between farms influence the spread dynamics differently for different 
diseases. In ASF, neighbourhood spread and airborne spread can be disregarded. 
On the other hand, BT may spread over very long distances along via the air. The 
probability of spread of BT decreases slowly as a function of increasing distance 
between farms. The spatiality of the spread of FMD is in between ASF and BT: in 
our model, there was a 3 km radius for neighbourhood/airborne spread. Other 
spatiality is due to spatially dependent contacts such as animal transportation.
Models give only conditional answers when a certain farm of a certain farm type, 
area or production sector is the primary infected farm. We started outbreaks on 
every Finnish pig and cattle farm with the same probability. Our assumption was 
that the probability of introduction would be evenly distributed among Finnish 
farms. If import risk is unevenly distributed, the results should be weighted 
accordingly. This would require a full quantitative import risk assessment for 
each disease at the farm level, which is an unreasonably large task for the 
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purposes of this report. When the results of this document are applied in 
practice, this limitation should be taken in account. The results show the poten-
tial range of outcomes, but the expected value (mean) may shift considerably if 
the risk of introduction deviates strongly from the assumed distribution.
3.2 The effect of the sheep/goat production on the spread of 
the studied diseases
3.2.1 Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD)
Sheep and goat production had little interaction with the other production sectors. 
Inclusion of sheep/goat farms in the simulations did not alter the results when a pig 
or cattle farm acted as the primary infected farm (Table 1 vs. Appendix 5). Sheep or 
goat farms as the primary infected farm caused markedly lower mean size of epidemic 
outbreaks, and lower probabilities of epidemic and large outbreaks than other farm 
types. Outbreaks that started on professional sheep or goat farms showed larger rela-
tive variability in the outbreak size than on other farm types (Table 2).
As a result of the lower mean epidemic size and probability of epidemic outbreak in 
sheep/goat initiated outbreaks, the overall expected mean size of an epidemic out-
break (11.40) and probability of epidemic outbreak (0.59) are estimated to be 5–8% 
lower with the inclusion of sheep/goat production than when sheep/goat farming 
is ignored.
Table 2. The effect of farm type on the simulated outcomes of FMD spread, based on 100 000 iterations in simu-
lations where sheep and goat farms as well as cattle and pig farms may act as the primary infected farm and the 
contacts of sheep/goat production are also simulated.
Farm type of primary 
infected farm
Mean size 
of epidemic 
outbreak
CV of size 
of epidemic 
outbreaks
P(epidemic 
outbreak)
P(large out-
break)
Total N of 
iterations
Farrowing farm 6.26 1.44 0.68 0.04 3 466
Farrowing-to-finishing farm 5.84 1.48 0.59 0.03 4 023
Finishing farm 5.32 1.76 0.50 0.02 3 315
Dairy farm 13.15 1.64 0.73 0.14 58 418
Beef cattle farm 9.36 1.96 0.41 0.05 12 176
Suckler cow farm 7.62 2.17 0.34 0.03 7 526
Professional sheep farm 3.41 1.57 0.25 <0.01 716
Semi-professional sheep farm 3.35 2.32 0.22 <0.01 3 430
Hobby sheep farm 3.56 2.36 0.21 <0.01 5 190
Goat farm 3.25 1.98 0.21 <0.01 1 740
When a pig farm acts as the primary infected farm, most of the further spread occurs 
within the pig production sector and only 2–3% of infected farms are either sheep 
or goat farms. Similarly, cattle farms tend to infect sheep and goat farms rarely. Only 
1–3% of farms infected by cattle farms were sheep/goat farms. The same applies 
when sheep and goat farm were the primary infected farms. Most of the infected 
farms were from the same production sector as the primary infected farm. Sheep 
and goat farms were estimated to promote further spread more often towards cattle 
farms (22–38% of infected farms) than towards the pig production sector (2–4% of 
infected farms). The sheep production sector and goat production sector did not infect 
each other much more often than the pig production sector (Table 3).
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The inclusion of sheep/goat production had only a low impact on risk management 
estimates such as the number of non-infected farms under risk management 
measures. Because the expected epidemic size was lower than in the simulation 
without sheep and goat production, the mean number of non-infected farms in 
surveillance and protection zones remained almost the same (Table 2 vs. Table 38). 
The slopes of regression functions showed more significant changes. If sheep/goat 
farms were included in simulations, an infected farm could be expected to cause 
5.3% more non-infected farms to be in protection zones and 7.4% more of them to 
be in surveillance zones (Table 4).
Table 3. The effect of farm type of the primary infected farm on the distribution of infected 
farms across different production sectors.
Farm type of the primary 
infected farm
The proportion (%) of different farm types among farms 
infected by further spread
To pig 
farms
To cattle 
farms 
To sheep 
farms
 To goat 
farms Total
Farrowing farm 77.30 20.16 2.06 0.47 100
Farrowing-to-finishing farm 76.57 20.96 1.88 0.59 100
Finishing farm 72.00 24.70 2.69 0.60 100
Dairy farm 1.79 97.05 1.00 0.17 100
Beef cattle farm 1.94 96.39 1.41 0.25 100
Suckler cow farm 1.95 95.10 2.50 0.45 100
Professional sheep farm 3.55 37.55 58.39 0.51 100
Semi-professional sheep farm 2.04 24.91 72.40 0.65 100
Hobby sheep farm 2.10 21.58 75.50 0.82 100
Goat farm 2.62 24.33 4.48 68.58 100
Table 4. The relationship between the number of FMD-infected farms (when the primary 
infected farm is a pig, cattle, sheep or goat farm) and the number of non-infected farms (y) 
in protection and surveillance zones. The relationship equation is y = a*(number of infected 
farms)+b, where a,b are regression model coefficients. Models are only valid if the number of 
infected farms is >1. The SE of the coefficient is given in parentheses.
Variable y a b R2
Mean number of 
farms for epidemic 
outbreaks (SD)*
Number of non-infected 
farms in protection 
zones
5.896 (0.005) -2.694 (0.094) 0.937 64.1 (124.2)
Number of non-infected 
farms in surveillance 
zones
21.480 (0.018) 16.421 (0.324) 0.934 267.1 (449.5)
*Only indicative of variation, as the distribution is highly skewed
In reference simulations, cattle and pig farms that also had sheep/goats (mixed 
farms) were able to produce 5% smaller epidemic outbreaks, and 23% less frequently 
than cattle and pig farms that did not have sheep or goat production (Appendix 5, 
Table 42).
In an additional simulation, outbreaks were always started on mixed farms includ-
ing sheep or goat production (100 000 iterations with and without sheep and goat 
related contacts). The probability of an epidemic outbreak was slightly higher if 
sheep- and goat-related contacts were taken into account (0.50 vs. 0.48; the relative 
increase is approximately 4%). On the contrary, the mean size of an epidemic outbreak 
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was slightly smaller (10.99 vs. 11.40). Mixed farms with sheep or goats have more 
frequent contacts with sheep and goat farms than with other farms, which results 
in a lower tendency to promote further spread of disease (see Tables 2 and 3). The 
difference between these two simulations was spatially consistent, i.e. the inclusion 
of sheep- or goat-related contacts promoted the probability of an epidemic outbreak 
approximately equally within each PVO district.
3.2.2 The impact of detection time on the results for sheep farms in FMD
simulations
We performed sensitivity simulations in which primarily infected sheep and goat 
farms were detected 20, 40 or 60 days later after virus introduction compared to 
when primary farm was a pig or cattle farm. This parameter defines the duration of 
the high-risk period when the primary infected farm is a sheep or goat farm.
The probability of an epidemic outbreak increased almost linearly as a function of 
increasing detection time. Similarly, the mean size of epidemic outbreaks increased 
with increasing detection time, but the relationship showed more variability. The 
results for cattle and pig farms acting as the primary infected farm were unaffected 
by the detection time applied to sheep and goat farms.
The results suggest that a four-fold increase in the detection time on sheep and 
goat farms would be required for a probability of an epidemic outbreak equal to the 
value for pig farms. A three-fold increase in the detection time would lead to the same 
result for the mean size of an epidemic outbreak (Figures 1 and 2).
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Figure 1. The impact of the detection time of FMD on the probability of an epidemic outbreak when 
the primary infected farm is a sheep or a goat farm. Results for pig and cattle farms as the primary 
infected farm from the same simulation runs are given as references. The detection times for pig 
and cattle farms are assumed to be 20 days (Appendix 0, Appendix 3), whereas for sheep and goat 
farms they vary as represented by the horizontal axis. Error bars represent the normal approximated 
95% confidence interval of the expected percentage.
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Figure 2. The impact of the detection time of FMD on the mean size of an epidemic outbreak when 
the primary infected farm is a sheep or a goat farm. The results for pig and cattle farms as the 
primary infected farm from the same simulation runs are given as references. The detection times 
for pig and cattle farms are assumed to be 20 days (Appendix 0, Appendix 3), whereas for sheep 
and goat farms they vary as represented by the horizontal axis. Error bars represent the 95% 
confidence interval of the mean.
3.2.3 Bluetongue (BT)
The inclusion of sheep or goat production in the BT simulation did not change the 
expected outcomes of cattle farms when they act as the primary infected farm. The 
mean size of epidemic outbreaks increased by 0.05–0.1 farms, depending on the type 
of primary infected farm.
The probability of an epidemic outbreak and the probability of a large epidemic 
remained the same as when sheep/goat farms were not included in the simulation 
(Table 5).
On the contrary, the probability of epidemics and large outbreaks was markedly lower 
when the primary infected farm was a sheep or goat farm. The mean size of epidemic 
outbreaks was 2–4 infected farms, depending on the farm type (Table 5). Because the 
probability of epidemic outbreaks is so low in sheep/goat production, the mean size 
of an outbreak only indicates that the expected size of an outbreak is on the same 
level as if would start in the cattle sector.
The mean of epidemic outbreak size was 2.92, the probability of an epidemic outbreak 
0.22 and the CV 0.85 when sheep and goat farming was included in the simulation. 
The effects of structural change in agriculture on the spread of animal disease in Finland
22
The probability of an epidemic outbreak was 0.02 lower than in simulations without 
sheep and goat farms. The mean size of an outbreak was 0.1 farms higher and the CV 
10% larger than in the reference simulation without sheep and goat farms.
Table 5. The effect of inclusion of sheep and goat production on the outcomes of BT simulations in relation to farm 
type. CV = coefficient of variation.
Farm type of primary 
infected farm
Mean size 
of epidemic 
outbreak
CV of size 
of epidemic 
outbreaks
P(epidemic 
outbreak)
P(large  
outbreak)
Total N of 
iterations
Dairy farm 2.85 0.83 0.28 <0.01 65 436
Beef cattle farm 3.26 0.94 0.11 <0.01 13 666
Suckler cow farm 3.37 0.94 0.11 <0.01 8 513
Professional sheep farm 2.28 0.44 0.08 <0.01 806
Semi-professional sheep farm 3.00 0.89 0.06 <0.01 3 823
Hobby sheep farm 4.67 0.93 0.04 <0.01 5 760
Goat farm 2.48 0.50 0.04 <0.01 1 996
When sheep and goat farms were taken into account, risk management estimates 
increased. The expected number of non-infected farms in control, protection and 
surveillance zones increased by 13%. The slopes of functions estimating the numbers 
of non-infected farms in control and protection zones increased by 6.3% and 5.0%, 
respectively. The number of non-infected farms in surveillance zones was less depen-
dent on the number of infected farms than were other zones (Table 6).
Table 6. The relationship between the number of BT-infected farms (when the primary infected 
farm is a cattle, sheep or goat farm) and the number of non-infected farms (y) in control, protection 
and surveillance zones. The estimated relationship equation is y = a*(number of infected farms)+b, 
where a and b are regression model coefficients. Models are only valid if the number of infected 
farms is >1. The SE of coefficients is given in parentheses.
Variable y a b R2
Mean size of 
epidemic out-
break (number 
of farms) (SD)*
Number of non-infected 
farms in control zones 127.276 (0.194) -1.454 (0.387) 0.811 373 (341)
Number of non-infected 
farms in protection 
zones
919.059 (2.336) 1 205.401 (4.563) 0.608 4 142 (2627)
Number of non-infected 
farms in surveillance 
zones
171.960 (2.096) 2 034.723 (4.176) 0.063 2 873 (1150)
* Only indicative of variation, as the distribution is highly skewed
3.2.4 Discussion, the effect of sheep and goat production
Sheep and goat farming plays a minor role in the potential spread dynamics of FMD 
and BT in Finland. The probabilities of epidemic outbreaks were lower than in the 
cattle and pig sector, indicating that the initial ability of sheep and goat farms to 
promote further spread is low. The same also applies to the expected magnitude 
of an outbreak. An outbreak initiated from the sheep or goat production sector is 
usually smaller than an outbreak initiated from cattle or pig production sectors. The 
affinity of spread towards the cattle sector can occasionally promote slightly larger 
outbreaks. This is due to the tendency of cattle farms to spread disease further. 
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However, even in cases of spread towards the cattle sector, the probability of large 
outbreaks is lower in outbreaks originating from sheep or goat farms than in those 
starting on other types of farms.
These results indicate that, in general, sheep and goat production is not able to effi-
ciently promote the further spread of FMD or BT. The large coefficients of variation in 
the FMD simulation indicate that there might be individual farms and locations where 
FMD may spread efficiently from sheep and goat farms. The same does not apply to 
BT simulations. However, the BT model is simpler and does not utilise as much farm 
level information as the FMD and ASF models. Thus, the BT model leads to coarser 
outcomes than the FMD and ASF models.
Disease spread mostly occurred within production sectors, and spread to other sectors 
was particularly seldom when the primary infected farm was a cattle farm. Therefore, 
production sectors did not substantially modify each other’s spread potential. A risk 
estimate could be approximated simply by estimating the spread within each sector. 
When classifying pig or cattle farms according to their ability to promote the spread 
of disease to other farms, the inclusion of sheep and goat farms in the simulations 
would add little value.
Sheep and goat farming was excluded from the future projections of this study. Our 
results suggest that this had only minor consequences for the outcomes. Sheep 
production in Finland is a relatively minor sector (Virtanen et al. 2013). Although the 
number of sheep and goat farms is quite large, the average size of farms is small and 
their impact on livestock production is quite small. For instance, the number of sheep 
and goat farms is approximately the same as the number of pig farms in Finland. 
Nevertheless, less than 0.3% of meat produced in Finland is sheep or goat meat, 
whereas almost half of meat produced in Finland is pig meat (Appendix 2, Table 29). 
The number of sheep in Finland is only 0.3% of the sheep population in Great Britain, 
where sheep farms have been promoting the spread of some animal diseases. The 
number of sheep in Finland decreased between 1995 and 2000. Since 2000, the 
number of sheep has increased, but is still lower than in 1995. There is no clear indi-
cation as to what the future entails for sheep production in Finland. However, it can 
be assumed that there will be a slight trend towards increasing production.
The small impact of sheep production on disease spread under 2009 conditions 
indicates that if sheep production increase and the increase concentrated on sheep 
farms with only sheep, the expected impacts on the risk of other production sectors 
would probably be relatively low. Goat production is even smaller in Finland. The 
number of does is less than 1/10 of the number of ewes. The future impact of goat 
farming on other production sectors can be expected to be even smaller than that of 
sheep production.
Mixed farms of sheep or goats with pigs or cattle are not efficient amplifiers of 
disease spread. In Finland, the number of mixed farms is low and they are generally 
smaller and thus less connected with other farms than an average-sized farm. The 
probability of an epidemic outbreak increased by approximately 4% and the mean 
size of an epidemic outbreak decreased slightly when simulations of spread were 
started on mixed farms and sheep and goat connections were included. The results 
indicate that most of the spread potential of mixed farms is due to connections 
related to pig and cattle production. Even in this limited group of farms, the inclusion 
of sheep and goat contacts added little value to the predictions.
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A clear result is that the inclusion of sheep and goat farms in the simulations 
increased the number of non-infected farms in control, protection and surveillance 
zones by 13%. Thus, the exclusion of sheep and goat farms leads to an underestima-
tion of the direct costs of risk management and disease control measures, as the costs 
of inspections in restrictive zones and tracing of contact farms are related to the 
number of farms, their location and size.
The sheep and goat registry was introduced in 2008. TIKE considered the total number 
of sheep in official statistics for 2008–2012 to be only approximate. The animal 
movement data from 2009 used in this study were probably an underestimate of 
sheep and goat movements between Finnish farms. Therefore, the overall picture of 
sheep farming as a low-ability spreader should be considered with caution.
Assumptions regarding the detection time have marked effects on the outcome of 
simulations. We applied the same detection time assumptions as for the primary 
infected farm on all farms. Infected sheep, cattle, goat and pig farms would be 
detected 20 days after virus introduction in our simulations. Only a considerable 
deviation from this assumption on sheep farms would warrant revision of the claim 
that sheep and goat production have a lower spread potential than pig and cattle 
farms.  Sensitivity analysis revealed that to reach the same spread potential as a pig 
farm, the detection time of an outbreak starting from a sheep or goat farm would 
need to be 4 times longer than it is for a pig farm. However, McLaws & Ribble 
analysed 24 non-endemic epidemic outbreaks between 1992 and 2003 and found 
that FMD outbreaks are detected within 25 days from virus introduction, and the 
average detection time is markedly lower. This suggests that a four times longer 
detection time in situations where a sheep or goat farm acts as the primary infected 
farm would be unlikely.
3.3 The effect of specialized production on the spread of FMD
Specialized production (sow pools, multi-sites and weaner farms) was only assessed 
in FMD simulations. The probability of an epidemic outbreak (i.e. disease spreading 
to other farms) was higher when the outbreak started from a pig farm that is part of 
a sow pool or a multi-site production system when compared to other pig production. 
Similarly, if an outbreak started on a weaner farm for calves, the probability of an 
epidemic outbreak was markedly higher than on average in outbreaks starting from 
the cattle sector (Figure 3).
The mean size of an epidemic outbreak was also higher when the outbreak started 
in any of these three specialized production forms. Most notably, the mean epidemic 
outbreak size was 21.6 farms and the probability of a large outbreak was 0.23 when 
the outbreak started from a weaner farm (Figure 4). The corresponding probability 
was 0.07 for sow pools and 0.04 for multi-sites. Additional analysis of the reference 
simulations (Appendix 5) showed that the weaner farms were involved (either as 
primary or secondary infected farms) in 70.6% of all large simulated outbreaks, 
although they comprise only 0.3% of Finnish cattle farms.
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Figure 3. The probability of a simulated epidemic FMD outbreak when the primary infected farm 
is sow pool, multi-site pig farm or weaner farm. The blue dashed line indicates the probability of 
epidemic outbreak when the simulation has started from any farm in the cattle sector and the red 
line when the simulation has started from any farm in the pig sector. Error bars represent the 95% 
confidence interval for the estimates.
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type of the primary infected farm is sow pool, multi-site pig farm or weaner farm. The blue line 
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Figure 5. The proportion of goat, sheep, cattle and pigs farms as the destination of disease spread 
when the primary infected farm is a sow pool, a multi-site pig farm or a weaner farm.
When specialized farm types acted as the primary infected farm, disease spread 
usually remained within the same production sector. In cases of spread between 
production sectors, the pattern was the same as when an outbreak had started on an 
ordinary farm (Figure 5). In multi-site systems, 27.6% of further spread stayed within 
the system. If an outbreak started in a sow pool system, 12.1% of further infected 
farms belonged to sow pool systems. When focusing only on animal transport, in 
outbreaks starting on a farm that is part of a multi-site system, 33.6% of infected 
farms that were infected by direct animal contact also belonged to a multi-site 
system. In sow pools, the corresponding number was 13.0%.
Compared with the farm type-specific results from the reference simulations (Appen-
dix 5), it becomes even more apparent that the probabilities of an epidemic and a 
large outbreak are higher within multi-site production. Moreover, the mean size of an 
epidemic outbreak was larger than typically on sow farms. The relative variation in 
outbreak size was slightly lower than in reference simulations for the corresponding 
farm type (Table 7). Similar observations are also valid in sow pool systems with a 
few exceptions. Farms classified as finishing farms were more capable of inducing 
epidemic outbreaks, and the mean size of epidemic outbreaks was higher than on the 
finishing farms of multi-site systems (Table 8).
Other traffic (see Appendix 7, Table 54) has more relevance in cases of spread from 
weaner calf farms than from networked pig farms (Figure results 6). In contrast, the 
size of epidemic outbreaks from networked pig farms is more defined by animal 
transport-related contacts (Figure 6).
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Table 7. The effect of farm type within a multi-site production system on the simulated FMD spread (N = 100 000 
iterations) starting from a specialised production farm. CV = coefficient of variation.
Farm type of primary 
infected farm
Mean size 
of epidemic 
outbreak
CV of size 
of epidemic 
outbreaks
P(epidemic 
outbreak)
P(large 
outbreak)
Total N of 
iterations
Farrowing farm 7.96 1.28 0.79 0.07 13 448
Farrowing-to-finishing farm 6.81 1.33 0.80 0.04 10 956
Finishing farm 5.33 1.35 0.61 0.02 38 005
Table 8. The effect of farm type within a sow pool system on the simulated FMD spread (N = 100 000 iterations) 
starting from a specialised production farm *.
Farm type of primary 
infected farm
Mean size 
of epidemic 
outbreak
CV of size 
of epidemic 
outbreaks
P(epidemic 
outbreak)
P(large 
outbreak)
Total N of 
iterations
Farrowing farm 7.79 1.31 0.81 0.07 12 217
Farrowing-to-finishing farm 6.69 1.21 0.73 0.06 7 985
Finishing farm 7.81 1.05 0.76 0.08 1 504
*Note that only a proportion of finishing pigs are grown on farms identified as part of a sow pool system in this 
study.
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Figure 6. Proportional contribution of contact routes to the simulated spread of FMD when the 
type of the primary infected farm is a sow pool, multi-site pig farm or weaner farm (for definitions: 
Appendix 7, Table 1).
3.3.1 Discussion, the effect of specialized production
Multi-sites and sow pools as the primary infected farm were simulated to produce 
larger outbreaks than average-sized pig farms in reference simulations. In addition, 
the probability of epidemic outbreak was larger for multi-site and sow pool farms. 
Farms belonging to sow pools and multi-site systems were divided into the same 
farm type classes (farrowing, farrowing-to-finishing, finishing farms) as conventional 
farms. This enabled more appropriate comparison with the outcomes of typical farms. 
When these approximate farm types were compared against a standard produc-
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tion system, the difference was larger than when special and standard production 
systems were compared as groups.
Only a small fraction of further spread remained within these specialized production 
networks. Thus, pigs are also frequently delivered outside these networks. This may 
in part be an identification and classification issue. The data may not have been able 
to fully identify all the farms belonging to the networks. Identification was based on 
information gathered from slaughterhouse companies. Because the delivery of 
piglets is mostly coordinated by slaughterhouse companies, they are able to identify 
farms belonging to networked production. The intensity at which the farms operate 
as part of a network may vary. For instance, farms may have additional production 
capacity and animals raised with this additional capacity may originate from or end up 
to outside the network. Partially networked production systems may produce larger 
outbreaks because they “leak” outside the system. In FMD simulations, part of the 
leak is due to airborne spread towards the cattle sector. Part of the leak is also due 
to transport to pig farms outside the network. Farms in these pig production systems 
were on average larger than a typical pig farm in Finland. This may contribute to the 
larger outbreaks and higher probabilities of epidemic outbreaks.
The results suggest that if disease is detected in a networked pig production system, 
it is relevant to consider all farms within the system as contact farms. In addition, 
because the systems generally leak, normal contact tracing is important.
Networked pig production systems affected the risk of the cattle sector receiving the 
disease in a similarly to standard production systems. During an outbreak, the spread 
of disease from the pig sector to the cattle sector can be considered independently of 
the type of pig production system.
On average, weaner farms produced markedly larger outbreaks than any other farm 
type in the cattle sector. They were also involved in the majority of large outbreaks, 
indicating that they are highly connected with other farms. The higher percentage of 
weaner farms involved in large outbreaks than all farm types on average suggests 
that these farms were both effective in spreading the disease and also efficient in 
receiving an infection. Weaner farms were not particularly large farms. However, 
because animals spend only a short period of time on the farm, the turnover rate is 
high and the farms are efficiently connected with other farms. It is important that 
these farms are not connected with each other. In other words, farms should not 
deliver animals to several weaner farms.
Information on animal transport vehicles is not available in as much detail from the 
cattle sector as from the pig sector. In the pig sector, almost all movements can be 
linked with the vehicle identification number. On the other hand, vehicle movements 
can only rarely be linked with animal movement in the cattle registry. Therefore, 
we applied information gathered from slaughterhouse companies to estimate the 
number of vehicle movements per day. Additionally, we assumed that other animal 
movements occurring nearby on the same day were likely to utilize the same vehicle. 
This means that, in case of special arrangements in the logistics of weaner farms, the 
accuracy of our estimates for the spread potential from weaner farms may decrease.
The number of sow pools has decreased during recent years, and industry representa- 
tives have recently estimated that the number will further decrease in the future. 
The number of sow pools was reduced from 15 in 2002 (Rosengren et al. 2002) to 
12 in 2009. By contrast, networked multi-site pig production and three-stage cattle 
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production may be increasing. It is important that the logistics in these specialized 
production systems are developed systematically. The development should include 
epidemiologically relevant preventive operations as the key criteria.
One of the weaknesses of networked pig production is that the systems are not 
always as closed as they could be. Therefore, these systems are less easily handled 
in disease outbreaks and other animal health disorders and the consequences of 
failure are dispersed more widely. Through careful planning, more closed systems 
can be achieved. Other potential improvements in the logistical solutions, such as 
improved synchronisation of animal flows and separated animal transport, decrease 
the risk of disease spread in the system. However, even if a completely closed 
system would be the goal from the disease risk management perspective, it cannot 
be achieved completely. Diseases that have spatial spread mechanisms (vector borne, 
airborne) are not stopped even if the animal transport system is completely closed.
Weaner farms were the most effective production type to spread the diseases 
further. They have frequent connections with a large number of farms, from which 
they receive and to which they send animals. One of the problems with this type of 
operation is that weaner farms do not operate completely separately. Animals from 
one farm may be transported to several weaner farms that are also connected with a 
large number of other farms.
3.4 Projected changes in production structure and expected 
consequences of structural change
Luke performed projections for different scenarios of structural change. These needed 
to be interpreted into a form that could be included into the epidemiological simu-la-
tions. We applied three scenarios: “Baseline 2033”, “Slow pig 2033” and “Fast cattle 
2033”, which are described in Table 9 (for detail, see Appendices). The scenarios can 
be summarized as follows:
   Scenario “Baseline 2033”: More than 2/3 of pig farms and over 70% of dairy 
farms operating in 2009 exit the business by 2033. The expected reduction in 
the number of beef cattle and suckler cow farms is smaller. When the number of 
farms decreases, the number of animals per farm increases to maintain the 
presumed production level. The scenario assumes an approximately 20% overall 
decrease in production. Despite this, the number of animals on the farms 
increases. The largest relative increase is among farrowing farms and the smallest 
among beef cattle farms (Tables 9 and 10).
   Scenario “Slow pig 2033”: The number of pig farms is 1/3 higher and the 
average number of animals per farm is 50–60% lower than in the baseline 
scenario. Cattle farms are as in the baseline scenario (Tables 9 and 10).
   Scenario “Fast cattle 2033”: the number of cattle farms decreases more than 
in the baseline scenario, but the number of animals per farm is higher (Tables 9 
and 10).
The scenarios influence the data applied when simulating contacts between farms, 
because the contact structure is dependent on the future number and size of farms. 
The “AI technician” and “dairy tanker” data (Appendix 1) were reduced by the same 
magnitude as the number of dairy farms. Amendments to the slaughterhouse data 
were somewhat smaller due to a smaller reduction in the number of suckler and beef 
cattle farms. The smallest reduction was in the animal transport data, but this 
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depended on the assumptions made concerning animal transportation logistics in 
2033 (Appendix 7; Table 11).
Table 9. Number of farms in Finland and animals per farm in three different scenarios. The 
year 2009 is given as a reference. Scenarios are based on the distribution of 1000 projections. 
Farm type
 Year 2009 Baseline 2033 Slow pig 2033 Fast cattle 2033
N size N size N size N size
Farrowing farm 763 209 56 1 562 87 1 013 56 1 562
Farrowing-to- 
finishing farm 879 435 206 1 567 314 995 206 1 567
Finishing farm 698 663 222 1 734 359 1 099 222 1 734
Pig farms 2 340 484 760 484
Dairy farm 12 438 50 3 459 133 3 456 132 2 604 177
Suckler cow farm 1 628 63 1 122 169 1 163 169 856 226
Beef cattle farm 2 588 58 1 179 72 1 182 71 861 95
Cattle farms 16 654 5 760 5 801 4 321
Total 18 994 6 244 6 561 4 805
Table 10. Relative change (%) in the number of farms and farm size in three different 
scenarios for 2033 compared to the situation in 2009.
Farm type
Baseline 2033
Relative change % in
Slow pig 2033
Relative change % in
Fast cattle 2033
Relative change % in
Number 
of farms
Farm 
size
Number 
of farms
Farm 
size
Number 
of farms
Farm 
size
Farrowing farm -93 +647 -89 +385 -93 +647
Farrowing-to-
finishing farm -77 +260 -64 +129 -77 +260
Finishing farm -68 +162 -49 +66 -68 +162
Pig farms -79 -67 -79
Dairy farm -72 +166 -72 +164 -79 +254
Suckler cow farm -31 +168 -29 +168 -47 +259
Beef cattle farm -54 +24 -54 +22 -67 +64
Cattle farms -65 -65 -74
Table 11. The number of records in different databases for 2009 and in three different scenarios for 2033. The rela-
tive differences (%) compared to the records in 2009 are given in parentheses.
Database 2009 Baseline 2033 Slow pig 2033 Fast cattle 2033
AI visits database 499 391 152 970 (-69%) 152 590 (-69%) 115 050 (-77%)
Dairy tanker visits database 21 418 6 319 (-70%) 6 305 (-71%) 4 752 (-78%)
Slaughterhouse database 132 814 46 131 (-65%) 54 848 (-58%) 38 656 (-71%)
Animal transport between farms 
database 117 365 62 475* (-47%) 67 158* (-43%) 51 161* (-56%)
Semi-connected animal transport 
records between farms na 52 441 53 934 44 580
Fully connected animal transport 
records between farms na 10 034 (-92%) 13 224 (-88%) 6 581 (-94%)
*All semi-connected animal transport records are re-linked in the scenarios for 2033. (Semi-connected transport 
records: Animal transport contacts for 2009 in which either the source or target farm has exited the industry before 
2033 in an iteration; for more information, see Appendix 7).
 
na = not applicable
The effects of structural change in agriculture on the spread of animal disease in Finland
31
The applied scenario and proportion of re-linked contacts determine the assumed 
relative batch size in the scenario (Figures 7–9). This assumption also varies between 
production sectors. In the pig and cattle sectors, the same proportion of re-linking will 
lead to a different batch size. The proportion of re-linking also defines the number of 
animals transported per farm per year. If the proportion of re-linked contacts is low, 
the batch size should increase as the total number of contacts decreases more than 
with a higher proportion of re-linked contacts.
The “Slow pig” scenario deviates from the “Baseline” scenario only in assumptions 
related to the pig sector. As the number of farms continuing in the business is higher 
than in the baseline scenario, the expected requirements for a batch size increase 
are lower than in the baseline scenario. In the “Fast cattle” scenario, in contrast, the 
increase in batch size expectation is higher than in the baseline scenario for the 
cattle sector.
Generally, we assume that the total number of contacts will decrease. In all scenarios 
and proportions of re-linking, the total number of contacts is lower than in 2009 
(Figure 10). The intensity per farm is likely to increase, as the number of contacts is 
higher than in 2009, if the proportion of re-linked contacts is at the 0.15 level in the 
pig sector and 0.35 in the cattle sector (Figure 11).
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Figure 7. The effect of the proportion of re-linked animal transports on the relative batch size in the 
“Baseline” scenario. The relative batch size describes how many times more animals need to be 
transferred from one farm to another per transport with a given proportion of linked contacts than 
in 2009. Third degree polynomial fits are given for interpolations.
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Figure 8. The effect of the proportion of re-linked animal transports on the assumed relative batch 
size in the “Slow pig” scenario. The relative batch size describes how many times more animals 
need to be transferred from one farm to another per transport with a given proportion of linked 
contacts than in 2009. Third degree polynomial fits are given for interpolations.
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Figure 9. The effect of the proportion of re-linked animal transports on the relative batch size in the 
“Fast cattle” scenario. The relative batch size describes how many times more animals need to be 
transferred from one farm to another per transport with a given proportion of linked contacts than 
in 2009. Third degree polynomial fits are given for interpolations.
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Figure 10. Reduction in total animal transports in Finland in “Baseline”, “Slow pig” and “Fast 
cattle” scenarios according to the proportion of linked contacts. Linear fits are only suitable for inter- 
polation. The “Baseline” scenario also represents the relative change in the pig sector in the “Fast 
cattle” scenario and the change in the cattle sector in the “Slow pig” scenario.
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Figure 11. Relative change in the number of animal transport contacts per year on a farm accor- 
ding to the proportion of re-linked contacts in the pig and cattle sector. Linear fits are only suitable 
for interpolation.
3.4.1 Discussion, projected changes in production structure
The total number of animal movements between farms was assumed to decrease 
in all scenarios due to the reduction in the number of animals in the country. It can 
also be expected that the batch size will increase. In our baseline scenario for the pig 
sector, the minimum batch size increase was assumed to be 50%. This is linked to 
the assumption that the number of contacts per farm will increase 3-fold and the 
total number of animal transport contacts in Finland will decrease by 35%. Because 
the reduction in the number of cattle farms was assumed to be smaller than that of 
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pig farms, the number of contacts per farm will increase less in the cattle than in the 
pig sector. However, the total number of animals will be reduced by the same rela-
tive factor as the contacts in the pig sector.
Depending on the farm type, the pig farm size was projected to increase by 160–
650% in the baseline scenario, while the number of pig farms decreased by 79%. It 
is unlikely that the annual number of animal contacts of a pig farm will decrease in 
the future. It would require the batch size in the baseline scenario to be at least 5.37 
times larger (i.e. the proportion of re-linked contacts equals approximately 0.15) than 
in 2009, when the average batch size was 68 pigs. As a result, the average number 
of pigs per transport between farms would be 365. The 99th percentile of the batch 
size was 428 pigs in 2009. In other words, an increase to a 5.37 larger batch size 
appears unlikely. Pig transport vehicles vary in size. This scenario would require that 
the size of the typical transport vehicle in 2033 would be equal to the largest vehicles 
in 2009. Infrastructure limitations such as the quality of roads and the size of bridges 
may limit the possibility to increase the average vehicle size. However, the transporta- 
tion technology may also change over the 20-year period, so that even larger 
vehicles may be available in 2033.
Assumptions regarding the increase in farm size also influence the possible range of 
animal transport contacts. It can be expected that the limiting factor is the size of the 
receiving farms, i.e. the size of finishing farms. The size was assumed to be only 2.6 
times greater than in 2009. This may suggest a re-linking proportion of 0.5. If this 
criterion is applied, we are simultaneously assuming that the total number of animal 
transport contacts is only reduced by 60% and the contacts per farm per year increase 
by at least 160%. Larger increases in the batch size would only be possible if the 
duration of growing in the finishing stage was markedly reduced, which is not 
expected.
In the cattle sector, the average batch size was 2.2 animals in 2009. This suggests that 
a situation is very likely to be achieved where the number of contacts of a farm per 
year would decrease according to our assumptions (re-linking 0.43). This would 
require an increase in the batch size to at least 6.6 animals, which is three-fold higher 
than in 2009. In 2009, the largest batches were markedly larger. The 99th percentile 
of the batch size was 20 animals in 2009. This suggests that the increase is very 
possible and that this assumption requires weaker assumptions for the increase in 
vehicle size than in the pig sector. Even a larger increase in batch size appears 
possible. Re-linking of all semi-linked contacts (batch size would be 9.8 times higher) 
would lead to a reduction in the total number of cattle transports by over 80%.
Sweden has a different production structure from Finland. Large cattle farms were 
more common in Sweden than in Finland in 2006–2008. During recent years, the 
average farm size in Finland has been similar to that in Sweden 10–20 years earlier. 
By applying data from Nöremark et al. (2011), it can be estimated that the 
average batch size in Sweden was 7.75 animals (505 908 individual animal trans-
portation records, 65 201 movements) in 2008. Achieving a similar level in Finland, 
the batch size should increase by approximately 3.5-fold in the “Baseline 2033” 
scenario. By combining these two criteria, it can be considered realistic to achieve a 
3–4 times larger batch size in the cattle sector by 2033. However, substantial adapta-
tions in logistics may be required.
If we assume that the increase in the batch size is directly related to the farm size 
increase, the probable increase in the batch size would be lower. In our projection, 
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dairy and suckler cow farms were 2.7 times larger than in 2009. Larger increases in 
the batch size would require production-related changes on farms. The end point of 
cattle production, beef cattle rearing farms, is only slightly larger in our projections 
than in 2009. Their number is decreasing less than the number of dairy farms. If this 
is taken into account, it would lead to even smaller batch size increases. The ability of 
these farms to receive animals would not increase much if they operate as they did 
in 2009. It may be assumed that the increase in the batch size is probably less than 
170% and the relevant proportion of re-linked contacts is at minimum 0.5.
If the efficiency of logistics and production increase less than farm size, the average 
batch size will probably also increase less. Thus, assuming maximum re-linking (1) 
of animal transports, it would lead to a situation where only a modest 50% increase 
in batch size is achieved. However, this would reduce the benefits of increased farm 
size. A re-linkage of 0.75 would probably cause a more credible lower limit for the 
batch size increase (90%) along with increasing farm size.
The alternative scenarios differ from the baseline. The “Slow pig 2033” scenario 
assumes a smaller reduction in the number of farms and a smaller increase in the 
number of animals on the farms. On the contrary, the “Fast cattle 2033” scenario 
assumes a larger reduction in the number of cattle farms and a larger increase in the 
farm size.
Using the above logic, the smallest possible batch size increase in the “Slow pig 
2033” scenario is 66%, because the finishing farm size increases accordingly. In 
the “Slow pig 2033” scenario, a re-linkage proportion of 52% of animal transports 
corresponds to a 66% increase in the batch size. In the “Fast cattle 2033” scenario, the 
minimum batch size increase would be slightly higher than in the baseline scenario. 
This means that the minimum increase in batch size would be 250% (corresponding 
to a re-linkage of 0.49). If farm size-related criteria are applied in re-linking, the 
possible re-linking is similar, regardless of the applied scenario. This is because the 
number of semi-linked contacts changes together with the number of farms defined 
by a scenario.
Despite what was noted above, in all scenarios and re-linking options, the batch size 
is larger than in 2009 in both production sectors. This study does not present any 
results for a situation in which Finnish animal production operates logistically “less 
efficiently” than today.
3.5 Structural development and economies of scale
The data show that wages and materials are the main cost items in livestock farms 
(Appendix 6). Work on farms is still mainly conducted by the producer and his or her 
family (on average 95%), because the share of paid labour is on average only 5%. 
Producers have invested in technology (machinery and buildings), which resulted in 
the share of labour costs remaining relatively stable or decreasing during 2000–2011. 
By contrast, the share of costs incurred due to materials, machinery and buildings has 
increased.
Previous research suggests that as farm size increases, the most significant change is 
related to the decreased share of labour costs (Ala-Mantila 1998). The biggest share 
of production costs in dairy farming is accounted for by wages. Other costs (animals, 
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other animal expenses, insurances, electricity and fuels) also form a significant share 
of production costs. The unit production cost of milk, i.e. the total production costs of 
a farm divided by the quantity of output, decreases as the number of cows on the 
farm increases. In pig meat production, the largest individual cost items are piglets 
and purchased feeds. In pig meat production, the unit cost also typically decreases as 
more pig meat is produced by the farm.
Ovaska and Heikkilä (2013) have studied the structural development and competi-
tiveness of Finnish dairy farms. They found that for a typical Finnish farm, the most 
significant cost disadvantages were machinery, wages and other costs. Wage costs 
decrease proportionally the most significantly as the farm size class increases. Latuk-
ka (2013) observed that small farms have the largest unit production cost, and as the 
number of cows per farm increases, the unit cost decreases.
Unit production costs were studied by using a linear mixed-effect model and farm-
level data for the years 2000–2011. The results indicate that the unit production cost 
increases every year, but the rate of increase varies between farms and the type of 
production. The unit production costs decrease as farm size increases. Small farms 
(standard output less than €50 000) have significantly higher unit costs than medium- 
sized (€50 000–€100 000) or large farms (more than €100 000). This may be due 
to the relatively rapid growth in farm size in Finland during the 2000s. Hence, large 
farms may not yet have reached their desired levels of production and input use. The 
variation between farms and years was also larger for small than for large farms. 
There were no significant differences in unit costs between similar livestock farms 
located in different regions. The year-to-year correlation in unit costs was high and 
the unit costs of farms changed at a different pace over time.
Figure 12 illustrates how production costs per unit of output were estimated to 
decrease in finishing pig production and dairy production. Figure 12 is based on 
log-linear costing models (log Y = a+bX+e). This implies that decreasing economies 
of scale are assumed. The graphs in Figure 12 present the production costs of a dairy 
farm compared to a farm with 30 dairy cows and the production costs of a finishing 
pig farm compared to one with 500 pigs (i.e. for these farm sizes, the cost index is 
1). The estimates were used to quantify possible economies of scale that would be 
available in future projected farms by 2033. Possible changes in prices or production 
technology over time were not accounted for, i.e. the comparison of costs was made 
at the 2009–2011 price level and by assuming the same production technology as in 
the bookkeeping data.
In the baseline scenario, the production costs per unit of output were estimated to 
decrease between 2009–2033 due to structural change by 22% in dairy production, 
by 8% in finishing pig production and by 6% in piglet production when compared to 
the farm structure observed in 2009. These results reflect changes in production costs 
on an average-sized farm. Changes in the costs of suckler beef production were not 
estimated due to data issues. The results are likely to be realistic, because the farm 
size in pig production has already increased substantially, whereas dairy farms in Fin-
land are still quite small on a European scale. The results are in line with Rasmussen 
(2010), who estimated that the elasticity of scale is larger on dairy than on pig farms. 
Hence, dairy farms could benefit more from expanding their production than pig 
farms. In the “Slow pig 2033” scenario, the production costs of pig production were 
estimated to decrease by only 3–4%, while in “Fast cattle” scenario, the production 
costs of dairy farms were estimated to decrease by approximately 33%.
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Figure 12. Projected change in production costs (cost/unit of output) in relation to farm size in 
finishing pig and milk production when compared to a finishing farm with 500 pigs or to a dairy farm 
with 30 cows.
3.6 Disease spread in production structures of the future
Most of the results are derived from the “Baseline 2033” scenarios for all three 
diseases. The differences between the scenarios are discussed in the conclusions.
3.6.1 Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD)
The probability of an epidemic outbreak in 2033 was lower or, at the most, equal 
to the level of the reference simulation. The greater the proportion of 2009 contacts 
that were assumed to be linked with animal transports between farms in 2033, the 
higher was the probability of an epidemic outbreak in 2033. The probability of an 
epidemic outbreak was generally higher when the outbreak started in the pig sector 
than when it started in the cattle sector (Figure 13). The mean size of an epidemic 
outbreak was generally larger when the outbreak started in the cattle sector. The 
relationship between the size and the proportion of linked contacts appeared to be 
curvilinear (Figure 14).
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Figure 13. The probability of an 
epidemic outbreak in FMD simu- 
lations with the “Baseline 2033” 
scenario. The outbreak has started 
in either the pig or the cattle 
sector and a proportion of semi- 
connected animal transport links 
have been re-linked. Dashed lines 
represent the levels in reference 
simulations of 2009. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence inter-
vals for the estimates.
Figure 14. The mean size of an 
epidemic outbreak in FMD simu- 
lations with the “Baseline 2033” 
scenario. The outbreak has started 
either in the pig or the cattle 
sector and a proportion of semi- 
connected animal transport links 
have been re-linked. Dashed lines 
represent the levels in reference 
simulations for 2009. Error bars 
represent the 95% confidence 
intervals for the estimates.
Figure 15. The probability of 
an epidemic outbreak in FMD 
simulations with the “Base-
line 2033” scenario. The 
outbreak has started in the 
cattle sector and a proportion 
of semi-connected animal 
transport links have been 
re-linked. Error bars repre- 
sent the 95% confidence 
intervals for the estimates.
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Outbreaks that started on dairy or farrowing farms yielded a larger probability of 
epidemic outbreak than outbreaks starting from other types of farms (results Figures 
15 and 16). Suckler cow and finishing farms had the lowest probability of developing 
an epidemic outbreak. The mean epidemic outbreak size was high for all farm types 
in the cattle sector (results Figure 17). In the pig sector, only farrowing farms had a 
similar spread potential to cattle farms (results Figure 18).  On farrowing-to-finishing 
and finishing farms, the mean size of epidemic outbreaks was markedly lower than 
on farrowing farms. The probability of large outbreaks appeared to be highest on 
farrowing farms, followed by the cattle sector, and lowest on finishing farms (results 
Figures 19 and 20). The variation in results increased as the proportion of linked 
contacts increased (results Figure 20).
Figure 16. The probability of 
an epidemic outbreak in FMD 
simulations with the “Base-
line 2033” scenario.The 
outbreak has started in the 
pig sector and a proportion 
of semi-connected animal 
transport links have been re-
linked. Error bars represent 
the 95% confidence intervals 
for the estimates.
Figure 17. The mean size 
of epidemic outbreaks in 
FMD simulations with the 
Baseline 2033 scenario. The 
outbreak has started in the 
cattle sector and a proportion 
of semi-connected animal 
transport links have been re-
linked. Error bars represent 
the 95% confidence intervals 
for the estimates.
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Figure 18. The mean size 
of epidemic outbreaks in 
FMD simulations with the 
“Baseline 2033” scenario. 
The outbreak has started 
in the pig sector and a 
proportion of semi-connected 
animal transport links have 
been re-linked. Error bars 
represent the 95% con-
fidence intervals for the 
estimates.
Figure 19. The probability 
of large (>17 infected farms) 
epidemic outbreaks in FMD 
simulations with the “Base-
line 2033” scenario. The 
outbreak has started in the 
cattle sector and a proportion 
of semi-connected animal 
transport links have been re-
linked. Error bars represent 
the 95% confidence intervals 
for the estimates.
Figure 20. The probability 
of large (>17 infected farms) 
epidemic outbreaks in FMD 
simulations with the “Base-
line 2033” scenario. The 
outbreak has started in the 
pig sector and a proportion 
of semi-connected animal 
transport links have been re-
linked. Error bars represent 
the 95% confidence intervals 
for the estimates.
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Figure 21. The coefficient of variation (CV) of the size of epidemic outbreaks in FMD simulations 
with the “Baseline 2033” scenario. The outbreak has started either in the pig or the cattle sector and 
a proportion of semi-connected animal transport links have been re-linked.
The numbers of non-infected farms per infected farm in protection and surveillance 
zones will decrease as the total number of farms and farm density decline. The 
decrease in non-infected farms per infected farm is estimated to be 50–60% in 
protection zones in epidemic outbreaks (Table 12). In sporadic outbreaks, the 
decrease is only 20%. Similarly, in surveillance zones, the decrease in non-infected 
farms within the zones is 50–60% per infected farm, depending on the size of the 
outbreak. Even in sporadic outbreaks, the reduction is over 40%.
The number of animals on infected farms was estimated to increase in the future, 
because the size of farms is expected to increase. If the type of the primary infected 
farm is not specified (any Finnish pig or cattle farm), the number of pigs per infected 
farm can be expected to decrease by 33–57%.  In contrast, the number of cattle per 
infected farm can be expected to increase by 110–370% (Table 13). The explanation 
is that the number of pig farms is much lower than the number of cattle farms, and 
the primary infected farm in this scenario is any cattle or pig farm in Finland. In 
addition, an outbreak starting from the cattle sector remains within the sector much 
more frequently than an outbreak starting from the pig sector. In a typical outbreak 
starting in the cattle sector, the probability that pig farms become infected is smaller 
than the probability that cattle farms become infected in a typical outbreak starting 
in the pig sector.
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Figure 22. The change in the number of animals in protection and surveillance zones in ucar when 
compared with 2009 conditions in relation to the number of infected farms.
The situation is different when estimating the number of animals on non-infected 
farms in protection and surveillance zones. In small outbreaks, the number of animals 
on non-infected farms in protection and surveillance zones can be 15–50% higher 
than under 2009 conditions (Figure 22). With an increased outbreak size, the impact 
of the reduced number of farms in the country starts to influence the outcome. This 
results in a slightly lower number of animals on non-infected farms than in 2009. 
Pigs in surveillance zones do not follow this general pattern. In larger outbreaks, the 
number of pigs on non-infected farms may increase slightly, but still clearly less 
than the size of pig farms (Figure 22). In conclusion, the simulation results do not 
suggest large changes in similar-sized outbreaks when the number of animals on non- 
infected farms in surveillance and protection zones is considered.
Table 12. The relationship between the number of FMD infected farms and non-infected farms in 
protection and surveillance zones in the “Baseline 2033” scenario. The relationship equation is y 
= a (number of infected farms)+b, where a and b are regression model coefficients. Models are 
only valid if the number of infected farms is  >1. The SE of the coefficient is given in parentheses.
Variable y a b R2
Number of non-infected farms in protection zones 2.065 (0.002) 0.187 (0.095) 0.982
Number of non-infected farms in surveillance zones 7.725 (0.008) 12.976 (0.391) 0.979
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Table 13. The relationship between the number of FMD infected farms and the number of pigs 
and cattle on infected farms and on non-infected farms in protection and surveillance zones in the 
“Baseline 2033” scenario. The relationship equation is y = a*(number of infected farms)+b, where 
a and b are regression model coefficients. Models are only valid if the number of infected farms is 
>1. The SE of the coefficient is given in parentheses. Piglets under 3 months and cattle under 6 
months are not included in these figures.
Variable y a b R2
Number of pigs on infected farms 10.8 (0.234) 83.6 (11.4) 0.096
Number of cattle on infected farms 209.2 (0.2) -173.1 (9.7) 0.981
Number of pigs on non-infected farms in 
protection zones 224.8 (1.2) 548.0 (58.9) 0.634
Number of cattle on non-infected farms in 
protection zones 270.6 (0.3) -7.1 (15.4) 0.974
Number of pigs on non-infected farms in 
 surveillance zones 970.1 (3.6) 2 938.5 (175.6) 0.784
Number of cattle on non-infected farms in 
surveillance zones 964.3 (1.1) 1 622.3 (53.4) 0.975
Figure 23. The impact of the “Slow pig 2033” scenario on the probability of an epidemic outbreak.
The “Slow pig 2033” scenario did not have a clear effect on the probability of an 
epidemic (Figure 23) or a large outbreak, the mean size of an epidemic outbreak or 
the relative variation in outbreak size when compared to the baseline scenario. The 
proportion of re-linked contacts is a significantly more important factor in determi-
ning the risk of further spread than the future projection scenario.
3.6.1.1 Alternative scenarios
“Slow pig 2033”
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“Fast cattle 2033”
Figure 24. The impact of the 
“Fast cattle 2033” scenario 
on the probability of epidemic 
outbreaks in the cattle sector. 
The “Fast cattle 2033” scenario had a small effect on the probability of an epidemic 
outbreak (Figure 24). On dairy farms, in particular, the probability of an epidemic 
outbreak was consistently lower than in the “Baseline 2033” scenario. On suckler cow 
and beef cattle farms, the effect was not as clear but showed the same tendency. 
The proportion of re-linked contacts was still a significantly more important factor in 
determining the risk of further spread than the applied scenario.
3.6.1.2 Discussion, FMD
The outcomes of the different scenarios deviated only slightly, and it was therefore 
decided to make a general assumption regarding the animal transports (proportion 
of re-linked contacts) between the farms. It was concluded that a relinking proportion 
of 0.5–0.75 would probably be the most relevant range for the future scenarios, and 
this has been applied throughout this section of the report. Naturally, if this assump-
tion is not valid in the future, the further conclusions should be adjusted accordingly.
The probability of an epidemic outbreak may decline in the future, as the probability 
of an epidemic outbreak at 0.5–0.75 re-linking was lower than the probability in the 
reference simulations. A larger proportion of re-linked contacts is expected to elevate 
the probability of an epidemic outbreak in the pig sector to the level of the reference 
simulations, but this does not apply to the cattle sector. Farm types responded diffe- 
rently to the re-linking assumption. The probability of an epidemic outbreak on 
farrowing farms was clearly elevated in the future scenarios. On farrowing-to-finishing 
and finishing farms, it was the same or slightly lower than in the reference simu-
lations. The “Baseline 2033” scenario assumes that the largest farm size increase 
would occur for farrowing farms, and that the reduction in the numbers of farrowing 
farms would be larger than that among other pig farms. These assumptions together 
result in a higher relative concentration of contacts with farrowing farms than with 
other pig farms in future scenarios.
As in the pig sector, the farm type in the cattle sector influenced the probability of 
an epidemic outbreak. The reduction in the probability of an epidemic outbreak on 
dairy farms was at least 20%, while the suckler cow and beef cattle farms retained 
the same probability levels as in the reference simulations. We assumed that the 
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routes of dairy tankers and AI technicians would be shortened due to the reduced 
number of dairy farms. This can be expected to reduce the number of contact-receiving 
farms along the daily route. These assumptions, together with the reduced numbers 
of neighbouring farms, reduce the probability of an epidemic outbreak in the base-
line simulations starting from dairy farms. The reasons for other cattle farms retaining 
the probability of an epidemic outbreak at the level of reference simulations may be 
connected with increased animal movements per farm and the lower significance of 
other traffic (persons and vehicles) in defining the spread potential.
The size of an epidemic outbreak varies and depends on the proportion of re-linked 
animal transport contacts, i.e. the increase in the batch size. With a 90% batch size 
increase, the mean size of epidemic outbreaks was higher than in the reference simu-
lations. If the batch size is assumed to increase by 150%, the average outbreak size 
is reduced by 28–52% and the outcome is lower than in the reference simulations for 
all farm types except farrowing farms. This highlights the importance of animal trans-
port logistics in defining the future spread potential.
Even if the batch size increased by 150%, leading to fewer infected farms during 
an outbreak, there would quite probably be more animals on infected farms, as the 
farm size is assumed to increase. If the farm type of the primary infected farm is not 
taken into account, the results mainly include outbreaks that have started from cattle 
farms. In this situation, the number of pigs per infected farm can be expected to be 
reduced by 33–57%. The number of cattle per infected farm, on the other hand, can 
be expected to increase by 110–370%. If the primary infected farm was a pig farm, 
the number of pigs per infected farms would increase from the level in the reference 
simulations.
The numbers of non-infected farms in protection and surveillance zones will markedly 
decrease. This is partially compensated by the increased farm size, and the reduction 
in the total number of animals in restriction zones thus remains almost equal to the 
level in the reference simulations. By assuming that the batch size will increase by 
150%, the number of animals within the zones is estimated to decrease by 10–40%. 
If we assume that the batch size will only increase by 90%, the number of animals is 
estimated to show only a slight increase. These results mean that in the future, the 
impacts of restrictive zones on the production capacity will approximately remain at 
the level of the reference simulations.
The collection of data on non-infected contacts during a simulation requires a 
considerable amount of computational resources, limiting the number of iterations 
per simulation. Traced non-infected contact farms were therefore not assessed 
in this study. According to our earlier studies, the number of contact farms may 
correspond with the number of farms in surveillance and protection zones (Lyytikäi-
nen et al. 2011). Because the number of farms in surveillance and protection zones 
can be expected to decrease, the number of traced non-infected and infected contact 
farms should increase. This will increase the importance of tracing in the future and 
decrease the importance of restrictive zones as risk management measures. It seems 
reasonable to assume that the reduction in non-infected farms in restrictive zones 
corresponds with the increase in traced contact farms if the infectivity of the contacts 
remains the same. Thus, it can be expected that the number of traced contact farms 
would exceed 80% of the total number of farms under restrictive measures, while 
in 2006 the proportion was only about 50%. Simultaneously, farms in restrictive 
zones would be reduced to one-fifth of the total number of non-infected farms under 
restrictive measures. Therefore, the information on contacts and how the information 
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is handled will become more important in the future than it is today. This should lead 
to savings in direct management costs, as the risk management costs of a traced 
contact farm are lower than the management costs of a farm in a surveillance or 
protection zone (Lyytikäinen et al. 2011).
The culling of animals on infected farms can be expected to be more difficult in the 
future due to the increased numbers of animals per farm. Nevertheless, the total 
number of culled animals may not change dramatically, as the predicted change in 
the numbers of infected farms was moderate.  Detailed planning is required on how 
many animals can be culled effectively and how the carcasses are to be stored and 
transferred to a rendering plant. It is recommended to revise the contingency plans 
by using the largest farms that are currently operating, because the number of 
animals on the largest farms can be used as an example of the future capacity 
requirements related to the culling and rendering capacity of the carcasses.
3.6.2 African swine fever (ASF)
The expected outcome of an ASF outbreak is dependent on the proportion of 
re-linked contacts, but the slope of the curve of the mean epidemic outbreak size is 
less steep than in FMD simulations. Re-linking resulted in an expected mean size of 
epidemic outbreaks of 2.2–3.5 infected farms when applying the “Baseline 2033” 
scenario (Figure 25).
Figure 25. The mean size 
of an epidemic outbreak in 
ASF simulations with the 
“Baseline 2033” scenario. 
The outbreak has started on 
a pig farm and a proportion 
of semi-connected animal 
transport links have been re-
linked. Error bars represent 
the 95% confidence intervals 
for the estimates.
Farrowing farms were the most effective spreaders of ASF. The probability of an 
epidemic outbreak and the mean size of epidemic outbreaks were larger than on 
other farm types in the pig sector (Figures 26 and 27). Finishing farms were the least 
effective in spreading the disease, and the outcomes of farrowing-to-finishing farms 
were between the outcomes of finishing and farrowing farms. Relative variation 
increased in all farm types with an increased proportion of re-linking of animal trans-
port contacts (Figure 28).
The number of non-infected farms in surveillance and protection zones can be 
expected to be lower in the future. In the baseline scenario, one infected farm 
increased expectations on the number of non-infected farms in protection zones by 
less than one farm, and in the surveillance zone by about four farms. These values 
are approximately one-third of the corresponding values in the reference simulations 
(Table 14, Appendix 5).
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Figure 26. The probability of an epidemic outbreak in ASF simulations with the “Baseline 2033” 
scenario. The outbreak has started on a pig farm and a proportion of semi-connected animal trans-
port links have been re-linked. Error bars represent the 95% confidence intervals for the estimates.
Figure 27. The mean size of an epidemic outbreak in ASF simulations with the “Baseline 2033” 
scenario. The outbreak has started on a pig farm and a proportion of semi-connected animal trans-
port links have been re-linked. Error bars represent the 95% confidence intervals for the estimates.
Figure 28. The coefficient of variation of epidemic outbreaks in ASF simulations with the “Baseline 
2033” scenario. The outbreak has started on a pig farm and a proportion of semi-connected animal 
transport links have been re-linked.
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Table 14. The relationship between the number of ASF-infected farms and the number of non- 
infected farms in protection and surveillance zones in the “Baseline 2033” scenario. The relation- 
ship equation is y = a*(number of infected farms)+b, where a and b are regression model 
coefficients. Models are only valid if the number of infected farms is  >1. The SE of the coefficient 
is given in parentheses.
Variable y a b R2
Number of non-infected farms in protection zones 0.932(0.008) 0.096(0.019) 0.431
Number of non-infected farms in surveillance zones 4.179(0.024) 0.850(0.060) 0.598
Table 15. The relationship between the number of ASF-infected farms and the number of pigs* on 
infected farms in protection and surveillance zones in the “Baseline 2033” scenario. The relation-
ship equation is y = a*(number of infected farms)+b, where a and b are regression model coeffi-
cients. Models are only valid if the number of infected farms is >1. The SE of the coefficient is given 
in parentheses.
Variable y a b R2
Number of pigs on infected farms 2075.4 (6.0) -601.5 (4.2) 0.857
Number of pigs on non-infected farms in 
protection zones 1507.8 (13.6) 165.6 (33.8) 0.379
Number of pigs on non-infected farms in 
surveillance zones 6795.8 (42.8) 1405.6 (105.8) 0.558
*Piglets under 3 months are not included in these quantities
Figure 29. Change in the number of pigs in protection and surveillance zones in relation to the 
number of infected farms. The “Baseline 2033” scenario is compared with the results of the refe-
rence simulation.
The number of pigs on infected farms can be expected to increase. This does not apply 
to the total number of pigs on non-infected farms in protection and surveillance 
zones, as the number of farms will decrease more than the number of animals per 
farm will increase (Table 15). Therefore, the sum of animals on non-infected farms is 
not expected to change much in the future (Figure 28). The results indicate that the 
increased farm size will compensate almost completely for the reduced number of 
farms in terms of animals on non-infected farms in restrictive zones in an ASF 
outbreak.
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3.6.2.1 Discussion, ASF
By applying the same criteria of re-linking as in FMD (0.5–0.75), it was concluded that 
the mean size of an epidemic outbreak of ASF was 2–32% larger in future projections 
than in the reference simulations in all pig farm types. This resulted in a larger 
number of animals existing on infected farms when the future is predicted by the 
“Baseline 2033” scenario. Because the expected size of an outbreak is larger than 
in reference simulations, the number of animals on non-infected farms in restrictive 
zones can be expected to be larger in the future.
Farrowing farms appeared to have the greatest potential to spread ASF, as the prob-
ability of an epidemic outbreak and the mean size of an outbreak were the largest in 
this farm category. As expected, the farrowing-to-finishing farms were not as effec-
tive spreaders as the farrowing farms, and the finisher farms were the least effective 
farm type in spreading ASF further. These results are consistent with the earlier risk 
assessments of CSF and FMD spread in Finland (Raulo & Lyytikäinen 2006; Lyytikäinen 
et al. 2011).
Relative variation in the epidemic outbreak size increased when the proportion of re-
linked contacts increased. This implies that the outbreak size becomes more variable 
when there are more contacts. The relative variation is, however, markedly smaller in 
ASF than in FMD simulations. Thus, the outcome of an outbreak is much more easily 
predictable for ASF than for FMD.
Restrictive zones are also relevant in ASF outbreaks. Although ASF does not have a 
specifically spatial spread component, contacts have spatial properties. The probability 
of contacts between nearby farms is higher than between farms further away from 
each other. However, this spatiality is weaker for ASF than for diseases that have an 
airborne spread component. As a consequence, the significance of restrictive zones 
will decrease more for ASF than for FMD in the future. Contact tracing will also have 
relatively higher importance in ASF outbreaks than in FMD outbreaks in the future.
In this study, we did not simulate spread promoted by wild boars. Although the wild 
boar population in Finland is small, it has presumably been growing slowly during 
recent decades. In the winter of 2014–2015, large numbers of wild boars were to be 
hunted in order to reduce the population size. To limit the spread of diseases, it is 
important that the population of wild boars remains small and that they do not come 
into contact with domestic pigs and pigs on farms. The spread potential from wild 
boars to domestic pigs is partially dependent on the type of production. For instance, 
outdoor access of domestic pigs and materials from the environment that are trans-
ferred to pig farms will influence the risk of introducing disease from wild boars to 
domestic pig production.
According to our simulation results, the domestic pig population is not able to spread 
ASF rapidly to large numbers of farms. Therefore, an ASF outbreak in the wild boar 
population may not be a large risk for an escalated ASF epidemic outbreak in domestic 
pig production. However, if ASF is found in wild boars, it could still have severe 
implications for pig production and economic impacts on the pig sector in Finland, 
with reduced possibilities to export pig meat.
It was assumed that ASF is detected rapidly on the farm and is therefore diagnosed 
swiftly. If the ASF virus evolves into a form that causes less severe clinical symptoms 
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and lower mortality than anticipated, the disease may spread freely for a longer time 
than we have assumed. In such a situation, larger outbreaks and consequences are 
possible. Moreover, if the infectivity of ASF increases, larger outbreaks than anticipated 
by our results are possible.
3.6.3 Bluetongue (BT)
In BT simulations, the mean size of an epidemic outbreak (2.3–2.4 infected farms, 
depending on the proportion of re-linking) did not exceed the level of the reference 
simulations for any applied re-linking value (0–1). The mean size of an epidemic 
outbreak did not increase with the proportion of re-linked contacts. Instead, it was 
stable across the simulated range of animal transports between farms (Figures 30 
and 32).
However, the probability of an epidemic outbreak increased along with an increasing 
proportion of re-linked animal transportations. It reached the value of the reference 
simulations (0.24) at a re-linking proportion of 0.75. The highest probabilities of 
epidemic outbreaks were obtained for dairy farms and the lowest for suckler cow 
farms as the starting point of an outbreak (Figure 30). Similarly, the increase in 
the probability of epidemic outbreaks was largest for a dairy farm and lowest for a 
suckler cow farm as the starting point of an outbreak (Figure 31).
The CV of the epidemic outbreak size (0.32–0.43, depending on the level of re- 
linking) did not show a clear pattern in relation to the level of re-linked contacts 
(Figure 32) and was lower than in the reference simulations. There were no clear 
differences between farm types in the relative variation.
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Figure 30. The mean size of an epidemic outbreak in BT simulations with the “Baseline 2033” 
scenario. The outbreak has started on a cattle farm and a proportion of semi-connected 
animal transports have been re-linked. Error bars represent the 95% confidence intervals for the 
estimates.
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Figure 31. The probability of an epidemic outbreak in BT simulations with the “Baseline 2033” 
scenario. The outbreak has started on a cattle farm and a proportion of semi-connected 
animal transports have been re-linked. Error bars represent the 95% confidence intervals for the 
estimates.
Figure 32. The mean size of an epidemic outbreak in BT simulations with the “Baseline 2033” 
scenario. The outbreak has started on a cattle farm and a proportion of semi-connected 
animal transports have been re-linked. Error bars represent the 95% confidence intervals for the 
estimates.
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Figure 33. The coefficient of variation of an epidemic outbreak size in BT simulation with the “Base-
line 2033” scenario. The outbreak has started on a cattle farm and a proportion of semi-connected 
animal transports have been re-linked.
The importance of animal transports appeared to increase between 2009 and 2033. 
In 2033, 75% of all further spread was estimated to be due to animal transports and 
only a quarter due to spatial spread. In 2009, the proportions for both routes were 
quite similar (Figure 34).
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Figure 34. The contribution 
of spatial spread and animal 
transports to further spread 
as modelled in BT simu- 
lations for 2009 and 2033, 
assuming 0.75 re-linking in 
2033.
In the “Baseline 2033” scenario, the number of farms in control zones was estimated 
to decrease to one-third of the value observed in the reference simulations. A similar 
62–65% reduction was observed in the number of non-infected farms in surveillance 
and protection zones (Table 16).
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Table 16. The relationship between the number of BT-infected farms and the number of non- 
infected farms in control, protection and surveillance zones in the “Baseline 2033” scenario. The 
relationship equation is y = a*(number of infected farms)+b, where a and b are regression model 
coefficients. Models are only valid if the number of infected farms is >1. The SE of the coefficient 
is given in parentheses.
Variable y a b R2
Mean number of 
farms for epidemic 
outbreaks (SD)*
Number of farms in 
control zones 46.907 (0.338) -5.380 (0.510) 0.491 100 (58)
Number of farms in 
protection zones 460.401 (3.524) 217.043 (5.421) 0.460 1 276 (543)
Number of farms in 
surveillance zones 204.085 (3.075) 495.370 (4.730) 0.180 1 003 (345)
*Only indicative of variation, as the distribution is highly skewed
3.6.3.1 Discussion, BT
A BT outbreak can be expected to be smaller in the future and the probability of an 
epidemic outbreak is equal or lower than in 2009. Because the relative variation in 
outbreaks decreases, the outcome is more predictable than it was in the reference 
simulations. These findings can be explained by the reduction in the number of farms 
combined with the patterns of BT spread. Furthermore, the increase in farm size does 
not substantially affect the spread of BT.
BT outbreaks were quite insensitive to the re-linking assumptions. Only the proba- 
bility of epidemic outbreak increased when the proportion of re-linked contacts 
increased, whereas the size and the relative variation did not show a clear pattern. It 
can be expected that direct animal contacts will be more relevant in the future and 
spatial spread will be of less importance in defining the size of an outbreak.
The number of non-infected farms in control, protection and surveillance zones is 
clearly smaller due to a decrease in the number of cattle farms in Finland. The 
number of non-infected farms in control and protection zones is more dependent 
on the number of infected farms than is the number of non-infected farms in 
surveillance zones. Surveillance zones are thus less dependent on the dynamics of an 
outbreak and more directly dependent on the farm density in Finland.
Future projections were not spatially varied, which means that the probability of 
farms carrying on or ceasing production was similar across the country. Therefore, 
structural change is expected to be similar across the country, and will not even out 
the existing differences in the spread potentiality of BT.
Vaccination is a possible way to prevent the spread of bluetongue. Vaccination usually 
reduces the infectivity of BT to a level where the disease does not spread efficiently 
(decrease in R0 in cattle farms is 70–83%). Our simulations suggest that vaccination 
is not generally required in Finland. This can be concluded even if vaccination is not 
simulated explicitly, because the probability of an epidemic outbreak and the final 
size of an epidemic outbreak are very small. Even if there would be a larger pulse of 
infected vectors that could infect several farms simultaneously, the conclusion would 
not change. The spread potential in Finland would still be low due to the relatively 
low temperatures and long distances between farms.
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In our simulations, the vector-active season for spread between farms started at mid-
summer. The latent period for spread between farms is long and the detection of 
infected farms is assumed to be difficult. Therefore, two-thirds of the vector-active 
season (90 days per year) may already be over before any risk measure is applied. 
The start of vaccination after the initial detection of the disease will take time. The 
vaccine could take several weeks to become available after the decision to vaccinate. 
The vaccination procedure for a 20-km radius control zone will demand vaccination 
of animals on 100–200 farms. This may take weeks. According to an expert opinion, 
vaccination would be started after at least 3–5 infected farms are found. According to 
the current simulations, this type of scenario is highly unlikely.
The first preventive effects of vaccination could be achieved at the end of vector- 
active season, when they would be of little use in preventing further spread during 
the ongoing season. However, the effects of a vaccination campaign would probably 
appear during the following vector-active season. The results of the future projections 
suggests that due to the lower spread potential of BT in the future, emergency 
vaccination will be an even less feasible risk management measure in preventing the 
spread during the ongoing vector-active season.
In 2015, BT surveillance in Finland will concentrate on blood sampling of cows on 
suckler cow farms. In our simulations, suckler cow farms were the least effective farm 
types in spreading BT, and when this is taken in account, targeting sampling to them 
appears ineffective. However, during the vector-active season, suckler cow farms may 
be as easily infected with BT. The spread of BT mainly occurs during the vector-active 
season. During this season, suckler cows are kept outdoors, probably more than other 
cattle. Therefore, BT surveillance in Finland probably concentrates on farms that are 
“good” at receiving but “poor” at spreading BT. As BT has a low spread potential in 
Finland, this probably has no practical influence and does not reduce the efficiency of 
the surveillance system as a preventive management measure.
We assumed that the latent period for BT (length of the period from the time of 
introduction of virus into the herd to the start of the infective period) is 2 weeks. For 
an individual animal, the incubation period is markedly shorter than the latent period 
in the model (Koeijer et al. 2011). If the function of the model by Turner et al. (2012) 
is applied, which defines how the intra-herd prevalence will develop over time, it 
can be concluded that indirectly our model assumes that the spread between farms 
would require at least a 5–8% intra-herd prevalence of infection.
Our simulation model applies data on BT serotype 8 and the parameterisation is 
based on an outbreak in the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany in 2006 (Koeijer 
et al. 2011, Turner et al. 2012). More recently, BT serotype 4 has been spreading in 
south eastern Europe. There is no information on whether it has similar or different 
biological properties compared to serotype 8. The potential differences between sero-
types may limit the possibilities to generalize the results of this study. If the serotype 
has different properties compared to serotype 8, the outcome could be different. The 
most relevant factors to spread are the infective dose, incubation time, reproduction 
speed and temperature for the replication capability.
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3.7 Simulated economic impacts of the diseases
3.7.1 Reference simulations
Economic losses caused by the three diseases under the 2009 situation varied 
markedly (Table 1 and Appendix 6), among other factors, according to the size of 
the outbreak, the magnitude of trade disruptions and the type and location of the 
primary infected farm. The total economic losses caused by an FMD outbreak in 
Finland were estimated to range from €12 million to €74 million in 95% of the 
cases. In the event of ASF, the range of losses was estimated at €5 to €23 million. 
These results are based on an assumption that exports to non-EU-countries1 would 
be severely disrupted, and the disruptions would last on average as long as it is 
suggested in the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2008), whereas intra-community 
exports would only be disrupted a little. The results are quite sensitive to assump-
tions regarding trade disruptions. If the trade disruptions were 30% more severe than 
assumed above, the total average losses would increase to €31.1 million. Economic 
impacts varied according to stakeholder group. Among three groups (producers, 
consumers, taxpayers), producers were expected to suffer the largest losses, whereas 
consumers could even benefit temporarily due to trade disruptions caused by FMD or 
ASF. In the event of FMD, export losses represented less than 10% of the value of 
exports of agricultural goods in 2009.
In contrast to FMD and ASF, BT is not expected to cause major disruption in the 
markets, because according to the OIE, countries are not recommended to impose 
any restrictions on the trade of animal products. Foreign trade of animals and also 
semen is likely to be distorted due to BT, but since the exporting of live animals from 
Finland is quite marginal, the disease can be expected to have no significant impact 
on livestock markets in Finland. There is some evidence from the past outbreaks 
observed elsewhere in Europe that, for instance, calf prices may be affected by BT 
in some cases. Such effects are, however, mainly related to local restrictions on live 
animal trade or to changes in the supply and demand for calves. In the baseline 
scenario, economic losses caused by a bluetongue were estimated to range from €2.8 
to €9.0 million.
Besides the farm type, the patterns of spread also played a role in determining 
the economic losses. Epidemic FMD outbreaks resulted on average in €32.6 million 
(95% CI 12.7–84.8) in losses, whereas losses caused by sporadic cases remained on 
average at €23.7 million (95% CI 11.5–61.1). In iterations where one or more farms 
were infected by low-risk human contacts, the losses were on average more than €53 
million. Hence, even if these contacts were estimated to spread the disease in only 
very few cases, relevant outbreaks were quite costly. The result is plausible, although 
it may be partly due to an artifact.
In the event of ASF and BT, the differences were less substantial. An epidemic ASF 
outbreak caused on average €12.3 million (95% CI 5.8–29.5) in losses, whereas 
sporadic cases resulted in only €10.0 million (95% CI 4.3–27.0) in losses. Regarding 
BT, the values were €4.8 million (95% CI 2.7–10.9) for an epidemic outbreak and €4.0 
million (95% CI 2.7–6.5) for a sporadic outbreak.
1 The most important non-EU export destination for dairy product exports was Russia. For pig meat 
  exports, the main non-EU destinations included Russia and countries in Asia.
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3.7.2 FMD in the baseline future projections
In the baseline future scenario, the degree to which the contacts are linked between 
farms also impacts on economic losses. Total economic losses on average increased 
from €23.7 to €34.4 million when the proportion of linked contacts increased from 
zero to unity. Linking about 75% of contacts resulted in a similar result to the situa-
tion in the 2009. The volatility of losses also increased when the proportion of linked 
contacts increased. In the baseline scenario, linking 100% of contacts resulted in 95% 
CI ranging from €11.7 to €109.7 million. Although black bars in Figure 35 represent 
the range of variation in losses, they cannot be interpreted to indicate the statistical 
significance of differences between the scenarios. Economic losses to producers on 
average increased from €72.2 to €100 million, benefits to consumers from €54.4 to 
€75.1 million and losses to public funds from €0.8 million to €9.4 million when the 
proportion of linked contacts increased from zero to unity (Figure 35). Hence, direct 
losses in particular could be affected by structural change, although other losses and 
particularly their variation could also be affected.
Figure 35. Simulated economic impacts of an FMD outbreak to producers, consumers, public funds and in total in 
the “Baseline 2033” scenario. Blue bars represent average impacts and black bars represent the range of impacts 
that were simulated occur in 95% of iterations.
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Besides the proportion of linked contacts, the type and location of the primary infected 
farm also affected the results. The results suggested that a farrowing farm as the 
primary infected farm could particularly result in substantial losses. When the propor-
tion of linked contacts increased from zero to unity, losses caused by outbreaks 
starting from a farrowing farm increased from €28.2 (95% CI 12.4–60.0) to €46.0 
million (95% CI 12.8–139.3) on average, and those caused by outbreaks starting from 
a dairy farm increased from €24.0 million (95% CI 11.6–61.3) to €36.4 million (95% 
CI 11.7–142.7) on average. These farm types also had the largest variation in simu-
lated losses when the proportion of linked contacts was high.
The effects of structural change in agriculture on the spread of animal disease in Finland
57
Regionwise, outbreaks starting from either Kuopio or Jyväskylä regions were likely 
to result in more costly outbreaks than on average. This result is most likely related 
to the structure of livestock production in the region. For instance, the Kuopio region 
is well known for a strong emphasis on dairy production. When the proportion of 
linked contacts increased from zero to unity, losses caused by outbreaks starting from 
the Kuopio region increased from €23.9 (95% CI 11.6–61.4) to €39.1 million (95% CI 
39.1–151.9) on average.
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Figure 36. Simulated total economic losses of an FMD outbreak in the “Baseline 2033” scenario 
according to the type of primary infected farm and the proportion of linked contacts (0, 0.5, 0.75 or 
1.0). The bars represent average impacts and black bars represent the range of impacts that were 
simulated occur in 95% of iterations.
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Figure 37. Simulated total economic losses due to an FMD outbreak in the “Baseline 2033” 
scenario according to the location of the primary infected farm and the proportion of linked contacts 
(0, 0.5, 0.75 or 1.0). The bars represent average impacts for each starting point (region) of the 
outbreak.
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3.7.2.1 FMD in alternative future projections
Alternative structural change scenarios result in different economic impacts of an 
FMD outbreak compared to the baseline scenario. In general, the “Fast cattle 2033” 
scenario results in larger and the “Slow pig 2033” scenario in smaller economic losses 
than the “Baseline” scenario. The differences, however, vary according to the type 
of farm. When the proportion of linked contacts was zero in the “Slow pig” scenario, 
outbreaks in which the spread of disease begins from a farrowing farm on average 
resulted in €4.8 smaller losses, while for most other farm types the difference was 
approximately €2 million. When the proportion of linked contacts was 1, the farrowing 
farms resulted in €3.6 million smaller losses in the slow cattle than in the baseline 
projection, whereas for other farm types the differences were less prominent.
Regarding the “Fast cattle” scenario, when the proportion of linked contacts was 1, 
outbreaks starting from farrowing farms resulted in €3.2 million larger losses than in 
the baseline projection. Outbreaks beginning from cattle farms resulted in approxi- 
mately €1.5 to €2.5 million larger losses than in the baseline projection. Hence, 
cattle farms and piglet production were expected to face a larger risk than in the 
baseline projection.
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Figure 38. Simulated total economic losses due to an FMD outbreak in the “Baseline”, “Slow pig” 
and “Fast cattle” future scenarios according to the type of the primary infected farm when the pro-
portion of linked contacts is 0. The bars represent average impacts for each starting point (farm 
type) of outbreak.
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Figure 39. Simulated total economic losses due to an FMD outbreak in the “Baseline”, “Slow pig” 
and “Fast cattle” future scenarios according to the type of the primary infected farm when the 
proportion of linked contacts is 1. The bars represent average impacts for each starting point (farm 
type) of outbreak.
As the importance of cost parameters and trade may change in the future, we also 
conducted analyses regarding cost parameters and trade impacts. Figure 40 presents 
the total economic losses due to an FMD outbreak according to the type of the 
primary infected farm when the proportion of linked contacts is 0.75 in the baseline 
future and in three alternative scenarios in which the level of direct costs is increased 
by 50%, the duration of trade disruptions is increased by 3 months on average or the 
magnitude of distorted trade is increased by 50% from the baseline scenario. A 50% 
increase in the level of direct cost parameters increased the total costs on average by 
5–10%. The largest increase was simulated for outbreaks starting from dairy farms. 
These parameters increased the variation in losses particularly in the cattle sector.
If the impact of FMD on trade distortions was 50% larger than assumed in the base-
line scenario (but their duration did not change), the losses were simulated to 
increase by 40–51% on average. In this scenario, the most substantial increase was 
simulated for the scenario in which a finishing pig farm was the starting point of the 
outbreak. However, the variation in losses increased the most in outbreaks starting 
from dairy or finishing beef cattle farms. Finally, when the duration of trade 
distortions was increased on average by 3 months from the baseline, but their impact 
otherwise remained at the level of the baseline scenario, the simulated losses 
increased on average by 56–73% from the baseline future scenario. In this scenario, 
the most substantial increases were simulated for outbreaks in which a pig farm was 
the starting point. However, in this case, the variation in losses also increased the most 
in outbreaks starting from dairy or finishing beef cattle farms. In general, changes 
in economic parameters increased the variation in losses, particularly in outbreaks 
starting from the dairy sector, which may reflect the diversity of the sector.
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Figure 40. Simulated total economic losses due to an FMD outbreak according to the type of the 
primary infected farm when the proportion of linked contacts is 0.75 in the baseline future and 
in three alternative scenarios in which the level of direct costs is increased by 50%, the duration 
of trade disruptions is increased by 3 months on average or the magnitude of distorted trade is 
increased by 50% from the baseline scenario.
3.7.2.2 Discussion, FMD, economic
In the baseline scenario for 2009, the total economic losses caused by an FMD 
outbreak in Finland were simulated to range from €11.6 million to €74.4 million in 
95% of the cases. On average, the losses were simulated at €27.7 million under the 
farm structure in 2009. For the future baseline scenario, quite similar figures were 
simulated, but losses exceeding €100 million were more likely than in 2009. These 
results are based on an assumption that exports to non-EU-countries would be 
severely disrupted and the disruptions would last on average as long as is suggested 
in the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code, whereas intra-community exports would 
only temporarily be disrupted. The results only include impacts on the pig and 
cattle sectors, because impacts on small ruminants were not estimated. Given the 
small sheep and goat populations in Finland and the relatively modest production 
quantity of the small ruminant sector, these impacts were expected to be on average 
small. However, direct costs could be noticeable in a few special cases if a large 
number of sheep and goat farms need to be controlled.
The conclusions based on simulations in which economic aspects are taken into 
account have several similarities with the previously mentioned epidemiology-based 
conclusions, and hence they are repeated here only to the extent that is relevant 
for our discussion. Total economic losses on average increased from €23.7 to €34.4 
million when the proportion of linked contacts increased from zero to unity. In 
general, the results suggest that structural change might only result in small changes 
to losses caused by FMD outbreaks if the proportion of re-linked contacts is 0.5–0.75. 
However, this conclusion is very sensitive to the scenario assumption. The losses may 
increase or decrease depending on the proportion of re-linked contacts. The larger 
the proportion of re-linked contacts, the larger are the economic losses an outbreak 
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can cause and the more variation there is between different outbreaks. Although 
economic impacts of re-linking are to some extent smaller than from an epidemio-
logical basis only, it is very important that structural change is controlled so that risks 
related to the contact structure of livestock farms are reduced.
As in the case of 2009 simulations, future projections also showed large differences 
in losses between stakeholder groups. The majority of direct costs are covered by 
public funds. In relative terms, direct costs were impacted more severely by structural 
change than indirect costs. Direct costs and their variation were also highly sensitive 
to assumptions regarding the proportion of re-linked contacts. Among three groups 
(producers, consumers, taxpayers), producers were estimated to suffer the largest 
losses. These losses are mainly caused by assumed trade disruptions, because 
disruptions in exports can quickly result in oversupply in the domestic markets, as 
livestock products cannot be exported either at all or not to conventional trade part-
ners. Hence, producer prices tend to fall, and since production cannot be adjusted 
instantaneously as much as would be needed, producers face quite large losses. The 
average loss per farm increased substantially by 2033 because of the increased farm 
size. By contrast, consumers were estimated to benefit temporarily from an outbreak, 
but the benefit per individual consumer is quite small.
The results suggest that if the structural change in the pig sector slowed down, it 
could result in smaller losses in the future. By contrast, more rapid structural change 
in either the pig or the cattle sector would be expected to increase the costs of risk 
associated with an FMD outbreak. However, the impacts may vary according to the 
type of farm. The results suggest that the rate of structural change could have the 
largest impact on outbreaks starting from farrowing farms. Hence, it would be 
advisable to pay attention to the development of piglet production, including the 
concentration of piglet production in fewer farms.
Besides structural changes in the farming business, it is also important how markets 
will change. If the costs of controlling FMD increase in the future, this may have the 
largest impact on outbreaks starting from farrowing, dairy or beef cattle farms. In the 
future, animal health may become a more important criterion for countries willing to 
control their foreign trade. If the importance of trade increases, it is likely to have a 
major impact on the risks caused by FMD. Uncertainty concerning the losses caused 
by dairy farms can increase. Hence, the results suggest that change in the structure of 
dairy farming is of economic concern when the risks of FMD are considered. Both the 
duration and the magnitude of trade distortions are important. From the policy point 
of view, it would therefore be important to prepare approaches to mitigate trade 
distortions, such as arguments to reduce distortions, methods to control and prove 
that the production is of low risk, and the capacity to increase trade with markets that 
may remain open.
3.7.3 ASF in future projections
In the baseline future scenario, the total economic losses due to an ASF outbreak 
range on average from €10.5 to €11.5 million, depending on the proportion of linked 
contacts. Hence, the losses are close to the numbers simulated for the 2009 situa-
tion. However, about 95% of simulations are between €5 and €25 million. Producers’ 
losses increase slightly when the proportion of linked contacts increases. However, in 
relative terms, the costs to public funds increase more than other cost items and their 
variation also increases (Figure 41).
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The economic impacts of ASF varied to some extent according to the type of the 
primary infected farm. In future projections, simulated losses tended to increase in 
piglet-producing farms, even if the proportion of linked contacts was close to zero. 
Under the “Slow pig” scenario, the increase was smaller than under the baseline 
scenario. For a farrowing farm as the primary infected farm, the expected increase in 
the costs was approximately €1 million, whereas for other farm types the increase 
was smaller. The range of variation in losses also slightly increased. By contrast, when 
the proportion of linked contacts approached unity, when a farrowing-to-finishing 
farm was the primary infected farm, the increase was on average less than €1 
million, whereas a farrowing farm as the primary infected farm increased the costs 
on average by about €2–4 million (Figure 42). In the latter case, and under the base-
line future projection, the range within 95% of simulated losses was situated also 
increased to €5.4–33.5 million (as compared to €4.5–27.5 million under the 2009 
situation).
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Figure 41. Simulated economic impacts of an ASF outbreak for producers, consumers, public funds and in total in 
the “Baseline 2033” scenario. Blue bars represent average impacts and black bars represent the range of impacts 
that were simulated occur in 95% of iterations.
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Figure 42. Simulated total economic losses due to an ASF outbreak in the “Baseline” and “Slow 
pig” future scenarios and under the 2009 situation according to the type of the primary infected 
farm when the proportion of linked contacts is 0 or 1. The bars represent average impacts for each 
starting point (farm type) of the outbreak.
As the importance of cost parameters and trade may change in the future, we also 
conducted analyses regarding cost parameters and trade impacts. Figure 43 presents 
the total economic losses due to an ASF outbreak according to the type of the 
primary infected farm when the proportion of linked contacts is 0.75 in the baseline 
future and in three alternative scenarios in which the level of direct costs is increased 
by 50%, the duration of trade disruptions is increased by 3 months on average or the 
magnitude of distorted trade is increased by 50% from the baseline scenario. A 50% 
increase in the level of direct cost parameters increased the total costs on average by 
less than 5%.
If the impact of ASF on trade distortions was 50% larger than assumed in the baseline 
scenario, but their duration did not change, the losses were simulated to increase by 
42–45% on average and depending on the type of the primary infected farm. In this 
scenario, the most substantial increase was simulated for a piglet-producing farm as 
the starting point of the outbreak. In addition, the variation in losses was increased 
substantially. Finally, when the duration of trade distortions was increased on average 
by 3 months from the baseline, but otherwise their impact remained at the level of 
the baseline scenario, simulated losses increased on average by 60–73% from the 
baseline future scenario. In this scenario, the most substantial increases were simu-
lated  for outbreaks in which a finishing pig farm was the starting point. In this case, 
the variation in losses also increased substantially, as the largest simulated losses 
were more than €50 million per outbreak (Figure 43). In general, changes in economic 
parameters increased the variation in losses, particularly in outbreaks starting from 
the dairy sector, which may reflect the diversity of the sector.
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Figure 43. Simulated total economic losses due to an ASF outbreak according to the type of the 
primary infected farm when the proportion of linked contacts is 0.75 in the baseline future and in 
three alternative scenarios in which the level of direct costs is increased by 50%, the duration of 
trade disruptions is increased by 3 months on average or the magnitude of distorted trade is 
increased by 50% from the baseline scenario.
3.7.3.1 Discussion, ASF, economic future projections
In the reference scenario for 2009, economic losses caused by an ASF outbreak 
to Finnish society in total were estimated at €10.5 million (95% CI 4.6–22.7). The 
proportion of public funds used to cover losses was on average only €0.4 million (0.1–
1.1). In the baseline future scenario, the total economic losses due to an ASF outbreak 
were at the same level, ranging on average from €10.5 to €11.5 million, depending 
on the proportion of linked contacts. Hence, the losses were close to the numbers 
estimated for the 2009 situation, but the range of variation increased slightly. 
However, in relative terms, the costs to public funds increased more than other cost 
items, and their variation also increased. Under the “Slow pig” scenario, the increase 
was smaller than under the “Baseline” scenario.
The results suggest that ASF was economically less affected by the changes in the 
contact structure than FMD. In the future scenarios, farrowing farms also played an 
important role as the farm type leading to the most costly outbreaks. Hence, improving 
biosecurity and the contact structure of piglet production is also advisable from an 
ASF point of view. As the importance of cost parameters and trade may change in the 
future, it is important to be prepared for larger outbreaks. The authorities could 
prepare contracts and contingency plans for how to undertake official and other miti-
gative measures in the future so that society would be prepared to respond promptly 
to disease outbreaks. This would also help to control directs costs paid by taxpayers.
By contrast, the results suggested that ASF losses in future scenarios were more 
affected by possible changes in the role of trade distortions than in the case of FMD. 
Contingency planning is also important from the market point of view. Regarding ASF, 
the duration of trade distortions seems to be particularly important. This is partly due 
to our modelling approach, but also partly due to the structure of pig meat trade. The 
potentially increasing importance and severity of trade distortions associated with 
ASF outbreaks can substantially increase both the expected losses and uncertainty 
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concerning the losses faced by different stakeholders. Hence, as in the event of FMD, 
society and the livestock sector should be prepared to mitigate both trade distortions 
and disease spread.
3.7.4 BT in future projections
Unlike FMD and ASF, BT is not expected to cause major disruption in the markets, 
because according to the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code, countries are not recom-
mended to impose any restrictions on the trade of animal products in case of a BT 
outbreak. Foreign trade of live animals is likely to be disrupted, but since the expor-
tation of live animals from Finland is quite marginal, the disease can be expected to 
have no or an insignificant impact on livestock markets in Finland. There is some 
evidence from past outbreaks observed elsewhere in Europe that, for instance, calf 
prices may be affected by BT in some cases. The prices of live young sheep could also 
be affected. Such effects are, however, mainly related to local restrictions in live 
animal trade or to changes in the supply and demand for calves.
In the future scenario, losses caused by BT were estimated to decrease when 
compared to the 2009 situation. While under the 2009 situation the losses were 
simulated on average at €4.7 million, in the baseline future scenario they were simu-
lated to be only €2.8 million (95% CI €2.3–6.3 million). Eradication and surveillance 
costs (“programme costs”) were simulated to fall by about 50%, whereas produc-
tivity losses were simulated to fall by less than 20% (Figure 44). The reduction was 
simulated mainly because of the decrease in the number of farms and animals. A 
substantial proportion of programme costs was associated with the number of farms 
concerned rather than their size. Hence, a reduction in the number of farms, while 
the average farm size increases, results in a proportional reduction in the costs. The 
simulated average losses ranged from €2.5 million to €2.9 million when the propor-
tion of linked contacts was increased from zero to unity. Hence, the linking of contacts 
did not have a major impact on estimated losses.
Regarding the losses caused by BT, essential factors are the extent to which farms are 
tested and monitored, which measures are taken to prevent the spread of the 
disease in the zones, and how large different zones are. A large proportion of losses are 
related to monitoring and surveillance carried out to determine whether BT still exists 
in the country. However, the magnitude and practical implementation of these 
measures can have a substantial impact on the losses. In practice, BT should spread 
into a completely new region before direct losses due to BT would increase substan-
tially. Farm size and procedures taken to combat BT also matter. If restrictions are 
imposed on farm operations within the zones, their economic impacts can be large 
because the zones are quite large.
In the current situation and in the current future projections, the results do not 
suggest that vaccination against BT would be a preferred option. This is mainly due to 
two reasons: Firstly, the zones are large and the number of vaccinated farms would 
most likely be so large that the procedure would in most cases be more costly than 
potential savings due to a reduced number of infections. Secondly, quite a large 
proportion of losses are related to the measures to prove that the country is disease-
free. Hence, vaccination would have only a small impact on the losses, as these are 
mostly unavoidable after the disease has been introduced into the country. However, 
if the disease increased mortality and reduced productivity on infected farms, this 
could increase the importance of mitigation measures. A similar change in emphasis 
could be possible if BT affected the trade in animal products in the future.
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Figure 44. Simulated economic losses due to a BTF outbreak in the 2009 situation and in the 
“Baseline” future scenario (the proportion of linked contacts is 0.75).
3.7.4.1 Discussion, BT, economic future projections
The results suggest that in the future, losses caused by BT may decrease when 
compared to the 2009 situation. While under the 2009 situation the losses were simu- 
lated on average at €4.7 million, in the baseline future scenario they were simu- 
lated at only €2.8 million (95% CI €2.3–6.3 million). The size of a BT outbreak was 
estimated to be usually quite small. The results suggest that the losses caused by BT 
are strongly dependent on the extent of surveillance and monitoring measures taken 
in the country, because the number of farms and geographical area covered can be 
quite large. In addition, they are strongly dependent on the additional costs, produc-
tion distortions and reduced productivity impacts of the disease.
The results suggest that surveillance-related costs may decrease in the future, mainly 
because the number of farms is decreasing. A substantial proportion of “programme 
costs” was associated with the number of farms concerned rather than their size. 
Hence, this conclusion is conditional on surveillance and monitoring costs being non-
linearly dependent on farm size, i.e. costs per farm do not increase as much as farm 
size. The costs of BT were also not as closely related to the future contact structure as 
were losses estimated for ASF and FMD. Hence, regarding the future, it is important to 
optimize the efficiency of surveillance and monitoring associated with BT. In addition, 
climate change and structural change in the livestock sector can increase the losses 
faced by livestock producers. In any case, losses per farm can be expected to increase 
in the future. Hence, it might be important to develop measures that protect herds as 
entities and prevent the spread of disease within the farm.
Unlike FMD and ASF, BT is not expected to cause major disruption in the markets. 
However, if the disease was persistent, there could be economic impacts on the trade 
in live animals within the country. Due to globalization, these impacts on the Finnish 
livestock sector may be more prominent in the future than they are currently.
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3.8 Risk management in the future
3.8.1 Changes in biosecurity measures due to increased farm size
An increase in the average farm size affects the implementation frequency of several 
biosecurity measures. Increased use was predicted for 9 out of 17 studied biosecurity 
measures on at least one farm type. In the pig sector, 7 biosecurity measures were 
predicted to be in more frequent use on average-sized farms in the baseline scenario 
of 2033. In the cattle sector, an increase was predicted in the use of 8 different 
biosecurity measures.
The most obvious increases in the use of biosecurity measures in the pig sector were 
involved with using leak-proof containers for dead animals, keeping doors locked and 
arranging the production facilities into compartments. Increased implementation of 
biosecurity measures concerning visitors was also predicted. Loading areas are likely 
to be more common on average-sized farrowing and finishing farms in the future and 
the biosecurity aspects of traffic are probably taken in greater account on average-
sized finishing farms. Average-sized finishing farms are expected to increase the use 
of biosecurity measures more than average-sized farms of other types in the pig 
sector (Table 17).
In the cattle sector, improvements in the implementation of biosecurity measures on 
average-sized farms were predicted to mainly be introduced on dairy farms. The use 
of 8 biosecurity measures was predicted to become more frequent. Average-sized 
dairy farms are expected to have a higher implementation frequency of measures 
targeted towards visitors. Boots and coveralls will presumably be offered more often 
in the future. Biosecurity will probably be more often taken into account when 
organising farm traffic. Even compartmentalisation, the use of loading areas and the 
use of hygiene barriers can be expected to be more frequently applied on average- 
sized dairy farms in 2033 than in 2009. By comparison, we estimated that on 
average-sized beef cattle farms, none of the biosecurity measures would be imple-
mented more frequently than in 2009, and only 3 measures were estimated to be 
implemented more frequently on suckler cow farms (Table 17).
An increase in the average farm size was predicted to have no impact on the 
frequency of hand washing, washing of loading areas, cleaning of animal stables 
between batches or control of rodents and birds. On dairy farms, however, an increasing 
average size of the farm had a negative effect on the implementation frequency of 
the prevention of rodents and birds at the feeding table of the animal shelter.
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Table 17. Implementation of biosecurity measures in 2033 in the baseline scenario. Coefficients from the GLM 
models are transformed into likelihoods for the implementation of biosecurity measures on average-sized pig and 
cattle farms in Finland based on a questionnaire survey among farmers [% (±95% CI)]; see Appendix 4 and Sahl-
ström et al. (2014). Estimates in black are derived from a model in which the farm size effect was statistically 
significant and was not within the 95% confidence limit of typical-sized farms in 2009. Estimates in grey are from 
a model in which there was no statistically significant farm size effect and/or the estimate overlaps with the 95% 
confidence limit of a typical-sized farm of year 2009.
Variable description
Pig farm type Cattle farm type
Farrowing Farrowing-to- finishing Finishing Dairy 
Beef 
cattle
Suckler 
cow
The farmer and his family use 
protective clothing in the stables 99 (±1) 88 (±9) 92 (±6) 67 (±5) 67 (±7) 72 (±11)
The farmer and his family use 
boots or protective shoes in the 
stables
87 (±12) 80 (±11) 92 (±6) 71 (±5) 60(±7) 62(±12)
Visitors use protective clothing 
(coveralls) 95 (±7) 88 (±9) 93 (±6) 75 (±5) 46 (±8) 41(±12)
Visitors use boots 80 (±16) 91 (±7) 90 (±7) 84 (±4) 57 (±8) 78 (±10)
The farmer and his family wash 
their hands after working in the 
stable 
71(±24) 95 (±6) 89 (±8) 92 (±3) 86 (±5) 86 (±8)
Visitors wash their hands after the 
visit 64 (±22) 76 (±12) 73 (±12) 65 (±5) 46 (±7) 43 (±12)
The use of a barrier that separates 
the clean area from the dirty area 
and that is not passed without 
changing protective clothing and 
shoes.
59 (±20) 43 (±15) 33 (±13) 21 (±4) 10 (±5) 9 (±6)
The use of a separate loading area 94 (±6) 83 (±11) 54 (±14) 12 (±3) 2 (±2) 7 (±5)
Washing the loading area after use 42 (±20) 47 (±14) 31(±12) 3 (±1) 2 (±1) 3 (±3)
Outside the animal stables there 
is a leak-proof container for dead 
animals
90 (±9) 85 (±10) 88 (±8) 1 (±1) 0 (±1) 0 (±1)
The animal stables are cleaned 
between each “batch” 50 (±20) 55 (±14) 85 (±9) 18 (±4) 50 (±8) 24 (±10)
Doors are locked 78(±16) 68 (±13) 79(±11) 14 (±4) 16 (±6) 8 (±6)
Animals are divided into  
compartments 96(±5) 77 (±12) 80 (±11) 29 (±5) 29 (±8) 32(±11)
The traffic on the farm is 
organized so that biosecurity 
aspects are taken into account
57 (±20) 60 (±14) 55 (±14) 49 (±6) 26 (±8) 45 (±12)
Control of rodents and birds 96 (±7) 91 (±8) 99(±2) 80(±4) 79 (±7) 78(±10)
Control of rodents and birds in the 
animal stable or shelter at the 
feeding table
37 (±20) 60(±14) 59 (±13) 43 (±5) 38 (±7) 12 (±3)
Control of rodents and birds in the 
feed storage 54 (±20) 75(±12) 74 (±12) 36(±5) 35 (±7) 29 (±10)
A statistically significant effect of farm size is marked as follows: ***<0.001, **<0.01 and *<0.05. Average-sized farms 
in the model: farrowing = 1 562, farrowing-to-finishing = 1 567, finishing = 1 734, dairy = 133, beef cattle = 72, suckler 
cow = 169 animals. Note: these refer to the mean number of animals on the original scale in the baseline scenario of 
2033. The models apply ln-transformed size and are as reported in Sahlström et al. (2014).
The effects of structural change in agriculture on the spread of animal disease in Finland
69
Table 18. Indicative forecast for the change in the implementation frequency of biosecurity measures on average-
sized farms in the baseline scenario for 2033 when compared to the implementation frequency of average-sized 
farms in 2009
Variable description
Pig farm type Cattle farm type
Farrowing Farrowing-to- finishing Finishing Dairy 
Beef 
cattle
Suckler 
cow
The farmer and his family use 
protective clothing in the stables
The farmer and his family use 
boots or protective shoes in the 
stables
+
Visitors use protective clothing 
(coveralls) + ++ +
Visitors use boots + + + ++
The farmer and his family wash 
their hands after working in the 
stable 
Visitors wash their hands after the 
visit 
The use of a barrier that separates 
the clean area from the dirty area 
and that is not passed without 
changing protective clothing and 
shoes.
+
The use of a separate loading area ++ ++ +
Washing the loading area after use
Outside the animal stables there 
is a leak-proof container for dead 
animals
++ ++ +
The animal stables are cleaned 
between each “batch” 
Doors are locked ++ + +
Animals are divided into  
compartments ++ + ++ +
The traffic on the farm is 
organized so that biosecurity 
aspects are taken into account
+ ++ +
Control of rodents and birds
Control of rodents and birds in the 
animal stable or shelter at the 
feeding table
-
Control of rodents and birds in the 
feed storage
Symbols: - = reduction less than 10%; + = increase less than 20%; ++ = increase over 20%
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Table 19. Implementation of biosecurity measures in 2033 in the baseline scenario. Coefficients from the GLM 
models are transformed into likelihoods for the implementation of biosecurity measures on average-sized pig and 
cattle farms in Finland based on a questionnaire survey among farmers [% (±95% CI)]; see Appendix 4 and Sahl-
ström et al. (2014). Estimates in black are derived from a model in which the farm size effect was statistically 
significant and was not within the 95% confidence limit of typical-sized farms in 2009. Estimates in grey are from 
a model in which there was no statistically significant farm size effect and/or the estimate overlaps with the 95% 
confidence limit of a typical-sized farm of year 2009.
Variable description
Pig farm type Cattle farm type
Farrowing Farrowing-to- finishing Finishing Dairy 
Beef 
cattle
Suckler 
cow
Follow the instructions of ETT 100 (±1) 85 (±13) 95 (±7) 96(±3) 85 (±6) 93 (±7)
Checking the origins of animals 
before buying 92 (±12) 53 (±20) 52 (±16) 90 (±5) 38 (±9) 91 (±8)
Requiring a health certificate 45 (±30) 40 (±20) 20 (±14) 67(±7) 11 (±6) 75 (±12)
before buying 96(±11) 93 (±10) 90 (±9) 90(±4) 62 (±10) 88(±9)
Trying to buy animals from 
as small a number of farms 
as possible
94(±11) 86(±14) 78 (±12) 65(±8) 50 (±9) 61 (±14)
Buying animals mainly from the 
same farms 53 (±17) 37 (±20) 10(±9) 38(±8) 39 (±9) 11 (±10)
Transport animals using own 
vehicle 92 (±13) 82(±14) 95(±6) 26(±7) 87(±6) 73(±12)
Animals are handled by a 
slaughterhouse 51(±14) 35(±18) 10(±9) 25(±7) 42(±9) 37(±15)
3.8.2 Protective measures associated with animal trading
Protective measures associated with animal trading were not highly correlated with 
farm size in our questionnaire data. Thus, predictions of implementations based on 
farm size are only slightly affected. Requiring a health certificate when purchasing 
animals and the aim to buy animals from as small a number of farms as possible are 
predicted to remain at the level of 2011, even if the average farm size is expected 
to increase. Average-sized beef cattle and farrowing-to-finishing farms are expected 
to retain protective measures on the level of average-sized farms in 2011. Average-
sized farms of other types may show an improvement potential in the implementa-
tion of 1–2 measures. The difference in the pattern of protective measures between 
the pig and cattle sectors is also expected to remain the same, regardless of the 
increase in farm size (Table 19).
In the pig sector, average-sized farrowing farms appear to increase the frequency of 
checking the origins of animals before buying and transporting them in their own 
vehicles. Average-sized finishing farms try to buy animals from the same farms more 
frequently than in 2011. Average-sized dairy farms may apply quarantine of 
purchased animals more often than in 2011.  Average-sized suckler cow farms 
purchase animals more often from slaughterhouse animal trading, and the purchased 
animals are less frequently transported in vehicles owned by the farms themselves 
(Table 19).
The probability of a typical-sized farm buying animals according to the questionnaire: farrowing = 69%, farrowing-
to-finishing = 68%, finishing = 93%, dairy = 33%, beef cattle = 92% and suckler cow = 74% in 2011. Predictions that 
deviate from the mean of average-sized farms of that farm type in 2011 by more than 2 standard errors are marked 
in black, while others are marked in grey. 
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3.8.3 Discussion, biosecurity and protective measures
Our forecast for the implementation of biosecurity measures in the future is based 
on the projected changes in the average farm size. Numerous other factors may 
influence the frequencies of implementation. Therefore, the results must be 
considered only as a possible scenario that may be realized. However, economic 
factors, changes in the overall disease situation in Finland and legislation, as well as 
the future prospects and motivation of farmers will affect the implementation of 
biosecurity measures in Finnish pig and cattle farms in the future. The costs and 
realized benefits of the measures will also play a role.
A positive effect on the implementation frequency in relation to farm size can be 
thought as an indication of an existing economic or other incentive that is positively 
correlated with the farm size. According to our results, farm size-related incentives 
appeared to cover 23–70% of the studied biosecurity measures, depending on the 
farm type.
Even though the implementation of some biosecurity measures did not correlate 
with farm size at the time of our questionnaire, it does not mean that an incentive 
leading to an improvement in biosecurity with increasing farm size cannot be found. 
One of the options could be to strengthen economic incentives and impose condi-
tions on possible support payments to farms such that increased implementation of 
biosecurity measures would be required from enlarging farms. If improvements in 
biosecurity cannot be achieved through farm-size-related incentives, other moti- 
vating factors should be considered.
Many livestock farms will exit the industry by 2033. Exiting farms will predominantly 
be small farms that do not invest in new production facilities and infrastructure. If 
improvements are focused on those farms that continue and invest in new produc-
tion capacity, they can cover a substantial proportion of future livestock production.
Another argument that can be presented when targeting the improvements in 
biosecurity measures is that small farms have more to improve than large farms. The 
costs of biosecurity measures may limit the introduction of costly biosecurity 
measures, particularly on small farms (Niemi et al. 2015). Small farms and especially 
hobby farms may also be a potential group for introducing new diseases into the 
country. They may be less familiar with the laws and regulations than large farms. 
Hence, efforts should also be targeted at these farms.
However, small farms are usually less connected with other farms, especially with 
large professional farms. Small farms are also more likely to end production, and 
the investments do not therefore necessarily provide as permanent an improvement 
in the biosecurity conditions of the country as they do on large farms. In summary, 
small farms may have a large amount of improvement potential related to bio- 
security measures, but improvement may be more difficult to achieve and they 
may be less efficient in relation to the production volume than if the same effort is 
targeted towards larger farms. Highly connected farms would be an obvious group for 
targeted incentives in order to improve the overall biosecurity level. These farms are 
not necessarily the largest farms in the country, although farm size and connectivity 
with other farms generally correlate positively. In the pig sector, one of the most 
efficient groups in spreading a disease is elite breeding and multiplying herds (Raulo & 
Lyytikäinen 2006). Sow pools and multi-site pig farms were also efficient in spreading 
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diseases in the present study. In the cattle sector, the most effective group was the 
weaner calf farms. Hence, it may be advised to promote biosecurity measures that 
are related to animal transports in these farm groups.
Generalized linear models (Appendix 4) indicated 24 farm-size-dependent effects in 
implementation frequencies in the pig sector and 22 in the cattle sector. Half of the 
effects in the cattle sector and 58% of those in the pig sector were so large that the 
prediction for typical-sized farms in 2009 and 2033 clearly deviated (by at least 2 
standard errors). Only one decline in implementation frequency was large enough to 
be considered relevant (Table 18). Changes appeared to be the smallest on beef 
cattle farms, as was also the predicted increase in farm size.
A farm size increase may also lead to minor improvements in the implementation 
frequency of measures that are not strongly dependent on farm, because the farm 
size range is larger than the change in an average-sized farm. Although the practical 
importance of this change is smaller, it probably has some relevance in determining 
the spread potential in the country as a whole.
In the pig sector, factors such as the locking the doors of the animal shelter, the use 
of containers for the storage of dead animals and the use of compartments within the 
production units showed clear farm-size dependence. These measures are relevant 
for the protection of pig farms. According to our results, their implementation will be 
more prevalent in the future. In the cattle sector, most improvements were related to 
visitors. In the future, the use of boots or coveralls as protective clothing will become 
more common than today. On cattle farms, traffic-related arrangements will also be 
more frequently applied in the future. Moreover, it is not rational to apply certain pig 
sector biosecurity measures in the cattle sector.
This raises some concerns that the use of protective measures related to animal 
trading is not expected to increase much in the future. This may partly be a result of 
the outsourcing of animal trading to slaughterhouse companies reducing the control 
of farmers regarding the purchasing of pigs. It is also possible that risk management 
is presently too concentrated on biosecurity measures. Direct animal contact is 
always a potential route for disease spread. The low prevalence and occurrence of 
animal diseases in Finland may have led to a situation where the risks related to 
animal trading within the country are overlooked. Some indications for this can be 
seen in the implementation frequencies reported in the questionnaire. For instance, 
internal and external traffic on the farm are separated much more seldom than 
visitors are offered coveralls.
The possibility to concentrate animal purchases in the same farms is lower in the 
cattle sector than in the pig sector. According to our questionnaire, this will not 
improve in the future with an increase in farm size. As farm sizes increase, there may 
be a peak in the demand to fill the added capacity. This period has the potential to 
expose the farm to animal disease risks, and it may have incentives to accept 
animals that are “leftover animals” from several farms. The ability of farms to select 
the source of their incoming animals may be dictated by the availability of animals. 
There should be precautionary plans for how new stock is introduced to farms, and 
what kind of time window and sources to acquire animals are required in order to 
minimise disease risks.
We performed an additional future FMD simulation in which the animal contact 
network was re-organized by taking the spatial distance between farms into account. 
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If all possible animal trading contacts of the farm were linked to those farms within 
a 20 km radius, this was estimated to reduce the mean epidemic outbreak size in the 
future by only 10%. This is partly due to farms being further apart in the future. A 20-
km distance implies that the farms within the 20 km range potentially share at least 
some of the same farms in their restrictive zones (the radius of a protective zone is 
10 km). When any farm is detected as positive, part of the potential contact network 
of other farms within the 20 km range is also put under restrictive measures. The 
decreasing farm density and increasing distance between farms will reduce the 
importance of this spatial risk management strategy.
It was not simulated how much the outcome would be affected if a farm could buy 
animals from or sell to only a limited number of farms. This type of limitation is 
expected to mainly affect the maximum size of an outbreak. It would be a valuable 
limitation if the spread potential of an animal disease in the country was high. 
Under Finnish conditions, such a limitation would at least be effective for weaner 
farms, which seemed to be the subgroup most frequently associated with large 
outbreaks. However, this type of limitation would not offer additional protection 
value to Finnish farms against the spread of FMD, ASF or BT, because the spread 
potential was estimated to be low and spatial risks were limited. If the future is 
different from our baseline scenario and animals are moved substantially more often 
than we estimated, the outcome of such a limitation could be different.
3.8.4 Discussion, official measures during an outbreak in the future
The results suggest that in the future, contact tracing and related risk management 
measures will become more important than they are currently. This is due to 
growing distances between farms, resulting in restrictive zones capturing potentially 
less of the spread. Therefore, it will be increasingly important to collect and store 
information on animal transport contacts in the future. The quality of the data needs 
to be adequate for risk management purposes and it should be stored in an easily 
usable format. Presently, official animal movement databases contain information 
on transactions. Animal transport contacts between farms are constructed from these 
transactions. For this reason, information on cattle movements is not easily paired 
with vehicle movements and routes. This can be partially solved by applying unof-
ficial data sources from the industry. For instance, information from slaughterhouse 
companies may be useful. However, different slaughterhouse companies presumably 
have different systems, and some information may potentially be lost between the 
different systems. The development of official registries focusing on animal move-
ment and contact databases would be costly. A development decision warrants suffi-
cient benefits for the development to be economically feasible.
The increasing importance of contact tracing can be drawn from all of the simulated 
diseases of this study. Even vector-borne diseases may spread more by animal trans-
port than by vector movements in the future, as indicated by our BT results. This high-
lights the importance of ensuring that the available information and tools for tracing 
are efficient.
In the future, culling in connection with an epidemic will become more challenging 
than today. The movement of carcasses to rendering plants will also need to be 
planned more carefully than at present. This is due to the much larger numbers of 
animals and biomass on a farm that will need to be culled and destroyed. Require- 
ments for the rendering and storage capacity would increase in FMD and ASF 
outbreaks due to an increased farm size.
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The potential number of visits by veterinary officers on farms under restrictive meas-
ures in protection and surveillance zones will decrease in the future for a given out-
break size. The number of traced contact farms will increase correspondingly. If these 
farms are visited for the inspection of clinical signs, the number of visits will increase 
accordingly. The total number of farm visits would then remain unchanged but be 
sparser.
For FMD and ASF, the official measures determined by EU regulations also seem to 
be adequate in the future when controlling outbreaks, as the probability of epidemic 
outbreak or a large outbreak did not change substantially in the future scenarios 
when compared to the current situation. The results suggest that in BT outbreaks, the 
culling of positive herds may be a feasible option when compared to emergency 
vaccination. Vaccination could be considered as a longer term strategy (1–2 years) 
for the eradication of the disease. The results do not provide support for emergency 
vaccination as a beneficial policy during an ongoing vector-active season, although it 
may help to limit the spread of BT during the nest vector-active season.
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4 Summary and final conclusions
There is lower risk associated with sheep and goat production and a higher risk 
associated with networked beef and pig production
The aim of this study was to assess how changes in the structure of animal production 
impact on animal disease risks and the economic consequences of diseases. FMD, ASF 
and BT were used as examples to reflect the risks posed by contagious animal diseases 
under current and hypothetical future production structures. The spread of diseases 
and their implications were simulated in three different future production structure 
scenarios and then compared with the results obtained when simulating the produc-
tion structure for the year 2009. In addition, the effects of different production types 
on disease outbreaks in the 2009 structure were simulated.
The simulation results regarding conventional farms such as dairy, beef cattle, 
farrowing, farrowing-to-finishing and finishing pig farms were in line with previous 
research by Lyytikäinen et al. (2011). Hence, we first discuss the roles of other types 
of farms. The data show that in 2009, cattle were the most dominant production type 
in the event of FMD. Typical sheep and goat farms are currently small and they 
represent only less than one per cent of livestock production, as highlighted by Vir-
tanen et al. (2013) and Appendix 2. The results suggest that sheep and goats have a 
minor role when the potential spread of FMD and BT in Finland is considered. Sheep 
and goat farms are less likely to spread the disease to another farm and thus an 
epidemic is less likely, and a possible epidemic is expected to be smaller when a 
sheep or a goat farm is infected than when a cattle or a pig farm is infected. The 
small impact of sheep production suggests that although specialized sheep produc-
tion may increase, it is likely to have quite a modest impact on the risks of the 
evaluated diseases.
In addition, the results suggest that a dairy farm as the starting point of an outbreak 
was able to result in larger outbreaks and larger economic losses than a pig farm. 
However, the variation in outcomes was quite large and individual farms, including 
sheep and goat farms, are able to result in very large outbreaks. Similarly, there are 
situations in which economic losses can soar. The same does not seem to apply to 
BT. However; the BT model had in use less farm-level information than the FMD and 
ASF models.
The results also suggest that in most cases the disease, even if it spreads to other 
farms from the primary infected farm, is contained within the same production sector 
that the primary infected farm represents. This was particularly common when the 
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primary infected farm was a cattle farm, but this result may partly be due to the large 
share of cattle farms among all farms.
Mixed farms having sheep or goats with pigs or cattle are slightly less likely to cause 
an epidemic than specialized cattle or pig farms. Mixed farms are typically smaller 
than an average-sized specialized farm. In addition, on mixed farms having sheep 
and goats, the risk of spreading FMD is mainly caused by pigs and cattle. Increased 
specialization of farms towards a single species may reduce the overall risk of disease 
spread across production sectors. In this sense, specialization may also have provided 
some benefits through animal disease risks. However, even in cases of spread 
towards the cattle sector, the probability of large outbreaks is lower in outbreaks 
originating from sheep or goat farms than in outbreaks that have started from other 
types of farms.
The number of sow pools has decreased during the past decade, whereas multi-site 
pig production and three-stage cattle production may be increasing. The results 
suggest that some specialized production types, particularly multi-sites and sow pools, 
are at risk of causing an epidemic, and a larger epidemic than farms representing 
conventional types of production in the same production sector. In addition, less 
than 30% of further spread remained within these specialized production networks. 
Hence, they also pose a risk to farms not belonging to these networks. Further 
research is warranted on what types of farms are at risk when these networked farms 
are infected. These networked farms require special attention when the targeting of 
surveillance and biosecurity measures is considered. Their importance may partly be 
due to farm size and partly to mixing the production practices of specialized and 
conventional farms, which leads to their contact network being extensive, i.e. the 
systems are not as closed as they could be.
Similar principal results also apply to weaner (beef cattle) farms. They are more likely 
to cause epidemics, and these are larger and more costly epidemics than conven-
tional beef cattle farms. They have a rather high probability of being involved in large 
outbreaks, because they are intensively connected with other farms. From the risk 
management point of view, it is important that other cattle farms do not deliver 
animals to several weaner farms or take animals from several weaner farms, because 
there can be large multiplier effects of disease occurrence.
Farm size to increase substantially in the future
According to our analysis, farm size is likely to increase substantially (by 160–650%) 
in the future.  This means fewer but larger farms taking care of the supply of livestock 
products. The largest increase in farm size was mainly simulated in the pig sector, 
because the future projection is partly based on previous structural development, 
which has been stronger in the pig than in the cattle sector. Because of this, we also 
examined alternative scenarios: the “Slow pig 2033” scenario assumes a smaller 
reduction in the number of farms and a smaller increase in the number of animals 
within the farms, whereas the “Fast cow 2033” scenario assumes a larger reduction 
in the number of cattle farms and a larger increase in the farm size.
Regarding the spread of contagious animal diseases, how contact networks between 
farms will change is critical. According to our simulations, the total number of animal 
movements between farms is likely to decrease in the future, whereas the frequency 
of contacts per farm is expected to increase. This implies that the batch size per 
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animal movement contact will increase. Infrastructure limitations such as the quality 
and carrying capacity of roads and the size and carrying capacity of bridges may limit 
the possibilities to increase the average vehicle size. The development projected in 
our study is quite feasible when compared to the current situation in Sweden (Nöre-
mark et al. 2011) or Denmark. The transportation technology may also change over 
the next two decades so that larger vehicles are available in 2033 than now. This 
study does not present any results for a situation where Finnish animal production 
would operate logistically “less efficiently” than today.
Restructuring of contacts determined how the risk of FMD spread will change
The results suggest that a change in the contact structure is the most critical factor 
determining the risk of disease spread in the future. In our simulations, this was 
related to the proportion of contacts that were re-linked from farms that exit the 
industry by 2033 to the farms that continue production until 2033. The probability 
of an epidemic outbreak may decline in the future, because the probability of an 
epidemic outbreak with 0.50–0.75 re-linking was lower than the probability in the 
reference simulations. The larger the proportion of re-linked contacts, the higher the 
probability of an epidemic outbreak in the pig sector is expected to be. On average, 
pig farms were simulated to result in about 9 and cattle farms in about 13 infected 
farms should an epidemic outbreak occur when the proportion of re-linked contacts 
was 0.75.
It is important to take the farm type into account in the analysis, because the 
proportion of different farm types was projected to change in the future. Both 
economic and epidemiological results suggest large variation in the outcomes in the 
future. The results suggest that the number of cattle per infected farm can be expected 
to increase by 110–370%. If the primary infected farm is a pig farm, the number of 
pigs in infected farms will increase from the 2009 structure. Farm types responded 
differently to the re-linking assumption and future scenarios. The proportion of re-
linked contacts impacted more strongly on the size of an outbreak starting from 
cattle than from pig farms. When compared to the 2009 structure, the probability 
of an epidemic outbreak affected dairy farms more than suckler cow or beef cattle 
farms. Although the probability of an epidemic outbreak could even decrease from 
the 2009 situation, epidemic outbreaks on average were predicted to be larger in the 
future if a high proportion were re-linked. Variation in outbreak size also increased. 
Hence, the results suggest that dairy farms are particularly likely to cause large 
outbreaks in the future. By contrast, the results suggest that farrowing farms are particularly 
likely to result in an epidemic outbreak unless a very small proportion of contacts is re-linked. 
The results also suggest that farrowing farms are likely to be more capable of spreading 
FMD in the future than finishing farms. These results are realistic, because the average 
batch size of an animal transportation in the cattle sector is only 2–3 animals, whereas 
the batch size of a typical pig transportation is much larger. Hence, there are more 
possibilities to control for the animal transport batch size in the cattle than in the pig 
sector, and hence to control for the risk of disease spread.
For instance, if the batch size is assumed to increase to 150% of that in the year 2009, 
the average outbreak size is reduced by 28–52% and is smaller than in the reference 
simulations in all farm types except for farrowing farms. This highlights the impor-
tance of animal transport logistics in defining the spread potential of the future. The 
number of uninfected farms in protection and surveillance zones is anticipated to 
decrease. However, as farm size is expected to increase, the total number of animals 
in restriction zones will remain close to the 2009 situation.
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Economic losses due to FMD become less predictable
In the baseline scenario for 2009, the total economic losses caused by an FMD 
outbreak in Finland were simulated to range from €11.6 million to €74.4 million in 
95% of the cases, with a mean loss of €27.7 million. The total economic losses on 
average increased from €23.7 to €34.4 million when the proportion of linked contacts 
increased from zero to unity. Hence, the results suggest that economic losses due to 
FMD might not change dramatically in the future if the proportion of re-linked 
contacts is 0.5–0.75. However, the results also highlighted that economic losses on 
average and their variation were affected by the proportion of re-linked contacts, as 
a higher degree of re-linking increased the losses. Although the economic impacts 
of re-linking seem to be smaller than in the epidemiological results, it is very impor-
tant to control for structural change so that risks related to the contact structure are 
reduced. These results are in line with previous research discussed by Backer et al. 
(2007), which suggests that while the number of farms will decrease, the remaining 
farms could be more efficient in spreading disease.
The assumption regarding trade disruptions is also very critical to the economic losses. 
The baseline results are based on an assumption that exports to non-EU countries 
would be severely disrupted, and the disruptions would last on average as long as it 
is suggested in the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code, whereas intra-community 
exports would be disrupted only temporarily. As in the case of 2009 simulations, 
future projections also showed large differences in losses between stakeholder groups 
and suggested that the producers were the main group suffering economic losses due 
to an FMD outbreak. Disruptions in exports can quickly result in saturated domestic 
markets and falling producer prices. If the importance of trade increases, it is likely to 
have major impact on risks caused by FMD. From the policy point of view, it may be 
important to prepare approaches for mitigating trade distortions, such as arguments 
and methods to control the disease and to prove that the production is of low risk, 
as well as the capacity to increase trade with markets that may remain open. Import 
restrictions set by Russia in 2014 for EU products already suggest that industries can 
suffer substantial losses due to trade disruptions. As the EU is an important seller in 
the international livestock markets, the restrictions have increased the supply of live-
stock products to the EU markets. However, this case also show the flexibility of the 
markets, because, for instance, dairy product exports from the EU to the United States 
and Middle East increased substantially during 2014 (European Commission 2015), 
and the industry has thus been able to reduce the losses by adjusting the marketing.
In relative terms, direct costs mainly covered by public funds were impacted more 
severely by structural change than indirect costs. The culling of animals on infected 
farms can be expected to be more difficult in the future due to increased numbers 
of animals per farm. Hence, more planning will be needed to ensure smooth culling 
and transportation of carcasses to the rendering plant. The need for rendering capacity 
is also expected to increase in both future FMD and ASF outbreaks. However, the 
total number of culled animals may not change dramatically. It is recommended to 
revise the contingency plans by using the largest farms that are currently operating, 
because the number of animals on the largest farms can be used as an example of 
the future capacity requirements related to the culling and rendering capacity of the 
carcasses. Information on contacts and how the information is handled will also 
become more important in the future. This could lead to savings in direct costs, as 
the costs of a traced contact farm are usually lower than the costs of a farm in a 
surveillance or protection zone (Lyytikäinen et al. 2011). If the unit prices of controlling 
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FMD increase in the future, this may have the largest impact on outbreaks starting on 
farrowing, dairy or beef cattle farms. The results suggest that changes in the structure 
of dairy farming, particularly if the changes become more rapid, are of particular 
economic concern when the risks of FMD are considered. By contrast, a possible 
slowing in the rate of change in the pig sector could result in smaller losses in the 
future. As the results suggest the largest impact of structural change on outbreaks 
starting on farrowing farms, it could be beneficial to control the development of 
piglet production, including the concentration of piglet production in fewer farms.
An important aspect related to trade disruptions is that importing countries may not 
follow the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code. Instead, they may enforce import 
restrictions that have heavier consequences than those suggested by our baseline 
scenario. Both the duration and product coverage of restrictions can differ substantially 
from OIE recommendations, as the restrictions are solely decided by the importing 
country. As our sensitivity analysis suggests, more stringent import restrictions can 
cause the losses to soar. It is therefore important that stakeholders take measures to 
build confidence that the Finnish animal health system is able to control the situation. 
Perhaps the most important measures in this respect are the establishment of a 
credible surveillance and monitoring system and rapid response (and contingency 
plans related to the response) to an outbreak, should it occur.
Previous disease outbreaks observed in other countries suggest that the countries 
respond differently to disease news. Countries such as Japan and South Korea may 
impose quite strong measures, whereas some other countries seem to respond with 
fewer restrictions. Russia, which is an important trading country for the Finnish food 
industry, may also have exaggerated responses, as suggested by measures in 2013– 
14 in relation to ASF outbreaks in Poland and Baltic countries. In addition, non- 
disease-related policy issues may also trigger import restrictions, as suggested by the 
measures following the conflict in Ukraine in 2014.
ASF outbreaks to remain quite small
In the 2009 situation, 23% of ASF outbreaks on average were simulated to be 
epidemic outbreaks, and the mean size of epidemic outbreak was 2.6 infected farms. 
These results suggest that with the same re-linking assumption as in FMD (0.5–0.75), 
epidemic ASF outbreaks were on average 2–32% larger in future projections than in 
the 2009 structure for all pig farm types. In addition, there were more animals on 
infected farms in the future baseline scenario than in 2009. The number of animals in 
uninfected farms in restrictive zones can also be expected to be larger in the future. 
As in the case of FMD, farrowing farms had the greatest potential to spread ASF, and 
outbreaks originating from them were the most costly ones. Hence, improving bio-
security and the contact structure of piglet production is also advisable from the ASF 
prevention viewpoint. These results are consistent with the earlier risk assessments 
of CSF and FMD spread in Finland (Raulo & Lyytikäinen 2006; Lyytikäinen et al. 2011).
For 2009, the total economic losses caused by an ASF outbreak to Finland were esti-
mated on average at €10.5 million (95% CI 4.6–22.7), of which public funds covered 
€0.4 million (0.1–1.1). In the baseline future scenario, total economic losses due to 
an ASF outbreak ranged on average from €10.5 to €11.5 million, depending on the 
proportion on linked contacts. Hence, the average losses were estimated to change 
only slightly. These results are also consistent with previous research on CSF and FMD 
(Niemi et al. 2008;  Lyytikäinen et al. 2011).
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Similarly to FMD, the variation in outbreak size and economic losses increased when 
the proportion of re-linked contacts increased. The variation was, however, substan- 
tially smaller in ASF than in FMD simulations, and ASF was less affected by the 
contact structure than FMD. Regarding economic losses, costs to public funds are likely 
to increase more than other cost items, and their variation will also increase. This 
result is related to above-mentioned changes in farm structure. The results suggest 
that the importance of restrictive zones will decrease more for ASF than for FMD in 
the future, and contact tracing will also have relatively higher importance in ASF 
outbreaks than in FMD outbreaks.
In most cases, the domestic pig population seems to be unable to spread ASF to a 
large number of farms, both at present and in the future. However, larger outbreaks 
might be possible if the ASF virus evolves into a form that causes less severe 
clinical symptoms and lower mortality than anticipated, as these will affect the 
detection time, or if the infectivity of ASF increases.
Similarly to FMD, trade disruptions play a major role in determining the economic 
losses caused by an ASF outbreak at present and in the future scenarios. The logic is 
also similar, and similar factors tend to affect the losses caused by ASF and FMD. Trade 
distortions, particularly their duration, seem to be more important in the case of ASF 
than FMD. Even though careful contingency plans to reduce disease spread may not 
have a substantial impact on the epidemic size, they may be necessary to reduce the 
economic losses, as these and other measures taken by authorities may help to 
ensure trade counterparties that the country does not pose a risk to them. This may 
also help to control the direct costs paid by taxpayers. Hence, as in the event of FMD, 
society and the livestock sector should be prepared to mitigate both trade distortions 
and disease spread.
Results suggest limited bluetongue spread
BT outbreaks were typically limited to 1–2 infected farms. In the future, a BT outbreak 
could be smaller and the probability of an epidemic outbreak equal to or lower than 
in 2009. In addition, the variation in outbreaks may decrease. These findings can be 
explained by the reduction in the number of farms combined with the patterns of BT 
spread.
Farm size and the contact structure do not appear to play as large a role in a BT 
outbreak as in an FMD outbreak. Therefore, future changes in the contact structure 
will have only a small impact on BT spread. However, direct animal contacts could 
still be more relevant in the future, because on average there will be longer distances 
between farms, which will reduce the spatial spread. In addition, there will be fewer 
farms in control, protection and surveillance zones in the future. This will directly 
reduce the economic losses. In particular, the number of farms in surveillance zones is 
quite dependent on the farm density in Finland, as the zones are large. Since regional 
differences in structural change were quite small, the results suggest that structural 
change is unlikely to cause large regional differences in the spread of BT.
The results suggest that structural change may reduce the losses caused by BT. Under 
the 2009 situation, the losses were estimated on average at €4.7 million, whereas 
in the baseline future scenario they were reduced to €2.8 million only (95% CI €2.3–
6.3 million). The losses caused by BT are strongly dependent on the extent of sur-
veillance and monitoring measures taken in Finland, because the number of farms 
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and geographical area covered can be quite large. In addition, the losses are strongly 
dependent on the scale of additional costs, production distortions and productivity 
impacts the disease can cause.
A substantial proportion of costs related to monitoring the disease situation were 
associated with the number of farms in the monitored region rather than their size. 
Hence, regarding the future, it is important to optimize the efficiency of surveil-
lance and monitoring measures associated with BT. In addition, climate change and 
structural change in the livestock sector could increase the losses faced by livestock 
producers. Unlike FMD and ASF, BT is not expected to cause major market disruptions. 
However, if the disease is persistent, economic impacts on the trade of live animals 
within Finland could occur.
Vaccination is a possible way to prevent the spread of bluetongue. Vaccination usually 
reduces the infectivity of BT to a level where the disease does not spread efficiently 
(the decrease in R0 in cattle farms is 70–83%). Our simulations suggest that in most 
cases, vaccination is not justified economically or epidemiologically. This can be 
concluded even if vaccination is not simulated explicitly. The probability of an 
epidemic outbreak and its final size are likely to be very small, and losses that could 
be avoided by vaccination are likely to be modest.
In our simulations, the vector-active season for spread between farms started in June. 
The start of vaccination after the initial detection of the disease and the completion 
of vaccination will take time, even several weeks. Therefore, two-thirds of the vector- 
active season may already be over before any risk measure is applied. The first 
preventive effects of vaccination could be achieved at the end of vector-active season. 
Hence, the main effects of a vaccination campaign would probably take place during 
the following vector-active season. The results suggest that in the future, emergency 
vaccination will be an even less likely risk management measure in preventing the 
spread of BT during the ongoing vector-active season.
In 2015, BT surveillance in Finland will concentrate on blood sampling from cows kept 
on suckler cow farms. In our simulations, suckler cow farms were the least effective 
farm type to spread BT. From this narrow perspective, targeting sampling at suckler 
cow farms appears ineffective. However, suckler cows are kept outdoors more than 
other types of cattle. Therefore, BT surveillance in Finland in 2015 is likely to concen-
trate on farms that can effectively receive but not spread BT.
Based on our parameter assumption and applying information from the literature 
(Koeijer et al. 2011, Turner et al. 2012), it can be concluded that indirectly our model 
assumes that the spread between farms would require at least a 5–8 % intra-herd 
prevalence of infection.
Biosecurity is likely to improve
Numerous factors may influence the implementation of biosecurity measures on 
Finnish pig and cattle farms in the future. Economic factors, changes in the overall 
disease situation in Finland and legislation, as well as future prospects and the moti-
vation of producers can affect the implementation of biosecurity measures. The costs 
and realized benefits of the measures also play a role. Furthermore, the farm type 
affects the implementation of biosecurity measures in many ways.
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When farms have insufficient incentives to adopt efficient biosecurity measures, it 
could be possible to use targeted policies. For example, support payments could be 
provided conditional on the adoption of biosecurity, especially by enlarging farms. 
Larger farms usually have higher incentives to adopt biosecurity measures than 
smaller farms. If improvements are concentrated on farms that continue and invest 
in new production capacity, they can cover a substantial proportion of the future live-
stock production. On the other hand, smaller farms usually have a lower biosecurity 
level and hence more to improve than larger farms. However, the costs of biosecurity 
measures may limit the introduction of costly measures, particularly on small farms 
(Niemi et al. 2015). Efforts should also be targeted at these smaller farms, even if 
they usually have fewer contacts with other farms than larger farms have.
Farms having a large number of contacts with other farms are an important 
group concerning the spread of diseases and should be prioritised when targeting 
measures to improve biosecurity. In the pig sector, among the most efficient farms in 
spreading diseases are those with elite breeding and multiplying herds (Raulo & Lyy-
tikäinen 2006). Sow pools, multi-site pig farms and weaner calf farms may also be 
efficient in spreading diseases. Hence, it may be advisable to promote biosecurity 
especially on these farm types.
Our results suggest that the majority of biosecurity measures will be implemented 
more frequently in the future than now. In the pig sector, measures such as locking 
the doors of animal shelters, the use of containers for the storage of dead animals 
and the use of compartments within the production units are more likely to be 
implemented more frequently. In the cattle sector, most future improvements were 
predicted to be related to visitors, such as using boots or coveralls as protective 
clothing or traffic-related arrangements. However, it is of some concern that the use 
of protective measures related to animal trading is not expected to increase in the 
future. This may require further training and education among producers.
The possibility to concentrate animal purchases to a few farms is lower in the cattle 
sector than in the pig sector, and it appears that this will not to improve in the future. 
A particular problem is that farms investing in new production capacity may accept 
animals that are “leftover animals” from several farms. This poses a risk of animal 
disease spreading to the farm. Hence, better planning is required to control for the 
health of animals coming to the farm.
Contact tracing measures gain importance
The results highlight the increased importance of contact tracing and risk manage-
ment measures related to it in the future. As already mentioned, the reason is the 
increased distance between farms, resulting in restrictive zones capturing potentially 
less of the spread. Even vector-borne diseases may spread more by animal transport 
than by vector movements in the future, as indicated by our BT results.
Controlling contact networks can be considered as one of the biosecurity measures 
of a farm. The results suggest that restricting animal contacts to within 20 km radius 
from the farm would reduce the size of FMD outbreaks in the future only by 10%. 
This is partly due to farms being further away from each other in the future. Hence, 
the decreasing farm density will reduce the importance of restriction zones as a risk 
management measure. Another contact-related measure that has been used in some 
European countries to reduce outbreaks is limitation of the number of farms from/ 
to which animals are transported. Such a measure is likely to reduce the largest 
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outbreaks. However, the results suggest that in most farms, this measure would also 
have only a small impact, partly because the number of contact farms is already quite 
limited.
As the number of contact farms increases, the need for veterinary personnel 
inspecting the farms also increases. When infected farms become larger, more 
capacity is required to cull, transport and render animals and disinfect premises. Plan-
ning of these activities will require more attention in the future, because previously 
designed methods may no longer represent the best practices. Planning requires 
the collaboration of stakeholders. In addition, insights into how to implement, for 
instance, culling could be obtained by consulting countries that have larger farms and 
which have experiences of disease eradication. It may be necessary to agree on the 
implementation and the costs of these measures in advance before the outbreak to 
prevent the costs from soaring.
In conclusion, for FMD and ASF, it appears that the official measures determined by 
EU regulations will also be adequate in the future when controlling outbreaks, as the 
probability of an epidemic outbreak did not change substantially in the simulations 
when compared to the 2009 situation. This conclusion is in line with our previous 
findings regarding FMD and CSF (Raulo & Lyytikäinen 2006, Lyytikäinen et al. 2011). 
Regarding BT, vaccination also does not provide a quick solution, if any, but in some 
cases it could be a multi-year policy (term 1–2 years) to eradicate the disease.  The 
culling of BT-positive herds may be a feasible option when compared to emergency 
vaccination. The results do not support the use of emergency vaccination as a general 
risk management measure for any of the simulated diseases.
Structural change seems to provide more benefits rather than increase disease 
risks
Production costs per unit of output on average decrease when farm size increas-
es. Producers have invested in technology and reduced the use of labour during 
2000–2011. The main benefit of farm size growth seems to be related to the more 
efficient use of labour input. These results are in line with previous research (Ala-
Mantila 1998, Ovaska and Heikkilä 2013, Latukka 2013).
The costing models suggest that the dairy sector is able to benefit more from econo-
mies of scale in the future due to the increasing average farm size than the pig sector. 
In the pig sector, the benefits were estimated at less than 10% by 2033. Hence, dairy 
farms could benefit more from expanding their production than pig farms. Changes 
in the costs of suckler beef production were not estimated due to a lack of consistent 
data. The results are in line with Rasmussen (2010), who estimated that the 
elasticity of scale is larger in dairy than in pig farms. If passed across all farms, the 
benefits from economies of scale to the pig sector can be estimated (roughly) to 
amount to well over €20 million, and in the dairy sector to well over €200 million 
per year.
The results suggest that economic gains from structural change in the livestock sector 
are likely to be larger than the possible additional costs of risks caused by the simu-
lated diseases. This conclusion is based on the assumption that the probability of 
introduction of disease will approximately be the same in the future as it is currently. 
However, structural change requires that increased risks related to animal health and 
other factors that may increase the risk are taken into consideration when changing 
production structures. Hence, there is scope for improvement in biosecurity and 
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animal logistics, even if current results do not suggest major changes in the costs of 
disease outbreaks on average. Moreover, the impacts may be more severe because 
of the risk posed by diseases such as PRRS in pigs or respiratory diseases that are not 
to be eradicated from the country by the authorities.
There are a few examples from different countries, such as the spread of FMD in the 
UK and CSF in the Netherlands around the millennium via intensive and unexpected 
animal movements, and the spread of Salmonella in Finland via the feed transport 
network in 2009, which suggest that sometimes either a practice or exceptional 
actions may pose a risk to the sector. Because some production types can be parti- 
cularly risky, projects leading to new animal production facilities and redesigned 
input (e.g. feeds) and output (e.g., milk, meat, piglets, calves) logistics should also 
be evaluated from the animal disease risk viewpoint before they are established. The 
means for this include, for instance, building permits being subject to epidemiological 
evaluation regarding the location and the operational design of the building, the 
location of a new animal shelter being evaluated with respect to the disease risks, 
and subsidy payments to the livestock production being subject to complementary 
conditions that require the producers to apply proper biosecurity measures.
Topics for further research
One of the most important topics for future research is the impact of production struc-
tures on the spread of and economic losses from diseases that can become endemic 
in Finland. The control policies for such diseases should also be investigated in order 
to determine the conditions under which each policy is justified. In general, further 
research could focus on analysing the conditions under which different policy 
measures should be implemented. An additional question is how the structural 
change can be generalized to other diseases that are not officially controlled.
The simulations presented in this study utilized farm and animal movement regist- 
ries. Although pig and cattle registries are well established, the sheep and goat 
registry was founded in 2008. Based on previous experiences, it is likely that the 
animal movement data from 2009 were sparse, and hence our simulations may 
underestimate the spread potential of sheep and goat farms. Analysis of the coverage 
and accuracy of the movement registry could be useful to validate the simulation 
results. Available information on animal transport vehicles is not as detailed for the 
cattle sector as for the pig sector. Hence, the robustness of movement contact data 
could be further investigated. In our study, the impacts of data issues were analysed 
by sensitivity analysis and by simulating different scenarios. The farm data could also 
be complemented by more exact identification of farms of a special production type.
In the future, it will be even more important to obtain robust data on animal trans-
port contacts for the purposes of contact tracing. The quality of the data must be 
adequate for risk management purposes, and the data should be stored in an easily 
usable format. Regarding practical risk management, the accessibility of data to 
authorities could also be evaluated. In the future, it would be cost-effective to 
combine efforts and use data from several sources to form a perception of the 
contact network of a farm. Cross-validation may provide additional improvements to 
the quality of the data.
In the current simulations, the same disease detection time assumption was applied 
to all farms.  Results for the sheep and goat sector were insensitive to large changes 
in the detection time. However, further research on the efficiency of the detection 
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process and surveillance in general would be warranted to support the planning of 
surveillance activities.
Simulations for the future for FMD and BT did not include sheep farms. The results 
suggest that sheep and goat farms would not be efficient in spreading disease. The 
inclusion of sheep and goat farms might decrease the spread estimates but increase 
the direct costs of FMD, because sheep and goat farms are also subject to control 
measures.
Regarding BT, our simulation model applied data on BT serotype 8. More recently, BT 
serotype 4 has been spreading in south eastern Europe. However, there is no infor-
mation on whether it has similar or different biological properties compared to sero-
type 8.
The collection of data on non-infected contacts during a simulation requires consider-
able computational resources, which limits the number of iterations. According to our 
earlier studies, the number of contact farms may correspond to the number of farms 
in surveillance and protection zones (Lyytikäinen et al. 2011). Because the number 
of farms in surveillance and protection zones can be expected to decrease in the 
future, the number of contact farms outside the protection and surveillance zones 
may increase.
In this study, we did not simulate the spread of disease with wild boars. Although 
the wild boar population in Finland is small, it has increased during recent decades. 
To limit the spread of diseases, it is important that the population of wild boars 
remains small and that they do not come into contact with domestic pigs or farmed 
wild boar. Regarding biosecurity, one of the items that could be considered further is 
how the risk posed by wild boars affects domestic pig production. Moreover, if ASF is 
only found in wild boars, it could still have severe implications for pig production and 
the economics of the pig sector in Finland, with reduced possibilities to export pig 
meat. Hence, more information on the role of markets upon an outbreak would be 
warranted. In general, future research could also investigate how market disruptions 
have been mitigated in the past, to learn from those experiences.
The simulation results for the future only include impacts on the pig and cattle 
sectors, as impacts on small ruminants were not estimated. Given the small sheep 
and goat population in Finland and the relatively modest production quantity of small 
ruminants, the impact was expected to be small in most cases. However, direct costs 
could be noticeable in a few special cases if a large number of sheep and goat farms 
were to be in the restriction zones or serve as contact farms. Hence, further research 
must be aware of potential risks related to sheep and goat production.
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Appendices
Appendix 0: Simulated diseases
Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD)
FMD is a highly contagious epizootic disease of cloven-hoofed animals and is 
controlled both by domestic and EU legislation. FMD has not been found in Finland 
since 1959. In Europe, large outbreaks of FMD have occurred in the United Kingdom 
in 2001 and 2007. In January 2011, FMD was detected in three wild boars hunted in 
Bulgaria close to the Turkish border. Europe is currently free from FMD.
FMD may affect all cloven-hoofed animals, but those of greatest significance are 
found among domestic species: cattle, pigs, sheep and goats. FMD is not considered 
zoonotic. Cattle are the most sensitive to FMD, but swine and sheep are also severely 
affected. Clinical signs are apparent for 7–10 days (Alexandersen et al. 2001), but 
vesicles may be visible in sheep for less than three days (Kitching & Hughes 2002). 
However, virus excretion usually starts 1–5 days before vesicles are apparent.
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The first symptoms in cattle are usually fever (around 40 ˚C) (Kitching 2002), 
depression, decreased milk production and a reluctance to eat. Vesicular lesions on 
the tongue, nose, feet and teats, lameness and drooling develop within 12–24 hours 
from the first signs (Sutmoller 2001; Kitching 2002). Lameness and drooling are due 
to vesicular lesions and erosions on the feet and in the mouth, respectively. The 
mortality rate is low, except in young animals, but the morbidity rate is very high.
The clinical disease in pigs is dominated by lameness and a reluctance to stand due 
to painful foot lesions. Vesicular lesions in the mouth are less prominent than in 
cattle, but large vesicles that quickly rupture are common on the snout.
FMD in sheep is difficult to detect due to the mild clinical signs (Barnett & Cox 1999). 
The duration of viraemia in sheep is 1–5 days. The first symptoms that appear about 
three days after the onset of viraemia in sheep, goats and wild ruminants are foot 
lesions accompanied by lameness. Sheep and goats also develop fever, are reluctant 
to walk and may separate themselves from the rest of the flock. Vesicles are not as 
common and are more difficult to observe in sheep and goats than in cattle. Deaths 
occur (up to 90% of an affected flock) among young lambs and kids due to heart 
failure and without the appearance of vesicles (Kitching & Hughes 2002).
The incubation time is in general 2–7 days in cattle and pigs and 3–8 days in sheep. 
However, the incubation time might be as short as one day or as long as two weeks. 
(Sutmoller et al. 2001; Gibbens et al. 2001; Alexandersen & Mowat 2005; Ryan et al. 
2008).
The FMD virus (FMDV) belongs to the genus Aphtovirus and family Picornaviridae. 
Seven different serotypes have been identified (Grubman & Baxt 2004).The serotype 
in the UK outbreaks of 2001 was identified as an O PanAsia lineage virus (Knowles 
et al. 2001), and this is the serotype of primary interest in this report. This particular 
serotype was selected because it is the one that has caused widespread epidemics 
in Europe, and sufficient literature was available to parameterize the model for this 
strain.
The FMD virus is stable between pH 6–9 (optimum pH 7.4–7.6), but is rapidly 
destroyed at a pH lower than 4 and higher than 11. Inactivation in the environment 
is mainly due to a combination of high temperature, solar radiation and low humidity. 
The virus is stable at temperatures of up to 56 ˚C and can survive for one year at 4 ˚C. 
In freezing temperatures, it is stable and survives for a very long time.
FMD is transmitted by air, directly or indirectly. The disease spreads very rapidly 
and in a few days all sensitive animals kept in the same space are infected. Trans- 
mission between infected and susceptible animals mainly occurs through the respira-
tory route by virus aerosols.
Cattle are the most sensitive animals to FMDV aerosols. They are mainly infected via 
the respiratory route and considered as an “indicator host” for the disease. Pigs are 
relatively resistant to airborne FMDV infection compared to cattle and sheep (Alexan-
dersen & Donaldson 2002; Donaldson & Alexandersen 2002).
Virus excretion already begins during the incubation period, and airborne excretion 
mainly occurs during a 4- to 5-day period in the infected animal (Sellers & Parker 
1969; Donaldson et al. 2001). Maximal excretion occurs during the early acute phase 
The effects of structural change in agriculture on the spread of animal disease in Finland
93
of the disease, i.e. the peak coincides with the appearance of vesicles (Alexandersen 
et al. 2003b). Sheep differ from other species with their maximum viral emission 1–2 
days before the onset of clinical disease (Donaldson & Alexandersen 2002).
Pigs are considered as an “amplifying host” because they act as effective disease 
transmitters, exhaling more infective virus particles than cattle and sheep (Donald-
son & Alexandersen 2002). Due to their smaller lung volume, sheep excrete fewer 
virus particles than cattle and pigs. In contrast to pigs and cattle, FMD can spread in a 
sheep herd without visible clinical symptoms. 
Animals that have recovered from the disease may remain as infective carriers for a 
variable period of time. Up to 50% of cattle can remain infective for weeks, months, 
or in extreme cases for several years. Sheep and goats less frequently remain as 
carriers than cattle (Sutmoller et al. 2003), and for a shorter period of time, up to 6–9 
months (Doel 2003; Wernery & Kaaden 2004).  Pigs do not remain persistently infected 
(Fenner et al. 1987; Davies 2002).
Vaccination does not stop the virus from entering the body. In other words, vaccinated 
individuals can also be carriers of the virus that they are vaccinated against. Vacci-
nated animals may intermittently emit virus, but significantly less than unvaccinated 
infected animals. 
For more information about FMD, please see Lyytikäinen et al. (2011).
African swine fever (ASF)
African swine fever is a viral disease that spreads easily to domestic pigs and wild 
boar and has considerable socioeconomic consequences. Clinically and pathologically, 
African swine fever is very similar to classical swine fever. Laboratory diagnosis is 
necessary to separate these two diseases from each other (Kleiboeker 2002). There 
is no vaccine against ASF and it is not communicable to humans. ASF has a high 
mortality rate and significant impact on the operations of the swine industry (i.e. 
restrictions concerning animal traffic, costs due to preventive measures and complica-
tions in international trade).
The disease occurs in domestic pigs as well as in wild boar. It is endemic to a large 
extent in sub-Saharan Africa and in Sardinia (EFSA 2010a). Since 2007, the disease 
has occurred in the Caucasus region in Georgia and in its neighbouring countries 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia. In spite of measures to combat it, ASF continues to 
spread into new areas in Russia. Several cases have been reported in the areas 
surrounding Moscow, both in domestic pigs and wild boars (Gogin et al. 2013). The 
disease has also spread to the countries neighbouring Russia, and in 2014 to the 
Baltic countries and Poland. The first case of the disease in Belarus was reported in 
June 2013 near the Lithuanian border. Measures to combat the disease still continue. 
The first case in Ukraine was detected in 2012, where an outbreak was successfully 
halted (OIE WAHID Interface).
The causative agent of African swine fever is the Asfivirus, a DNA virus and a member 
of the Asfarviridae family. It is very resistant and can survive for months or years in 
frost or at refrigerator temperature (EFSA 2010a). The ASF virus is destroyed at normal 
cooking temperature, but unheated or inappropriately heated food waste and pork 
products prepared by salting and smoking constitute a considerable risk for spreading 
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the disease. The virus survives more than 300 days in ham prepared by salting or 
drying (e.g. Parma ham). Furthermore, the ASF virus lasts well at pH 4-13 and at 
temperatures under 60 °C. In faeces, the virus survives in room temperature for 11 
days and in pig blood at 4 °C for 18 months. (Kleiboeker 2002). Infected blood inacti-
vates in 30 minutes at a temperature of 60 °C (Farez & Morley 1997).
The virulence of ASF virus strains varies. Subsequently, the disease can be acute, 
sub-acute or chronic (EFSA 2010a). The virus in the Caucasus and in Russia is espe-
cially virulent and the virulence has persisted since the first outbreak of the disease in 
Caucasia in 2007. The virulence can manifest itself as a high mortality rate (Gogin et 
al. 2013). Therefore, in this report, we describe the hazard of African swine fever with 
a virulence similar to that of the virus strain circulating in Russia. In other regions, the 
virulence has subsided with time, enabling some pigs to develop a chronic form of 
the disease and become disease carriers (EFSA 2010a).
The incubation period is usually 3–15 days, in the acute form 3–4 days (OIE 2008). In 
the peracute form, the pig may die without preceding symptoms. In the acute form 
of the disease, pigs can show symptoms including high fever, haemorrhages in the 
skin (especially on the ears and flank), anorexia, blood in the stool and possibly 
diarrhoea. The haemorrhages in the skin can cause necrosis before death. Mortality 
rates are very high (almost 100%), and the disease can cause death within 6–13 days 
from infection (OIE 2008).
The disease usually transmits through the nasal cavity and the mouth when animals 
are in direct or indirect contact with infected pigs or through feed contaminated by 
the virus. However, in areas where ticks of the Ornithodoros genus occur, transmission 
by these vectors is significant for the maintenance and spread of the virus. ASF can 
even spread by indirect contact with contaminated material or by way of biting 
insects transporting the ASF virus mechanically. The disease might also spread through 
the semen of infected hogs. (Commission Decision 2003/422/EC).
The European Commission Decision (EC) No 422/2003 on approving an African swine 
fever diagnostic manual describes diagnostic and sampling methods and evaluation 
criteria for laboratory results to confirm ASF. Confirmation must be based on the 
detection of clinical signs and post-mortem lesions of disease, the detection of the 
virus, antigen or genome in samples of pig tissues, organs, blood or excreta or the 
demonstration of a specific antibody response in blood samples.
The selection of tests is dependent on the disease situation and the laboratory’s 
available methods (OIE 2008). Evira uses PCR for genome detection and Elisa for the 
detection of antibodies. Evira recommends the sending of tonsil, lymph node, spleen, 
kidney and lung samples.  In addition, whole blood samples without coagulation 
inhibitors are taken. Evira does not have the ability to isolate the virus. When 
necessary, samples are sent to a reference laboratory in Spain (Nokireki 2011).
One of the main challenges for ASF control in the Russian Federation is the absence 
of a centralized programme to combat the disease. Another significant challenge is 
the illegal movement of animals and infected meat. In many areas of Eastern Europe, 
raising pigs in the backyard or on family farms with little or no biosecurity is common. 
In this kind of production, swill and other sub-products are commonly used as feed. 
Backyard farmers also often choose not to report cases in order to avoid the loss of 
their pigs. Wild boar populations have additionally been affected by ASF outbreaks in 
the Caucasus area and also in the Tver region near Moscow, where the disease seems 
The effects of structural change in agriculture on the spread of animal disease in Finland
95
to have established itself in domestic and wild boar populations (Sanchez-Vizcaino et 
al. 2012).
For more information about ASF, see Oravainen et al. (2011).
Bluetongue (BT)
Bluetongue is a vector-borne disease of ruminants. Different species of the midge 
Culicoides act as the vector of the virus. The virus belongs to the genus Orbivirus and 
the family Reoviridae. There are 26 known serotypes (Maan et al. 2012).
In 2006, BT serotype 8 (BTV-8) emerged in Northern Europe, including Belgium, 
France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The next year (2007), it 
reappeared in the mentioned countries and further spread to the UK, Switzerland, 
Denmark and the Czech Republic. Since then, BT has also spread to Sweden in 2008 
and to Norway at the beginning of 2009 (Zientara & Sanchez-Vizcaino 2013). So far, 
bluetongue has not been detected in Finland. However, there are Culicoides midges 
in Finland that may act as vectors for the disease.
The symptoms of BT are most severe in sheep. They include fever, depression, exces-
sive salivation, dyspnea and panting. Other typical symptoms are ulceration in the 
mouth and swelling of the head and neck region, especially around the muzzle and 
eyes. Cattle may be asymptomatic or have only mild symptoms. In the case of an 
apparent infection, the symptoms are similar to those in sheep.  The symptoms 
of BT resemble those of FMD and must therefore be considered as a differential 
diagnosis. In Sweden, during the BT epidemic, hardly any cattle showed symptoms. 
The infection was detected through passive surveillance. During the period of BT 
infection in Sweden, active surveillance generated a number of clinical suspicions, 
including symptoms such as fever, lacrimation and salivation, but none could be 
confirmed. (Sternberg Lewerin et al. 2010).
In addition to cattle, sheep and goats, almost all wild ruminants are also susceptible 
to BTV infection. This includes white-tailed deer, which are common in Finland, but 
they are usually asymptomatic (Falconi et al. 2011).
The incubation time of BT is 2–20 days (see, for instance, Rosengren et al. 2009). 
Bluetongue is mainly spread by blood-sucking midges (Culicoides), which spread the 
disease from one infected animal to another. The virus needs to be replicated in the 
midge. The virus might also spread via semen, transplacentally or through milk to the 
newborn (Menzies et al. 2008, De Clercq et al. 2008, Belbis et al. 2013). BTV cannot 
be naturally transmitted from animal to animal. Therefore, no disinfection of the 
stables is needed.
Sheep may be viremic for 3–20 days, while cattle might be asymptomatic but viremic 
for as long as 60 days.
There is a potent vaccine against BTV. After the epidemic in Sweden was detected, 
a massive vaccination programme was started (Sternberg Lewerin et al. 2010). This 
was very successful and BT was considered eradicated from Sweden later on. Gubbins 
et al. (2012) estimated that R0 can be reduced by 70–83% in cattle farms and 98% in 
sheep farms by vaccination.
For more information on BT, please see Rosengren et al. (2009).
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Appendix 1: Data sources
The spread models apply several databases that either describe or define the potential 
group of susceptible farms, relevant contacts of the farm during the infective 
period and/or the time when contacts have occurred. All databases were constructed 
using data sources from 2009, except for the AI technician movement database, for 
which older data from 2006 were applied.
Farm database
In Finland, it is mandatory (2008/71/EC, regulation 1760/2000; MAF 1391/2006, 
MAF 1296/2001) to register livestock premises. The Finnish farm registry was used 
as the source of data for the location and the number of cattle and pigs on the farms 
(registry maintained by TIKE, the Information Centre of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry). The registry covers the majority of the Finnish cattle and pig farm popula-
tions. A further economic incentive for registration is that registration is required in 
order to receive livestock subsidies.
The farm database combines several information sources. Identification codes were 
used to link data from the Finnish farm registry with the yearly notifications for EU 
subsidies and monthly notifications of the number of animals on the farms. The farms 
that did not keep cattle or pigs and did not sell or buy cattle, pigs or milk in 2009 
were excluded from the database. If a farm had several animal holdings, the infor-
mation on these sub-units was aggregated into one row of information. Altogether, 
0.7% of farms had more than one animal holding in the registry. Different classes of 
animals were combined into two classes of animals: pigs were divided into sows and 
finishers, and cattle into dairy and other cattle. The database also contained the 
number of ewes and goats on the farms.
Finnish farm coordinates are based on either the address, the centre of the fields of 
the farm or the location of the central unit of the farm. Each farm was assigned to 
regions according to the veterinarian, relief worker, PVO, advisor, municipality and 
carcass collection. The proportions of different production types in the database are 
given in Table 21.
Database of animal transportation between farms
Data on the transportation of pigs and cattle are collected in the Pig Registry and the 
Cattle Registry, which are maintained by TIKE and Evira. The animal movement data-
base was constructed from the official animal movement registries of 2009.
Pig transportations between farms were based on the pig registry, which contained 
information on the pigs sold, purchased and transported between farms in Finland. 
The full database of pig movements between farms contained 24 000 notifications. 
The linking of pig trade events was based on farm-specific marks of sold piglets and 
the date, which were used to link separate notifications of farms either selling or 
buying pigs. By linking the notifications of farmers with those of pig traders, it was 
possible to link over 90% of the pig transportations with the transport vehicle.
The cattle transport database was constructed by linking two notifications of an 
animal with the same identification number: the first from the farm from which it 
was transported and the second from the farm that received it. Because the informa-
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tion on the trader could not be linked with these events, linking of the vehicle with 
the transportation event was not possible and the database therefore contains no 
information on transportation vehicles. The full database of cattle transports between 
farms contained 92200 notifications.
Sheep and goat transports were linked similarly to cattle notifications. Sheep and 
goat transports comprised 1138 notifications.
Domestic animals traded in Finland are mostly transported by entrepreneurs regis-
tered for animal transportation. Registration of the vehicle and the case/event is 
obligatory, based on animal welfare legislation (MAF 1429/2006).
Slaughterhouse transportation database
Data on the transportation of pigs to slaughter were directly retrieved from the pig 
transport registry and contained over 55 300 notifications of pig deliveries to slaughter- 
houses. Data on the transport of cattle to slaughter were directly retrieved from the 
cattle transport registry and contained over 77 600 notifications.
Data on the transportation of sheep and goats to slaughter were directly retrieved 
from the animal transport registry and contained 775 notifications. Usually, there was 
only one notification to the same slaughterhouse during one day. Therefore, sheep 
transports were not included in the slaughterhouse transportation database.
None of the registries contained sufficient information on the transportation vehicles, 
so detailed information on vehicle movements could not be included in the slaughter-
house transportation database.
AI technician movement database
Artificial insemination (AI) technicians mostly visit dairy farms. The Finnish Agri- 
culture Calculation Centre holds a registry that contains the daily actions of every AI 
technician operating in Finland. AI technicians are obligated to register the farms they 
have visited and the time and date of visit to the centre. Because the registry contains 
the farm identification numbers and times of the visits, it was possible to construct a 
database that contained every route of AI technicians during 2006. Notifications for 
farms that no longer operated in 2009 were removed from the database, and the 
filtered database contained 494 100 notifications of AI technician visits.
Dairy logistics database
The dairy industry provided us the routes of each dairy tanker for weeks 22 and 50 
in 2009. A dairy tanker typically visits a farm every second day to transport the milk 
from the farm to the dairy. The routes are changed approximately twice a year, 
during spring and autumn. The routes were adequate data sources to construct the 
dairy tanker logistics. The database contained over 80% of farms classified as dairy 
farms in the country when dairy farm was defined as a farm that had at least one 
dairy cow during 2009. The dairy industry plans the logistics of the tankers, so the 
order of visits within a day could also be included in the dairy logistics database. The 
database contained the collection routes of 9990 dairy farms.
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Questionnaires to farmers
Two postal questionnaire surveys, one directed to Finnish cattle farms and the other 
to Finnish pig farms, were conducted in the spring of 2007. The aim was to obtain 
information on the contacts of the farms that are not registered elsewhere. To 
estimate the frequencies of contacts, the farmers were asked about the number of 
visits per year that may lead to contacts with other farms. Data for 2006 obtained 
from the questionnaire were applied to estimate the unknown frequency of contacts. 
Both questionnaires consisted of 6 printed pages.
 
A wide variety of people visit farms, including animal caretakers, holiday substitutes, 
agricultural advisers, veterinarians and others. The frequencies of visits by people to 
cattle and pig farms or production units were estimated from a questionnaire study 
performed during 2007. The number of posted questionnaires, 2 699, covered 13.1% 
of Finnish cattle farms (n = 20 652). The recipient farms were randomly selected 
from the whole Finnish cattle farm population. Another questionnaire was sent to pig 
farmers (n = 1 118), which covered 34.6% of Finnish pig farms (n = 3 228) (National 
Farm Registry 2006). Sampling in this questionnaire was partitioned, as all farms that 
belonged to the highest 10% fraction according to either the number of sows or 
finishers received the questionnaire (13.6% of the Finnish pig farm population). The 
rest of the questionnaires were sent randomly to 21% of the other pig farms. There 
were 1180 respondents among the cattle farmers (response rate of 44%) and 571 
respondents among the pig farmers (response rate of 51%).
Questionnaire to veterinarians
To estimate how many farms a veterinarian visits during a day and how the farm 
production type would influence this frequency, a questionnaire was sent (in 2007) 
to 350 municipal veterinary officers in Finland, of whom 134 (38%) returned the 
questionnaire. The questionnaire was completed like a diary, where the practitioners 
reported their daily visits to farms during two five-day periods. They were asked to 
report which farms (pig, cattle or other) they visited during a 2-week period.
Questionnaires to farmers about biosecurity
Two questionnaires were designed to collect information about the level of bio- 
security and hygiene practices on Finnish cattle, pig and sheep farms. The first ques-
tionnaire was sent in March 2011 to each of 3000 cattle and 1000 pig farmers. 
Another slightly modified questionnaire was sent in June 2011 to 866 sheep farmers 
and 144 goat farmers in Finland. The sheep and goat questionnaire also contained 
a several questions concerning potential contacts, persons visiting the farm, vehicles 
and co-operation potentially leading to enhanced spread during an epidemic 
outbreak (for more details see Virtanen et al. 2013).
The questionnaires were sent by mail but could also be answered online. The 
online link was provided in the mailed questionnaire and on the reminder card, but 
also in the main agricultural newspapers in March 2011. A link to the pig and cattle 
questionnaire was published in two agricultural newspapers and the websites of the 
Association for Animal Disease Prevention (ETT), the National Health Classification 
Registry (Sikava and Naseva) and the Finnish Food Safety Authority Evira. The link 
to the sheep and goat questionnaire was published in June 2011 in two agricultural 
newspapers, an electronic newsletter (Saparo) and the website of the Finnish Food 
Safety Authority Evira.
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Other sources
Other sources were applied when needed to define parameters that were not 
estimable from the previous mentioned sources. This additional information was 
required to parameterize vehicle movement patters when animals were transported 
to slaughter and when cattle were transported between farms. Carcass collection of 
both pigs and cattle, and the operation of relief workers were also parameterized 
using additional information. 
A telephone questionnaire to slaughterhouses was performed to define how many 
farms a vehicle would visit per day transporting either animals to slaughter or cattle 
to another farm. Cattle carcass collection data from one week in Finland were used 
to estimate the spatial range of carcass collection vehicles and the number of cattle 
farms visited on one route. For pig carcass collection, the average number of visited 
farms during a route was estimated from the statistics for the whole of 2006.
Official statistics of the Farmers’ Social Insurance Institution were used as a parameter 
indicating how many days a relief worker might work on a single farm during one 
year.
Cost parameters
Information regarding the costs and material resources needed to mitigate and 
eradicate FMD and ASF were estimated according to procedures characterised by 
the terms of reference for veterinary officers with regard to a disease outbreak in 
Finland. The costing procedure was similar to that of Lyytikäinen et al. (2011). Labour 
requirements, the expenditures of which are paid from public funds, were estimated 
using data provided by Risk Solutions (2005). These data indicate the labour resources 
needed for field operations during hypothetical FMD epidemics of different sizes in 
the United Kingdom. Estimates of the labour required by a national crisis centre were 
based on a Finnish study (Niemi et al. 2008) and consultation with the officials. 
Updated unit prices for each resource were collected from official statistics or requested 
from officials and companies capable of providing relevant services and goods. These 
cost parameters represented situation during years 2009-2011.
Market-level losses and losses due to business interruptions during and after FMD 
and ASF outbreaks were simulated with a partial-equilibrium model, further details 
of which are described provided by Lyytikäinen et al. (2011) and Niemi and Lehtonen 
(2014). The model used to produce current results was calibrated against 2009 and 
2006 data. The model was extended by unpacking stochastic results (Lyytikäinen et 
al. 2011) representing the result of a dynamic programming model as the expected 
value, and this result was then unpacked to represent the distribution implicitly 
included in the results.
Estimates regarding the costs of BT were based epidemiological simulations, Finnish 
regulations, past surveillance programs and guidelines. BT outbreaks recorded in the 
Netherlands and Belgium during the past years (see e.g. Velthuis et al., 2010) were 
used to parameterize the main events. In addition similar cost data as in the event 
of FMD and ASF were used to calculate the costs of BT. Regarding BT, the impacts of 
disease on markets were not simulated because previous research and OIE Terrestrial 
animal health code did not suggest the disease to have significant impacts on dairy 
and meat markets in Finland.
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Appendix 2: Livestock production structure in Finland 2009
In Finland, agriculture has been gradually changing from family managed farms 
towards larger farms in both the cattle and the pig sector. This change has led to an 
increase in herd size and a decrease in the number of farms, but the total number of 
animals has remained about the same. Sheep farming may be growing in Finland, but 
is still small-scaled and most farms do not gain their income solely from sheep farming. 
The number of farms in Finland was approximately 20 000 in 2009 (Table 20). 
Table 20. The number of farms according to type in Finland.
Species/Farm type Number of farms
Cattle
Dairy 12 438
Beef cattle 2 588
Suckler cow 1 628
Pigs
Farrowing 763
Farrowing-to-finishing 879
Finishing 698
Sheep 
Professional sheep 150
Semi-professional sheep 734
Hobby sheep 1 097
Goat 371
Pig production
There were 2 340 pig farms and little over 1 million pigs in Finland in 2009. On 
average, there were 366 pigs on a farm and the largest farm had 6 251 animals. 
Traditional pig farms are classified in this study into three production types; farrowing 
farms, farrowing-to-finishing farms and finishing farms. In addition to these farm 
types, there are two special pig production types: sow pools and multi-sites. Sow 
pools and multi-sites consist of multiple specialized pig farms that usually have very 
specific contracts to secure the availability of pigs for meat production.
When farm and animal numbers are viewed geographically according to Provincial 
Veterinary Officer (PVO) districts, it can be seen that the pig industry is heavily 
concentrated on the coast of south western and western Finland (PVO districts Turku 
and Vaasa) (Table 21).
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Table 21. The number of pigs and pig farms in Finnish PVO districts in 2009. Pigs under 3 months 
excluded.
PVO Farms Pigs
Helsinki 67 32 180
Hämeenlinna 170 77 607
Joensuu 36 9 353
Jyväskylä 72 15 909
Kouvola 110 31 998
Kuopio 69 26 665
Maarianhamina 10 279
Mikkeli 53 13 196
Oulu 80 37 645
Rovaniemi 7 1 509
Tampere 104 32 302
Turku 818 388 919
Vaasa 744 337 574
Total 2 340 1 005 136
Farm type classification
Traditional pig farms produce pigs for meat production (Table 22). The classification 
of farm types in this study is based on the ratio of finishing pigs to sows on the farm. 
Farms that have on average less than two finishing pigs per sow are classified as 
farrowing farms. Farms that have two or more finishing pigs per sow are classified 
as farrowing-to-finishing farms. Farms that do not have any sows are finishing farms.
Table 22. Number of farms and average number of pigs per farm in 2009.
Farm type Number of  farms
Number of  
sows
Number of 
finishers
Mean number 
of pigs
Farrowing farm 763 88 508 70959 209
Farrowing-to- 
finishing farm 879 60 651 321 714 435
Finishing farm 698 0 462 774 663
Sow pools
A sow pool is a networked production system that has several production units. In 
sow pool systems, all dry sows are kept at a central unit and before farrowing they 
are leased by piglet producing units (satellites). Following weaning, the sows are 
returned to the central unit for mating or insemination. The system is operated in 
cycles of 16 weeks at the satellites, starting with the arrival of pregnant sows three 
weeks prior to farrowing, followed by weaning in this unit at 5 weeks of age and the 
return of sows to the central unit before the arrival of a subsequent group of sows 
eight weeks later. In 2009, 60 farms were identified as part of a sow pool. Sow pools 
contained 5% of Finnish sows and 2% of the finisher population. Finishing farms that 
were part of a sow pool were larger than other pig farms. Farms that were identified 
as farrowing farms were almost 1.7 times larger than farrowing farms on average 
(Table 23).
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Table 23. Average number of sows and finishers on Finnish pig farms participating in a sow pool 
and other farms.
Farm type Number of sows, sow pool
Number of 
sows, other
Number of 
finishers, sow pool
Number of 
finishers, other
Farrowing 
farm 180 114 94 68
Farrowing-to-
finishing farm 76 69 350 369
Finishing farm 0 0 2 095 651
Multi-site systems
A multi-site system consists of a number of herds that form a chain, through which all 
animals pass from birth until slaughter. Each herd in this chain is specialised in only 
one production stage.  A multi-site system consists of one or several farrowing herds 
where the insemination of sows and the weaning of piglets are performed. The 
piglets from one or several farrowing herds are reared at a separate rearing facility 
from where the young finishing pigs are distributed to several finishing herds. On the 
other hand, it is also possible that several small farrowing herds have joined and 
deliver piglets together to one or more large finisher unit/s without an intermediate 
phase. Multi-site farms comprised 169 pig farms in 2009. Approximately 16% of 
Finnish sows and finishers were produced in multi-site systems. Pig farms that were 
part of multi-site system were on average larger than other pig farms (Table 24).
Table 24. Average number of sows and finishers on Finnish pig farms operating as part of a 
multi-site system and the others.
Farm type Number of sows, multi-site
Number of 
sows, other
Number of 
finishers, multi-site
Number of 
finishers, other
Farrowing 
farm 512 96 109 92
Farrowing-to-
finishing farm 189 65 551 362
Finishing farm 0 0 1 154 550
Cattle production
In 2009, there were 876 782 cows on 16 752 farms in Finland. Cattle production 
can be divided into three categories: dairy farms, beef cattle farms and suckler farm 
(Table 26).
The majority of the farms were dairy farms encompassing the majority of all cows 
(Table 25). However, most dairy farms were also meat producers, and out of 600 000 
heads on dairy farms, approximately 50% were raised for meat production.
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Table 25. The number of cattle farms and animals in Finnish PVO districts in 2009.
PVO
Number of farms Number of animals
Dairy 
farms
Other 
farms*
Dairy cows on 
dairy farms
Beef cattle on 
dairy farms
Cattle on other 
farms**
Helsinki 310 134 9 169 7 435 5 609
Hämeenlinna 659 253 16 710 14 292 11 532
Joensuu 859 294 19 866 19 085 17 165
Jyväskylä 744 367 16 316 14 842 18 506
Kouvola 653 223 15 911 13 480 9 491
Kuopio 1 623 440 40 799 38 664 31 381
Maarianhamina 63 61 1 924 1 933 2 966
Mikkeli 775 310 16 806 15 192 14 556
Oulu 2 148 537 55 022 53 188 40 609
Rovaniemi 541 161 12 111 11 967 10 986
Tampere 587 284 15 190 14 594 12 214
Turku 902 402 21 104 21 155 26 524
Vaasa 2 574 750 73 113 77 308 50 362
Total 12 438 4 216 314 041 303 135 251 901
 
* Suckler cow and beef cattle farms included; ** includes beef cattle and suckler cows
Dairy farms
A cattle farm was defined in this study as a dairy farm if it had one dairy cow on the 
farm, even though it produced both milk and meat. Dairy farms in Finland were fairly 
small and had 25.3 dairy cows on average. The average number of cattle on dairy 
farms is 50 heads per herd. Typically, dairy cows are raised on the farm on which they 
are born. Calves suitable for dairy production can also be sold to other dairy farms.
Beef cattle farms
Beef cattle farms consist of weaning farms and finishing farms. Because of the large 
calf production on dairy farms, the majority of the meat (80%) came from dairy breed 
cows. Over 80% of all male calves and those female calves not used for dairy 
production were sold to weaning farms at the age of two weeks (with the excep-
tion of those raised for meat on dairy herds). In 2009, there were 47 weaning farms 
in Finland, i.e. less than 1% of the Finnish “other cattle” population is in located on 
weaning farms. On weaning farms, calves become ruminants and are accustomed to 
solid feed. At the age of 5 to 6 months, calves are transferred from weaning farms to 
finishing farms. Finishing farms are the final stage in meat production. This final 
stage lasts from 12 to 16 months, after which the animals are sent to slaughter.
Suckler cow farms
Beef cattle are also grown on suckler farms that are farms specialized in meat 
production. Cows are mated on the farm and calves are kept on pasture together with 
their dams until weaning (around 6 months). Calves are then transferred to finishing 
farms. It is possible for a suckler farms to grow cattle from birth to slaughter, but larger 
suckler cow farms are concentrated on producing weaning age calves for finishing 
farms. There were 1 628 suckler cow farms in Finland in 2009.
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Table 26. Types of farms and number of cows and other cattle in 2009 in cattle production sector.
Farm type Number of farms Dairy cows Other cattle
Mean number of 
cattle 
Dairy 12 438 314 041 303 135 50
Beef cattle 2 572 0 149 799 58
Suckler cow 1 628 0 102 103 63
Total 16 638 314 041 555 037 52
Sheep and goat production
Sheep and goat production is small-scaled in Finland. Sheep and goat farms in this 
study were divided into three classes: professional, semi-professional and hobby 
farmers (Virtanen et al. 2013). Because of the small numbers of professional (14) 
and semi-professional (36) goat farmers and the similarity of the two farming types, 
sheep and goat farm statistics are combined in Table 27. The number of animals on 
sheep and goat farms is commonly reported as the number of ewes and does 
because the majority of lambs and kids are slaughtered after six months from birth. 
In 2009, there were approximately 119 000 sheep, of which 64 000 were ewes, and 
approximately 6 700 goats, of which 6 000 were does. Professional sheep farms are 
more common in Oulu and Rovaniemi PVO  districts than on other parts of the 
country (Table 28).
Half of all ewes and does were located on professional farms, although they 
comprised only a small percentage of the farms having sheep or goats. One fifth of 
the sheep and goats were on pig or cattle farms. There were also organic sheep and 
goat farms. Organic sheep farms were larger and the average number of ewes on an 
organic sheep farm was 97 compared to 22 ewes on a traditional sheep farm.
Table 27. Number of sheep/goat farms, ewes and does and average number of sheep/goats per 
farm in Finland in 2009.
Farm type Number of farms Ewes and does
Other sheep 
and goats
Mean number of of 
sheep and goats
Professional 
sheep farm 150 26 996 19 640 311
Semi-professional 
sheep farm 734 21 768 21 034 58
Hobby sheep 
farm 1 097 2 930 2 470 5
Goat farm 371 4 056 631 13
*Pig and cattle farms had 14 266 ewes and does (20 %) and 12 379 other sheep and goats 
(22 %) in 2009.
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Table 28. The location of different types of sheep and goat farms in 2009.
PVO Professional sheep farms
Semi-professional 
sheep farms
Hobby sheep 
farms Goat farms
Helsinki 6 57 129 38
Hämeenlinna 4 34 98 43
Joensuu 7 30 60 22
Jyväskylä 7 44 60 14
Kouvola 5 38 81 29
Kuopio 5 35 74 23
Maarianhamina 11 56 25 4
Mikkeli 6 33 64 19
Oulu 24 69 121 35
Rovaniemi 30 83 31 13
Tampere 3 61 98 34
Turku 19 108 160 70
Vaasa 23 86 96 27
Quantities marketed and unit prices
The production of dairy milk in 2009 totalled 2 215 million litres. The volume of pig 
meat production was 206, beef meat 81 and sheep meat 0.8 million kg. The average 
producer price paid was €0.41/kg for milk, €2.47/kg for beef and €1.41/kg for pig 
meat (Table 29).
Table 29. Quantity of milk and meat production and producer prices paid in 1997–2014.
Dairy milk Beef Pig meat Sheep meat
Million litres € per 100 kg Million kg € per t Million kg € per t Million kg
1997 2 301 34.82 99 209 180 140 1.27
1998 2 300 34.46 93 224 184 126 1.18
1999 2 325 34.31 90 216 182 113 0.91
2000 2 371 35.33 91 206 173 129 0.75
2001 2 378 36.48 90 208 174 150 0.67
2002 2 376 37.29 91 190 184 137 0.64
2003 2 323 37.31 94 186 193 115 0.59
2004 2 304 36.37 91 190 198 120 0.65
2005 2 293 35.55 84 205 203 128 0.62
2006 2 279 36.90 85 212 208 126 0.65
2007 2 226 39.05 87 221 213 132 0.74
2008 2 188 44.79 80 241 217 144 0.77
2009 2 215 40.11 81 247 206 141 0.76
2010 2 222 40.59 82 240 203 137 0.79
2011 2 190 43.90 82 253 202 146 0.95
2012 2 188 46.26 80 281 193 163 0.95
2013 2 220 47.27 80 311 194 174 0.98
2014 2 289 45.05 82 303 186 158 1.09
Source: OSF: Luke, Milk and milk products statistics, Meat production and Producer prices of 
agricultural products
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Appendix 3: Epidemiological simulation models
In this study, we applied three disease-specific models. Two of them (FMD and ASF) 
essentially represent different parameterisations of the same model. The bluetongue 
model applies the same framework, but it is has several differences when compared 
to FMD and ASF models.
FMD model, year 2009
The FMD model is based on an earlier simulation model of a Finnish FMD risk assess-
ment (Lyytikäinen et al. 2011). In that model, we applied production information 
and the structure of the year 2006, and it did not contain information on sheep/goat 
production.
The changes can be summarized as: Farm and animal movement databases were 
updated to 2009.
The number of farm types was reduced in the cattle production sector. Cattle farms in 
the model are dairy, beef or suckler farms. Definitions of farm types were also simpli-
fied. A dairy farm was any farm containing at least one dairy cow and a suckler farm 
a farm with at least one suckler cow and but no dairy cows. Beef cattle farms were 
all those cattle farms that were neither dairy nor suckler farms. Pig farm typing 
remained similar to that applied in Lyytikäinen et al. (2011).
Sheep and goat production was included in the model. Sheep and goat farms that did 
not have cattle or pig production were added to the farm database (mixed farms that 
had pigs/cattle were already included). Contacts within sheep/goat production and 
with cattle/pig production were parameterised according to Virtanen et al. (2013) 
and included in the simulation framework.
Cadaver collection simulation was changed so that contacts between sheep/goat 
production and cattle production within the cadaver collection zone were noted.
Veterinary and relief worker functions were also modified so that contacts between 
all production sectors were noted.
Additional airborne transmission parameters were modified so that the affinity of 
cattle farms to receive airborne infection from a pig farm remained as in the FMD risk 
assessment, but for sheep farms the affinity was scaled down by a factor of 0.1 and 
for pig farms by 0.01.
ASF model, year 2009
The ASF model framework was developed from the FMD model by excluding 
cattle, sheep and goat production as well as irrelevant contact information and spread 
routes.
The parameterisation of ASF was mostly based on a Finnish classical swine fever risk 
assessment (Raulo & Lyytikäinen 2006) and an FMD risk assessment (Lyytikäinen et 
al. 2011).
Time lags applied in modelling of risk management operations were the same as in 
the FMD 2009 model.
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Transmission probabilities applied in the simulation originated from the CSF risk 
assessment (Raulo & Lyytikäinen 2006).
Contact processes of relevant contact types originated from the FMD model in pig 
farms, except that the ASF model did not contain neighbourhood spread or airborne 
spread.
Detection of the disease was assumed to be more rapid than that of CSF outbreak and 
achieved at the latest when the outbreak would reach the third epidemiological 
generation of pigs on the farm. If R0 is assumed to be 8–11, by the time of the 
third generation, there would be tens to hundreds of infected pigs. Due to more 
severe clinical symptoms than in CSF, this was assumed to lead to rapid diagnosis. By 
assuming a 4-day incubation period, a 5-day infective period and a time of death of 
13 days after infection, we concluded that the detection should eventually happen 
before the 28th day after the introduction of the virus.
Bluetongue model, year 2009
The bluetongue model applied the same farm database as in the FMD model, but the 
simulation of spread was modelled differently.
The bluetongue model was a combination of a spatial kernel model (de Koeijer et 
al. 2011) and an animal transport-induced spread model (adapted from Turner et al. 
2012). Simulation of contacts utilized the animal transport database as in the FMD 
and ASF models. The model utilises temperature information from 2009.
Spread model – The simulation process for FMD and ASF
The simulation process has five distinctive phases: 1) an initial phase that is required 
once per iteration, 2) estimation of the infective period of a farm, 3) estimation of 
the infective contacts, 4) the selection of a new infective farm and 5) if there are no 
new infected farms, the end phase of the iteration.
 
 Which is the 
1st infected farm?
No infective contacts
End of 
iteration
Start of 
iteration
Infective periodWhich farm(s) become infected?
 infective contacts
Initial phase
Figure 45. Figure 45. The 
basic process describing 
the simulation principle of 
the Finnish FMD and ASF 
models. An iteration starts by 
randomly selecting the first 
infected farm in the country. 
Knowledge of the length of 
the infective period and the 
identity of the farm makes 
it possible to define the 
infective contacts (see details 
later). By selecting new 
infective farms (end points 
of infective contacts), the 
iteration continues until no 
new infective contacts are 
formed.
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Initial phase
One farm is sampled randomly from the Finnish farm population to be the first infected 
farm of the iteration (Figure 45). In FMD simulations, the first infected farm may be a 
pig, cattle, sheep or goat farm, and in ASF simulations only a pig farm is suitable to 
be the first infected farm.
In this assessment, the iterations were started on 21 May 2009 and the contacts of 
the first infected farm were simulated for the following infective period (Figure 45). 
Some of the contacts were sampled directly from the databases and were thus 
dependent on the starting date of the iteration. In the initial phase of an iteration, 
all parameters used in equations estimating the number of visits to a farm (Table 32, 
Figure 48) were simulated by sampling from a covariance-variance matrix and 
estimated parameters of the model (for details, see Appendix 2, Table 20 in Lyytikäin-
en et al. 2011). The level of other country-level parameters containing uncertainty 
due to information sources was also sampled at the start of the iteration.
Infective period of a farm
The length of the infective period was given as an input parameter for the first infected 
farm, but for the following infected farms it was simulated by comparing different 
routes that could put a farm under restrictive measures and/or allow it to become 
detected according to EU legislation. For the first infected farm, it was assumed that 
the detection was always initiated by a suspicion of FMD or ASF. For other infected 
farms, there was no closed form to define the length of the infective period, because 
it was also dependent on other events such as which farms have already been 
detected as infected during the iteration and when the virus had been introduced to 
the farm (Figure 46). If a farm was infected by a detected farm, it could be traced as 
a contact farm. If it was in the protection or surveillance zones of an already detected 
farm, it could be detected earlier than by suspicion. Events defining the infective 
period were simulated conditionally: this means that an initial condition has to be 
met before the next event could be simulated. Because different operations take 
time, there are time lags between events (Table 30).
The infective period of a farm has two phases: In the first phase, all contact types can 
be infective and the farm is not under restrictive measures. When restrictive 
measures are effective for the farm, only neighbourhood and airborne spread in FMD 
simulations remain as infective pathways, until the farm has been initially cleaned 
(Figure 46). 
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Table 30. The duration of the infective period, time lags and parameters used to simulate events relevant in the de-
termination of the infective period of a single infected farm during iteration.
Parameter Initial condition
Duration of 
period or 
time lag (days)
Event following after the end 
of period or after the time lag
Non-infective period Virus has been introduced to the farm
FMD 2 
ASF 2 The start of an infective period
Latent period Virus has been introduced to the farm
FMD 4 
ASF 4
Clinical signs are possible on 
infected farm
The day of suspicion of farms 
infected before 1st detection
Virus has been 
introduced to the farm
FMD 20 
ASF 28
The end of first phase of the 
infective period of farms under 
suspicion*
The day of suspicion of farms 
infected after the 1st detected 
farm in the country 
Virus has been 
introduced to the farm
FMD 14 
ASF 21
The end of first phase of the 
infective period of farms under 
suspicion*
Time lag of diagnosis of 
primary infected farm
Farm has been suspected to 
be FMD/ASF positive 1–3 Positive diagnosis of FMD/ASF
Time lag of sending samples 
of farms in protection zones
Farm is in the protection 
zone 0–7
Laboratory has received 
samples
Time lag of sending samples 
of farms in surveillance zone
Farm is in the surveillance 
zone 0–7
Laboratory has received 
samples
Time lag of tracing Farm is diagnosed as FMD/ASF positive 0–7 Connected farms can be traced
Time lag of sending samples 
of traced contact farms 
Farm is traced as a contact 
farm of a farm diagnosed as 
FMD/ASF positive
0–7 Laboratory has received samples
Time lag of diagnosis of 
farms after 1st detected farm 
in the country
Samples have been sent 
due to clinical screening or 
protective zone serological 
screening or due to farmer 
notification or activity
0–1 Positive diagnosis of FMD/ASF
Time lag of eradication** Farm has been diagnosed as FMD/ASF positive 1–7
Animals of the infected farm 
have been culled
Time lag of initial cleaning** Culling on the farm has been completed 1–8
Initial cleaning of the farm has 
been completed, the end of 
second phase of the infective 
period
*Under suspicion means only those farms that are not detected by administrative operations, namely due to zone 
  and contact farm inspections
**McLaws & Ribble 2007
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The following definitions were used in the model (Figure 46):
Day of introduction of a virus: The day when the virus enters a specific farm.
Starting day of the infective period: After the virus is introduced to a farm and the 
non- infective latent period has ended, the infective period begins 
Infective period: When a farm is under restrictive measures, the infective period of 
all contact types except neighbourhood and airborne spread in FMD simulation will 
end. The infective period of neighbourhood spread and airborne spread lasts until the 
initial cleaning of the farm has been completed in FMD simulations. In ASF simula-
tions, the infective period ends when the last infected farm is put under restrictive 
measures.
Day of suspicion: The day when a farm is placed under suspicion of having FMD or ASF. 
Day of restrictive measures: Restrictive measures are put in force on farms under 
suspicion or on those located in the surveillance or protection zone around a possibly 
infected farm. Tracing is contact type dependent and has a time lag (0–7 days). 
After tracing, farms are put under restrictive measures. All other contact types, 
except neighbourhood spread and airborne spread in the FMD model, are assumed to 
be non-infective after this time point. 
Day of positive diagnosis: For the primary infected farm, a positive diagnosis is 
assumed to be obtained 1–3 days after suspicion. Confirmative diagnosis needs to 
be carried out before the animals are culled. On suspected farms and those infected 
following the primary infected farm, the decision to cull would be made according to 
the first positive indication of FMD or ASF. For the later infected farms, following the 
primary infected farm, the day of a positive diagnosis also depends on whether the 
farm is traced as a contact farm, or is located in the protection or surveillance zone 
around a positively diagnosed infected farm.
Day of eradication: Eradication is completed 1–7 days (Table 30) after the day of 
positive diagnosis. The time lag is defined according to recent FMD epidemics in the 
EU (McLaws & Ribble 2007) (Table 18). The day of eradication is the day when the 
eradication is completed. 
Day of initial cleaning: Initial cleaning is completed 1–8 days (Table 30) after the day 
of eradication. The time lag is defined according to recent FMD epidemics in the EU 
(McLaws & Ribble 2007). The end of the initial cleaning is the endpoint of neigh- 
bourhood and airborne spread.
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Figure 46. The events that define the infective period of an infected farm. A farm can become detected by 
suspicion. If a farm is not the first infected farm in the country, it is also possible that a farm becomes detected 
either by the tracing of contact farms of already detected farms, or by location in the protection/surveillance 
zones of other infected farms. The detection process has several time lags due to time limits in EU legislation 
and other processes that require resources or efforts. See Table 18 for applied values of time lags and periods 
preceding the events. The infective period partially ends when restrictive measures are in force and finally 
when the farm is initially cleaned. Blue events are applicable to spread simulation only for FMD while green 
are applicable to both FMD and ASF.
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Simulation of spread from infected farm(s)
The infectivity of viruses and contacts during the infective period defines the number 
of new farms becoming infected from an already infected farm (Figure 47). If new 
farms become infected, the infective contacts of these farms are then simulated and 
iteration continues.
When the infective period of a farm is known, it is possible to sample infective 
contacts from databases. This sampling also partly defines the contact farms (Table 
31). If the contacts following a visit to an infected farm are not explicitly known, for 
instance if information on the order of events is lacking within a day, the order of 
events (contacts due to a visit) is randomly simulated to estimate the contacts and 
contact farms. If events such as visits to the farm are not sampled from the database, 
they are estimated by equations (Figure 48). Each visit is then further simulated to 
estimate the contacts, their timing and contact farms from the population of 
susceptible farms (Table 31). Neighbourhood and airborne spread are tested 
separately for each farm in the susceptible population, which is determined by the 
distance from an infected farm (Table 31).
Steps applied in the simulation of a certain contact type are as follows:
1. Estimation or sampling of visits to an infected farm(s), (Figure 47, Table 31 and 
32);
2. Estimation or sampling of potential contacts due to every visit to an infected farm 
(if applicable) (Figure 47);
3. Estimation of contacts based on the potential contacts (Figure 47);
4. Testing to determine which contacts are infective (Bernoulli trials) (Figure 48 and 
Table 33);
5. If the number of infective contacts is less than the number in the susceptible 
population, sampling of contact farms that will become infected (Table 31).
The steps are repeated for each contact type to estimate all farms that one infected 
farm would infect. If the same farm is infected by several farms or by several different 
contacts, the fastest route of spread is taken into account. When there are no more 
new infections during the iteration, the iteration ends (Figure 47).
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Figure 47. The information used to simulate the infective process of a farm. Different informa-
tion sources and characteristics of the infected farm influence how many contacts an infected farm 
would give rise to within the infective period and which farms would become infected. The number 
of infected farms is also dependent on the infectivity of the contact types.
The following logic and definitions are used in the model:
Contacts are estimated for the infected farm or farms and only for the infective 
period (see the simulation of the infective period above). A contact is an event 
during the infective period that links farms and can potentially cause the trans- 
mission of disease to the extent that it could cause new outbreaks among the popu-
lation of susceptible farms.
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Figure 48. Schematic description of how different information sources will affect potential contacts by different 
contact types of a certain infected farm and how these are related to the contacts during the infective period. 
See parameters and definitions in Tables 31 and 32. Green indicates potential contacts that are applicable to 
both FMD and ASF models and blue indicates those potential contacts that are only relevant to FMD.
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Figure 49. Different contact types have different infectivity per contact. Contacts during the infec-
tive period and the infectivity of contact types together define which contacts are simulated to be 
infective. Because different contact types may infect the same farms, the number of infected farms 
may be smaller than the number of infective contacts. See parameters and definitions in Tables 31, 
32 and 33. Green indicates potential contacts that are applicable to both FMD and ASF models and 
blue indicates those potential contacts that are relevant only to FMD. P1-P7 are contact type-specific 
transmission probabilities (see Table 33).
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Potentially infective contact types: All those types of contacts that are assumed to 
be able to transmit the virus to another farm (Figure 48). Those operators who only 
visit the farm but not the animal holdings were not regarded as potentially infective 
contact types. Potentially infective contact types can be divided into two categories: 
event-driven contact types, where the transmission can be tested for a specific event 
such as a visit to the animal holdings, and eventless contact types (neighbourhood 
and airborne spread), where there are no distinctive events leading to transmission 
(Table 31, column 4).
Infectivity of contact types: The probability that one contact of a certain contact 
type from an infected farm would introduce an adequate dose of virus to another 
farm and initiate an outbreak of FMD or ASF on that farm. Values for infectivity were 
retrieved from the scientific literature (Table 33).
Visits to the farm: Visits of any contact type during the infective period to a 
certain farm. The number of visits is defined directly from a database, and is 
sampled for the infective period of the farm (Table 31) or estimated by equations 
(Table 32). If an equation or parameter is used as a value for the number of visits per year, 
the number of visits during the infective period is sampled by a binomial distribution, 
 ̴ Bin(number of visits per year, t/365), where t is the length of the infective period. 
If the number of visits per year is not an integer, it is treated as a Poisson parameter 
and sampled before the binomial sampling to define the integer value for that 
particular farm in the simulation.
Potential contacts due to a visit: Farms visited by a vector (person) that on the 
same day has visited an infected farm. Potential contacts are contact-type dependent 
and are either directly sampled from a database or estimated according to question-
naires and other data sources (Figure 48).
Contacts due to a visit: The farms that either a vehicle or a person has visited on the 
same day after a visit to an infected farm. This is the proportion of potential contacts 
(0-100%), if not known specifically (Figure 48).
Infective contact: A contact that generates an FMD or ASF outbreak on another farm. 
This is defined by performing a Bernoulli trial for contacts due to visits by using the 
infectivity of a contact type as the probability rule of the trial. If the random number 
is less than the probability rule, then a contact generates a new infected farm.
Susceptible farms: Those uninfected farms that can be potentially connected with the 
infected farm during the infective period. The definition of susceptible farms is 
dependent on the contact type and the identity of the infected farm (due to its 
location and operational region) (Table 31).
Contact farms: Those farms that can acquire the infection if a contact turns out to 
be infective in a Bernoulli trial. The definition of contact farms is dependent on the 
contact type, and the identity of infected farm (due to its location and operational 
region). Contact farms are sampled from the contact type-specific population of 
susceptible farms by a fraction defined by infective contacts, if not specified in the 
databases (Table 31).
The effects of structural change in agriculture on the spread of animal disease in Finland
117
Table 31. Potentially infective contact types in the FMD and ASF models, spatiality, temporality and the rules for 
defining susceptible and contact farms during the infective period of an infected farm.
Vector
Incident leading to  
transmission of 
infection
Spatiality of 
network
Source for 
temporal 
events
Susceptible farms Contact farms
PigsASF,cattle, 
sheep or goat
Transportation of live 
pigs or cattle 
between farms from 
an infected farm
Animal 
transportation 
database
Animal 
transportation 
database
Year 2009, animals 
are transported from 
infected farms
Same as 
susceptible 
farms
VehicleASF
Vehicle trans- 
porting pigs or cattle 
between farms has 
visited an infected 
farm earlier on the 
same day
Animal 
transportation 
database
Animal trans- 
portation database, 
in addition cattle: 
farm database, 
slaughterhouse 
transportation 
database
Year 2009, pigs: the 
same trans- 
portation vehicle and 
day, cattle: the same 
slaughterhouse, day 
and closeness
Sampled from 
susceptible 
farms
VehicleASF
Vehicle trans- 
porting pigs or cattle 
to slaughter has 
visited an infected 
farm earlier on  the 
same day
Slaughter 
transportation 
database
Slaughter trans- 
portation database
Year 2009, the same 
slaughterhouse and 
day of slaughter
Sampled from 
susceptible 
farms
Dairy tanker
Same vehicle trans-
porting milk to dairy 
has visited an 
infected farm earlier 
on the same day
Dairy logistics 
database
Dairy logistics 
database
Year 2009, the same 
dairy tanker after a 
visit to the infected 
farm
Same as 
susceptible 
farms
Carcass 
collection 
vehicleASF
Carcass collection 
vehicle has visited an 
infected farm earlier 
during the collection 
route 
Carcass collec-
tion regions, 
distance from 
infected cattle 
farm within the 
defined region
Simulated Poisson 
process
Pigs: the same 
carcass collection 
region, Cattle, 
Sheep, Goats within 
a given distance 
from an infected 
farm
Sampled from 
susceptible 
farms
AdvisorASF
Visit to the production 
unit on another farm 
after a visit to the 
production unit of an 
infected farm earlier 
on the same day
Depending on 
the operational 
region of the 
advisor
Simulated Poisson 
process
Same operational 
region as an 
infected farm
Sampled from 
susceptible 
farms
AI technicianASF
AI technician has 
visited the production 
unit of an infected 
farm earlier on the 
same day
AI technician 
movement 
database
AI technician 
movement 
database
Year 2006, same AI 
technician after a 
visit to the infected 
farm
Same as 
susceptible 
farms
VeterinarianASF
Veterinarian has 
visited the production 
unit of an infected 
farm earlier on the 
same day
Depending on 
the operational 
region of the 
veterinarian
Simulated Poisson 
process
Same operational 
region as the 
infected farm
Sampled from 
susceptible 
farms
Substitute 
workerASF
Substitute worker 
operates on two 
farms during the 
same day and one of 
them is infected
Depending on 
the operational 
region of the 
substitute worker
Simulated Poisson 
process
Same operational 
region as the 
infected farm
Sampled from 
susceptible 
farms
Unknown Neighbouring farms within 1.5 km Farm database Eventless
Proximity from 
infected farm below 
the given value
Same as 
susceptible 
farms
Unknown Neighbouring farms within 1.5-3 km Farm database Eventless
Proximity from 
infected farm within 
given values
Same as 
susceptible 
farms
Airborne Neighbouring pig farms within 3 km Farm database Eventless
Proximity from 
infected farm below 
the given value
Same as 
susceptible 
farms
ASF Contact types that are relevant also in ASF simulation; others are only relevant in FMD simulation.
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Table 32. Number of visits per year and number of potential contacts per visit for those contact types 
where potential contacts during the infective period are estimated by an equation or a parameter.
Contact type Number of visits per year
Number of 
potential 
contacts per  
visit
Relief worker, pig farm a, c 31 0–1
Relief worker, cattle farm b, c 31 0–1
Relief worker, sheep/goat 
farm b, f 31 0–1
Cadaver transportation, 
pig farm d Bin(Poisson (0.376Zmax+2.035)
2, 0.66) 0–11
Cadaver transportation, 
cattle farm e Bin(Poisson (0.026Ndai+0.003Noth+1.507)
2, 0.27) 0–14
Cadaver transportation, 
sheep/goat farm 
Professional sheep farm = 3.3; 
other sheep and goat farms = 0.8 0–14
Advisor, pig farm d Bin(Poisson (0.376Zmax+2.035)
2, 0.34) 0–2
Advisor, cattle farm e Bin(Poisson (0.026Ndai+0.003Noth+1.507)
2, 0.73) 0–2
Advisors and other 
visitors, sheep/goat 
farm
Professional = 18; 
Semi-professional/hobby farm = 17; 
goat farm = 7
0–2
Veterinarian, pig farm Sow herd = 7.5; Mixed Herd = 7.9; Finisher herd = 4.2 0–2
Veterinarian, cattle farm 0.30Ndai+0.02Noth+1.53Idai+1.53 0–2
Veterinarian, sheep/goat 
farm 2.2 0–2
a The probability that a pig farm uses a relief worker =  
  exp(0.171+0.871If
+0.792I
m
+0.660 Z
max
)/ [1+exp(0.171+0.871If
+0.792I
m
+0.660Z
max
)]
b The probability that a cattle farm other than a dairy farm uses a relief worker is 10%
c The probability that a relief worker works on two farms at the same time is sampled from 
  beta(21,110)
d Cadaver collection and advisors for pig farms are simulated together: the total number sampled 
  from a Poisson distribution is divided  by binomial sampling between advisors and cadaver 
  collection
e Cadaver collection and advisors for cattle farms are simulated together: the total number 
  sampled from a Poisson distribution is divided  by binomial sampling between advisors and 
  cadaver collection
f The probability that a sheep/goat farm uses relief workers is 20%
Symbols:
If = Indicator of farrowing farm,
Im = indicator of farrowing-to-finishing farm,
Zmax = standardised sum of pigs, cattle, sheep and goats on the farm,
Nda = Number of dairy cattle on the farm,
Noth = Number of other cattle on the farm,
Idai = Indicator of dairy farm, random distributions:
Bin = binomial distribution,
Poisson = Poisson distribution
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Table 33. Infectivity (probability of transmission of disease / one contact) of contact types in FMD 
and ASF models.
Parameter Value Contact types Reference
FMD-model
P1 0.4 Direct animal contact Stevenson 2003
P2 0.15 Animal transportation vehicles, Cadaver collection vehicles Stevenson 2003
P3 0.005 Dairy tanker Stevenson 2003
P4 0.01 Relief worker, Advisor, Veterinarian, AI technician Stevenson 2003
P5a 0.063 Neighbourhood spread up to 1.5 km Taylor et al. 2004
P6a 0.025 Neighbourhood spread within 1.5–3 km Taylor et al. 2004
P7b 0.00438 Airborne spread from pig farms to cattle farms Velthuis & Mourits 2007
ASF-model
P1c ̴ N(0.065; 0.030) *Coef Direct animal contact
As in Raulo & Lyytikäinen 
2006; Based on Stegeman 
et al. 2002
P2c ̴ N(0.011; 0.005) *Coef
Animal transportation vehicles, 
Cadaver collection vehicles
As in Raulo & Lyytikäinen 
2006; Based on Stegeman 
et al. 2002
P4c ̴ N(0.007; 0.004) *Coef
Relief worker, Advisor, Visitor, 
Veterinarian, AI technician
As in Raulo & Lyytikäinen 
2006; Based on Stegeman 
et al. 2002
a Airborne spread from a cattle farm to other cattle farms in the FMD model is included in P5 and 
  P6 –Taylor et al. (2004) estimated the spread among cattle farms.
b For sheep farms, the value is scaled down by multiplying by 0.1 and for pig farms by multiplying 
  by 0.01
c A sampled value from the normal distribution was multiplied by a coefficient estimated (Coef) by 
  initial sampled values of that iteration; the coefficient followed a normal distribution: N(2.65; 0.61)
Spread model – The simulation process for bluetongue
The simulation process follows the same framework as the FMD and ASF models. 
The simulation process has five distinctive phases: 1) an initial phase that is required 
once per iteration, 2) estimation of the infective period of a farm, 3) estimation of the 
infective contacts, 4) the selection of a new infective farm and 5) if there are no new 
infected farms, the end phase of the iteration.
Initial phase
One farm is sampled randomly from the Finnish farm population to be the first infected 
farm of the iteration (Figure 45). In BT simulations, the first infected farm can be a 
cattle, sheep or goat farm.
In this assessment, the iterations were started on 15 June 2009 when the vectors are 
active. Animal transportations are sampled directly from the databases and are thus 
dependent on the starting date of the iteration.
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Infective period of a farm
The length of the period preceding suspicion is given as an input parameter for all the 
farms (Table 34). For other infected farms than the first one, there is no closed form 
to define the day of suspicion (Figure 52), as it depends on the time of introduction 
of the virus. Restrictive measures are put in force either due to suspicion or by admin-
istrative decision due to a farm being traced as a contact farm or being in an estab-
lished control, surveillance or protection zone (Figure 52).
The infective period of a farm has two phases: In the first phase, when restrictive 
measures do not apply to the farm, the disease can spread by vectors between farms 
and by transporting infected animals from one farm to another. When restrictive 
measures are effective at the farm, only spread by vectors can remain as an infective 
pathway, until the active season of the vector has ceased (Figure 52).
Table 34. Time-related parameters in bluetongue spread simulation.
Time-related parameter Value Reference
Start of vector-active season Day = 165* Finnish meteorological data
Non-infective period of a farm 14 days after virus introduction de Koeijer et al. 2011
The day of suspicion 59 days after the end of the non-infective period Finnish BT contingency plan
End of vector-active season Day = 256 Finnish meteorological data
Duration of vector-active season 91 days Finnish meteorological data
Time lag of tracing 0–7
*Day 0 is 1 January
In vector-borne diseases, spread is possible during the vector-active season. The 
infective process starts at the beginning of the vector-active season and ceases at the 
end of the vector-active season. The vector-active season is temperature dependent: 
according to de Koeijer et al. (2011), spread between farms is mainly observed when 
the 14-day average temperature is above 15 °C.
According to Finnish meteorological information, there is yearly variation in the length 
of this period (Figure 50). The simulation time frame, for the sake of simplicity, was 
defined applying the temperature conditions in Helsinki in 2009. Helsinki is located in 
the southern part of Finland and has one of the longest vector-active seasons in the 
country. The vector-active season was estimated to be 91 days in 2009 and started 
on 15 June (Figure 51).
Figure 50. Moving average 
(14 days) temperature in 
Helsinki in 1993–2012; 
15 °C is indicated by a 
dashed line.
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Figure 51. Moving average temperature in Helsinki in 2009; 15 °C is indicated by a dashed line. 
The vector-active season is defined as the area above the dashed line.
The time for the detection of BT was indirectly assumed in the Finnish contingency 
plan to be 60 days, where the time limit for contact tracing was set. Therefore, a 59-
day period before detection was applied in simulations (Table 34).
Figure 52. The events defining the infective period of potential pathways of spread to other farms 
for bluetongue.
The day of suspicion of farm A
Moving average temperature 
declines below 15 °C
The starting day of infective 
period of farm A
The day of introduction of virus to 
a certain farm A
Non-
infective
latent
period
The day when farm A is put 
under restrictive measures  
End of infective period of vector-borne 
spread from farm A
End of infective period of animal 
transports from farm A
Always
End of infective period
Farm A is located in the 
control, surveillance or 
protection  zone of a 
detected and infected farm
Farm A is traced  to be a 
contact farm of another  
already detected and 
infected  farm
Another farm or farms have 
earlier  been diagnosed  positive 
for BT 
Time-lag 
of tracing
If Farm A is NOT the primary infected farm
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Simulation of spread from infected farm(s)
Infectivity and contacts during the infective period partially define the number of 
new farms becoming infected. Furthermore, the distance from an already infected 
farm defines the risk of virus introduction due to vector-borne spread. If new farms 
become infected, infective contacts and vector-borne spread from these farms are 
then simulated and the iteration continues.
When the time of introduction of the virus, the non-infective period and the end of 
the infective period are known, it is possible to sample related animal transports from 
databases. The prevalence of infection is estimated by a separate function and 
partially defines the transmission of disease.
The probability that at least one animal in a transported batch is infected is inversely 
related to the prevalence of infection:
P(transmission)= 1-(1-Prev)n, where Prev is the prevalence of infection and n is the 
number of animals in the transported batch. Transmission can then be simulated by 
performing a Bernoulli trial for each transported batch within the infectious period.
 
Vector-borne spread is tested separately for each farm in the susceptible population, 
which is determined by the spatial kernel (see below).
Steps applied in the simulation of bluetongue spread are as follows:
Testing of which contacts are infective (Bernoulli trials) before restrictive measures 
are in force.
Simulation of vector-borne spread during the vector-active season and testing of 
whether any vector-induced infections have occurred during the vector-active season.
If a farm is infected by several other farms or by several different contacts, the fastest 
route of spread is taken into account in the simulation and others are excluded. When 
there are no more new infections during the iteration, the iteration ends.
Spatial kernel
Spatial kernel in de Koeijer et al. 2011 was defined as:
λ(r) = λ0 /[1 + (r/ r0)] 
α
where r is the inter-farm distance (km), λ0 is the initial rate of transmission and r0 is 
a scaling distance. When the distance is known, the probability of transmission can 
then be estimated by:
p(r, T) = 1 − exp−λ(r)T , 
where T is the infectious period (days). The probability of transmission for each farm 
in the country could thereafter be sampled by simulating the binomial distribution 
Bin(1, p(r, T)), separately for each farm, conditionally on the distance from a certain 
infected farm.
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The parameters applied for our model (Table 35) were originally estimated for the 
2007 outbreak in Germany but suggested by the author (Koeijer, personal communi- 
cation 2014) to be more suitable for Finnish conditions than the general model 
describing spread in Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany (Koeijer et al. 2011).
Prevalence of infection
The prevalence of infection in the bluetongue model was defined similarly as in 
Turner et al. (2012) (Table 35), where it was assumed to follow a curve analogous to 
a curve originally developed for dengue fever (Pongsumpun et al. 2008):
Prev = (prevlim/4) (1-tanh[(L1-Tinf)/T1]) (1-tanh[(Tinf–L2)/T2]),
where t = time, Tinf = time from virus introduction, T1, T2, L1 and L2 are parameters 
defined by Turner et al. (2012). The model is valid when the temperature is above the 
cut-off temperature of 10.5 °C.
The prevalence of infection appears to peak 20–40 days after virus introduction and 
then decline slowly (Figure 53).
Figure 53. The dynamics 
of the within-herd preva-
lence of infection in a blue-
tongue outbreak, when 
the temperature remains 
constantly above the cut-
off temperature of 10.5 °C.
Table 35. Bluetongue-specific parameters for the simulation of spread in Finland.
Parameter Value Reference
λ0, initial rate of transmission 0.0000092 de Koeijer et al. 2011
r0, scaling distance 18 de Koeijer et al. 2011
α 3.2 de Koeijer et al. 2011
L1 16 Turner et al. 2012
L2 54 Turner et al. 2012
T1 7 Turner et al. 2012
T2 27 Turner et al. 2012
prevlima 0.355 Turner et al. 2012
a Assuming that the susceptibility of each farm is 1, i.e. no previous bluetongue infections are 
  assumed.
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Appendix 4: Risk management 2009–2011
Voluntary risk management measures
Biosecurity on cattle, pig, sheep and goat farms in Finland
The Finnish Association for Animal Disease Prevention (ETT) is an organisation that 
promotes animal health and welfare in the Finnish livestock sector. ETT prepares 
explicit instructions for the import of animals, semen and embryos. In addition, it 
contributes to the instructions for farms for the management of disease risks and 
preventive measures.
There are several ways to enhance biosecurity and reduce the risk of disease trans-
mission between farms. Control measures applied to the trade and transport of 
animals, including quarantine, vaccination, veterinary inspection and documentation, 
as well as logistical planning of transport routes, are important ways of mitigating 
the spread of disease.
The most common biosecurity measures applied (based on questionnaires conducted 
in 2011, see Appendix 1) seem to be protective boots and clothes, hand washing and 
control of rodents and birds entering the production unit. Generally, the least applied 
measures were related to loading areas as well as to the cleaning of loading areas 
and animal stables between batches.
In general, pig herds have better biosecurity than cattle herds in Finland. Several 
biosecurity measures related to pig production were not generally applied in the 
cattle sector, which is natural: there is no motivation to have a separate loading area 
indoors or adjacent to an indoor production facility when the animals are collected 
from or held outdoors. Similarly, it is not relevant to clean the loading area if it does 
not exist. The same applies to hygiene barriers controlling the movement of humans 
into indoor production units. Having a leak-proof container outside the animal stables 
was seldom applied on average-sized cattle farms. This is probably a result of the 
small number of animals and low mortality, and the container would consequently 
be used only rarely.
A positive effect of herd size for applying biosecurity measures was evident: in the 
pig production sector, 7–8 out of 17 biosecurity measures showed a farm size-related 
positive effect. In the cattle sector, dairy farms showed the most size-related positive 
effects (10), and beef cattle (7) and suckler farms (4) clearly less. 
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Table 36. Implementation of biosecurity measures in 2011. Coefficients from the GLM models are transformed into 
likelihoods for the implementation of biosecurity measures on average-sized pig and cattle farms in Finland based on 
a questionnaire survey among farmers [% (±95% CI)]; see Appendix 1 and Sahlström et al. (2014)
Variable description
Pig farm type Cattle
Farrowing Farrowing-to-finishing Finishing Dairy 
Beef 
cattle
Suckler 
cow
The farmer and his family use 
protective clothing in the 
stables
94 (±5)* 85 (±6) 88 (±6) 63 (±3)* 68 (±7) 61 (±8)*
The farmer and his family use 
boots or protective shoes in 
the stables
81 (±7) 75 (±7) 88 (±6) 64 (±3)*** 60(±8) 65 (±8)
Visitors use protective clothing 
(coveralls) 89 (±6) 86 (±6)*** 82 (±8)*** 54 (±4)*** 43 (±8)*** 27 (±8)*
Visitors use boots 81 (±6) 81 (±7)*** 80 (±8)*** 70 (±3)*** 52 (±8)*** 54 (±9)***
The farmer and his family 
wash their hands after working 
in the stable 
95 (±4)** 92 (±5) 87 (±6) 88 (±2)** 86 (±5) 81 (±7)
Visitors wash their hands after 
the visit 85 (±6)* 75 (±7) 67 (±8) 63 (±3) 45 (±8) 42 (±8)
The use of a hygiene barrier 
that separates the clean area 
from the dirty area and that is 
not passed without changing 
protective clothing and shoes.
41 (±8)* 31 (±8)* 29 (±8) 12 (±2)*** 10 (±5) 9 (±5)
The use of a separate loading 
area 72 (±9)*** 77 (±7) 33 (±9)*** 3 (±1)*** 2 (±2) 7 (±5)
Washing the loading area after 
use 28 (±8) 39 (±8) 21(±8) 2 (±1) 1 (±1) 3 (±3)
Outside the animal stables 
there is a leak-proof container 
for dead animals
59 (±9)*** 65 (±8)*** 70 (±9)*** 1 (±1) 0 (±1)* 0 (±1)
The animal stables are 
cleaned between each “batch” 36 (±8) 42 (±8) 81 (±7) 17 (±2) 48 (±8)** 25 (±7)
Doors are locked 57 (±9)** 52 (±8)* 64(±9)*** 12 (±2) 16 (±6) 8 (±5)
Animals are divided into 
compartments 69(±10)*** 61 (±8)*** 58 (±10)*** 11 (±2)*** 25 (±8)*** 29(±8)
The traffic on the farm is 
organized so that biosecurity 
aspects are taken into account
49 (±8) 47 (±8)* 36 (±9)** 28 (±3)*** 21 (±8)*** 27 (±8)***
Control of rodents and birds 91 (±5) 91 (±5) 98(±3) 76 (±3)** 76 (±7)*** 71(±8)
Control of rodents and birds in 
the animal stable or shelter at 
the feeding table
54 (±8) 64 (±8) 63 (±9) 52 (±3)*** 38 (±8) 16 (±6)
Control of rodents and birds in 
the feed storage 55 (±8) 65(±8)* 68 (±9) 41 (±3)* 34 (±7) 29 (±8)
The statistically significant effect of farm size is marked as follows: ***<0.001, **<0.01 and *<0.05. Average-sized 
farms in the model: farrowing = 209, farrowing-to-finishing = 435, finishing = 663, dairy = 50, beef cattle = 58, suckler 
cow = 68 animals. Note that these refer to the mean value in the original scale.
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Protective measures associated with animal trading
According to questionnaires (Appendix 1), farmers may apply several additional 
biosecurity measures that influence the risk to receive diseases with purchased 
animals (Table 37). The most applied protective measures involve “follow the instruc-
tions of ETT” and “try to buy animals from as small a number of farmers as possible”.
The origin of animals was more often checked before buying if a farm produced 
animals to sell live to another farm (farrowing, farrowing-to-finishing, dairy and suckler 
cow farms) and on farms that only occasionally buy animals. A similar trend also 
applies to requiring health certificates before buying animals, although in pig produc-
tion health certificates were required far less than in the cattle sector, partly because 
the actual health certificate system is not applied in the pig sector. However, the 
health status of the farm of origin can also be checked in the pig sector. Cattle farms 
and finishing pig farms cannot buy animals from the same farms as often as farms 
that have sows. Transporting animals in the farm’s own vehicle seemed to be more 
usual in the cattle than in the pig production sector. Slaughterhouse companies act as 
animal dealers most often when animals are entering the finishing stage of produc-
tion (finishing farms and beef cattle farms). Some kind of (quarantine like) isolation 
for incoming new animals is applied at least on dairy farms and finishing pig farms 
(Table 37).
Table 37. Implementation of biosecurity measures when purchasing animals in 2011. Coefficients from the GLM 
models are transformed into likelihoods for the implementation of biosecurity measures on typically sized pig and 
cattle farms in Finland based on a questionnaire survey among farmers [% (±95% CI)]; see Appendix 1. Only 
respondents who have declared that they buy animals were taken into account.
Variable description
Pig farm type Cattle
Farrowing Farrowing-to- finishing Finishing Dairy 
Beef 
cattle
Suckler 
cow
Follow the instructions of ETT 97 (±3) 88 (±7) 94 (±5) 92(±5)** 85 (±7) 91 (±7)
Checking the origins of 
animals before buying 72 (±12)* 63 (±11) 41 (±11) 90 (±4) 39 (±9) 86 (±8)
Require a health certificate 45 (±30) 40 (±20) 20 (±14) 67(±7) 11 (±6) 75 (±12)
before buying 36 (±12) 41 (±11) 17 (±8) 71(±5) 12 (±6) 80 (±10)
Try to buy animals from as 
few farms as possible 95 (±5) 93 (±6) 87 (±7) 92(±3) 64 (±10)* 91(±8)
Buy animals mainly from the 
same farms 87 (±8) 84 (±8) 64 (±11)* 57(±4)* 52 (±10) 62 (±12)
Transport animals with own 
vehicle 17 (±9)* 27 (±10) 12(±7) 37(±6) 42 (±10)* 23 (±10)*
Animals are dealt with by a 
slaughterhouse 82 (±9) 83(±8) 93(±5) 21(±5)* 85 (±6)** 58 (±12)*
Animals are placed in quaran-
tine upon arrival 56 (±12) 35(±12) 14(±8) 16(±5)** 40 (±9) 48(±13)
According to the questionnaire, the probability of buying animals on a farm of a typical size: Farrowing = 69%, farrow-
ing-to-finishing = 68%, finishing = 93%, dairy = 33%, beef cattle = 92% and suckler cow = 74%.
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Official risk management measures during an FMD or ASF outbreak
FMD and ASF are OIE-listed diseases and their control is regarded as a high priority 
(Cox & Barnett 2009). Because they are viral diseases, there is no treatment for the 
sick animal, and as a notifiable disease they should be eradicated.
A possible FMD or ASF outbreak in Finland is dependent on the disease situation in 
Europe and the rest of the world. Current control policies in Europe are based on strict 
import and quarantine regulations. 
FMD and ASF are controlled both by European directives and through more detailed 
national legislation and a contingency plans. The national contingency plans contain 
detailed descriptions of operations in the case of an FMD or ASF suspicion and confir-
mation. According to the law, all veterinarians under 50 years of age and veterinary 
students are permitted to work as veterinarians and obliged, if needed, to contribute 
to inspections and other veterinary work needed in case of an outbreak of FMD or ASF.
The Provincial Veterinary Officer (PVO), Municipal Veterinary Officer (MVO) and the 
Food Safety Authority (Evira) must immediately be notified about signs of FMD or ASF. 
In the case of a suspicion of FMD or ASF, a farm will be placed under restrictive 
measures. This includes the prevention of animal transports, and all traffic to and 
from the farm is prohibited or strictly controlled. Samples for analysis are taken 
according to instructions from the competent authorities in the country (Evira). If a 
diagnosis of FMD or ASF is confirmed, or even earlier if indicated by other evidence, 
the animals of the susceptible species on the farm are immediately culled and the 
farm is cleaned and disinfected under the supervision of an official veterinarian.
An epidemiological inquiry that includes identification of the contact farms is 
performed for the confirmed, infected farm. Contact farm definition is variable and 
depends on the disease. In case of FMD, the definition of contact farms includes all 
farms that in some direct or indirect way have been in contact with cloven-hoofed 
animals at the suspected farm, or may have acquired the infection from the same 
origin. All farms that have received or delivered animals from or to the suspected or 
infected farm during the 14 days (cattle and pigs), or 21 days for sheep, prior to the 
first clinical signs are regarded as contact farms. Contact farms are also farms that are 
situated within a radius of 1 km from the suspected/infected farm. In addition, farms 
that have been on the same route as the suspected/infected farm regarding, for 
instance, a transport vehicle or veterinarian during 2–3 days prior to the detection, 
are considered as contacts according to the Finnish contingency plan (Evira 2014a).
In an ASF outbreak, all farms that have received or delivered pigs from or to the 
suspected or infected farm during the preceding 40 days are regarded as contact 
farms. Contact farms are also farms that are situated within a radius of 1 km from the 
suspected/infected farm. In addition, farms that have been on the same route as the 
suspected/infected farm regarding, for instance, a transport vehicle or veterinarian 
during 2–3 days prior to the detection are considered as contacts according to the 
Finnish contingency plan (Evira 2014b). All contact holdings are put under restrictive 
measures.
Immediately after an outbreak of FMD or ASF is confirmed, the competent authori-
ties establish a protection zone with a minimum radius of 3 km and a surveillance 
zone with a minimum radius of 10 km around the infected farm. In the protection and 
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surveillance zones, no animals or animal products may be removed from their 
holdings.
All animals in the protection and surveillance zone and on contact farms outside the 
zones must be listed, clinically inspected and the measures documented by an 
official veterinarian at the latest 7 days after the zone is established or the contact 
farm is traced. The farms closest to the infected farm (1 km radius) are to be inspected 
within 2 days. In case of clinical symptoms, samples are taken according to instruc-
tions in the contingency plan. No animals are allowed to be moved from the farms 
were they are kept.
The restrictive measures can be lifted at the infected farm when all susceptible 
animals have been disposed of and disinfection of the premises has been performed. 
Restrictive measures can be lifted on contact farms that are not in the restrictive 
zones when clinical inspection has not indicated any symptoms of disease, and in the 
case of sheep and goats and FMD, a negative serological survey has been conducted 
and 21 days has elapsed following the last contact with an infected farm. At farms in 
restrictive zones, the restrictive measures can be lifted when at least 15 days in the 
protection zone and 30 days in the surveillance zone has elapsed since the culling of 
animals and preliminary disinfection of the infected farm, provided that a clinical 
examination and a serological survey, in case of sheep and goats, has given nega-
tive results.
Official risk management measures during a BT outbreak
Bluetongue is an OIE listed disease that has to be controlled according to law and 
directives. However, in contrast to many other diseases, BT control is not based on 
disposing of animals and disinfection of stables due to its nature as a vector-borne 
disease. The control of BT is not as straightforwardly regulated as for ASF and FMD and 
is dependent on different factors and the disease situation at hand. The control 
pattern may depend on whether an infected animal is detected during the vector-
free period, whether the animal is a recently imported animal, whether the disease is 
present in neighbouring countries and whether it has already spread to several farms.
In case of a BT suspicion that originates from a native animal, the farm is immedi-
ately placed under restrictive measures and it is prohibited to move animals to and 
from the farm. In the close neighbourhood within a radius of 20 km from the infected 
farm, an infective zone is established. In the first place, all farms with ruminants in 
this zone are monitored in order to check for infection and disease spread. A protec-
tive zone with a minimum radius of 100 km is established around the infected farm, 
and a control zone is established 50 km outside the protective zone. Inside the zone, 
animal movements are restricted without distinct permission from the authorities.
If the infection is detected during summer, most probably the decision to vaccinate 
herds in the infective zone would be made immediately after the infection is verified, 
or at least after 2–5 farms are infected. For instance, in Sweden, there is a vaccination 
plan in case of BT infection stating that vaccination would start immediately if the 
infection was verified during the vector-active period. In 2008, vaccinations began 
in Sweden two days after the verification of BT (Lewerin et al. 2010). In Finland, 
vaccination would, however, start after a longer delay, because there is no valid 
agreement with any vaccination company about providing vaccines at the moment 
and it would take some time to gather enough personnel for the vaccination teams. 
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The experts estimated the time delay due to vaccine delivery to Finland is at least 
one week from the decision to vaccinate. All other ruminants older than 1 year 
except goats and exotic ruminants would be vaccinated unless they were planned to 
be slaughtered within the next two months.
Appendix 5: Reference simulation results under the 2009 situation
In order to approximate the magnitude of the change, reference simulation results 
are compared against the results of future projection simulations. As future projec-
tions are not available for sheep/goat production, this sector is excluded from the 
reference simulations. Basic outcomes for a simulation are the size of an outbreak 
(number of infected farms at the end) and the probabilities of an epidemic (>1 
infected farm) and a large outbreak (>17 infected farms). A coefficient of variation 
(CV = standard deviation (SD)/mean of epidemic size) can be applied as an indi- 
cator of the relative variability of epidemic outbreaks.
Estimated risk management consequences of an outbreak are 1) the number of 
animals on infected farms, ie. the number of animals that need to be culled due to 
an outbreak of FMD or ASF 2) the number of farms and animals that are in the control 
(BT), protection and surveillance zones (FMD, ASF and BT). This reflects the number of 
farms that are put under restrictive measures and at least part of them are inspected 
for disease occurrence. The number of traced contact farms is also a relevant outcome 
of an outbreak, but it is much more difficult to estimate. The economic impact of 
traced contacts is in general small and they are therefore left out of this assessment.
FMD simulation (without sheep/goat production related spread)
Figure 54. Distribution of the number of infected farms following 100 000 iterations of FMD spread 
simulation.
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FMD simulation typically produced some spread of the disease beyond the index farm 
(Figure 54). The mean size of an epidemic outbreak was 11.91 farms (CV = 1.71). The 
probability of an epidemic outbreak was 0.63 and the probability of a large outbreak 
was 0.10. The number of infected farms markedly influenced the number of farms in 
the protection and surveillance zones: one infected farm caused on average 6 non-
infected farms in the protection zone and 20 non-infected farms in the surveillance 
zone (Table 38). The models have a high coefficient of determination (R2), but they 
are not applicable for the prediction of a single outbreak; rather, they describe the 
general trend. In a typical-sized epidemic outbreak, 65 non-infected farms are located 
in protection and 265 in surveillance zones.
The number of infected farms can be used to predict the number of animals on infected 
farms and non-infected farms in protection and surveillance zones. The expected 
numbers of cattle involved in an outbreak are larger than the expected numbers of 
pigs. The number of animals on non-infected farms in protection zones appears to be 
3–7 times higher and in surveillance zones 13–25 times higher than on infected farms 
on average (Table 39). Coefficients of determination indicate that the number of 
cattle involved in an outbreak is much more clearly linearly dependent on the 
number of infected farms than is the number of involved pigs, as these coefficients 
are higher for cattle than for pigs (Table 39).
Table 38. The relationship between the number of FMD-infected farms and the number of non- 
infected farms (y) in protection and surveillance zones. The relationship equation is y = a*(number 
of infected farms)+b, where a and b are estimated coefficients. The standard error (SE) of coeffi-
cients is given in parentheses. Models are valid when the number of infected farms is >1.
Variable y Coefficient a (SE)
Coefficient b 
(SE) R
2
Mean number of farms 
for epidemic outbreaks 
(SD)*
Number of farms in 
protection zones 5.596 (0.005) -2.978 (0.094) 0.931 64.8 (124.0)
Number of farms in 
surveillance zones 19.994 (0.017) 16.124 (0.330) 0.933 265.0 (438.7)
*Only indicative of variation, as the distribution is highly skewed
Table 39. The relationship between the number of FMD-infected farms and the number of pigs 
and cattle on infected farms in protection and surveillance zones. The relationship equation is y = 
a*(number of infected farms)+b, where a and b are estimated coefficients. The SE of the coefficient 
is given in parentheses. Models are valid when the number of infected farms is >1.
Variable y Coefficient a (SE)
Coefficient b 
(SE) R
2
Mean number of 
animals for epidemic 
outbreaks (SD)**
Number of pigs on 
infected farms 15.5 (0.3) 205.6 (5.2) 0.032 495 (1 897)
Number of cattle on 
infected farms 99.8 (0.1) -147.9 (1.5) 0.941 1 028 (2 196)
Number of pigs in 
protection zones 236.6 (0.8) 406.5 (16.2) 0.449 3 455 (7 572)
Number of cattle in 
protection zones 312.4 (0.3) -259.6 (6.3) 0.902 3 489 (7 054)
Number of pigs in 
surveillance zones 655.7 (3.1) 3 976.5 (49.7) 0.318 12 362 (20 113)
Number of cattle in 
surveillance zones 1 057.8 (1.1) 443.6 (19.4) 0.908 13 072 (21 810)
*Piglets under 3 months and cattle under 6 months are not included in these quantities.
**Only indicative of variation, as the distribution is highly skewed
The effects of structural change in agriculture on the spread of animal disease in Finland
131
The production sector has a large impact on the expected size of an outbreak. If 
the primary infected farm is in the cattle sector, the average size of the epidemic 
outbreak is more than twice as large as when the primary farm operates in the pig 
sector (Table 40). Similarly, the probability of an epidemic and a large outbreak is 
higher when the primary infected farm is a cattle farm. The cattle sector is even more 
isolated in this sense. When an outbreak starts in the cattle sector, it affects almost 
solely cattle farms.
Table 40. The mean size (number of infected farms) and CV of an epidemic outbreak, the probability 
of an epidemic and a large outbreak, and the number of infected farms according to the sector of 
the primary infected farm.
Production sector  
of the primary 
infected farm
Mean size 
of epidemic 
outbreak
CV of size 
of epidemic 
outbreaks
P(epidemic 
outbreak)
P(large 
outbreak)
Infected pig 
farms/cattle 
farms
Pig 5.87 1.55 0.58 0.03 4.29/1.58
Cattle 12.71 1.67 0.64 0.11 0.29/12.42
The farm type of the primary infected farm also affects the characteristics of the 
expected outcome. A pig farm as the primary infected farm is able to produce an 
epidemic outbreak more often than beef cattle and suckler cow farms, although such 
epidemics are smaller. Dairy farms have the highest probability of producing epi- 
demics and large outbreaks. In addition, the average size of an epidemic outbreak is 
the highest when a dairy farm is the primary infected farm (Table 41).
Table 41.  Effect of the type of the primary infected farm on the simulated outcomes of FMD spread 
(Total N = 100 000 iterations).
Farm type of 
primary 
infected farm
Mean size of 
epidemic 
outbreak
CV of size 
of epidemic 
outbreaks
P(epidemic 
outbreak)
P(large 
outbreak)
N of 
iterations
Farrowing 6.02 1.24 0.67 0.04 4 125
Farrowing-to-
finishing 6.12 1.69 0.58 0.03 4 534
Finishing 5.26 1.77 0.49 0.02 3 635
Dairy 13.35 1.62 0.72 0.14 65 626
Beef cattle 9.70 1.84 0.41 0.05 13 698
Suckler cow 7.77 2.10 0.33 0.03 8 361
When sheep and goat production-related spread is not simulated, cattle and pig 
farms that have sheep or goats produce 5% smaller epidemic outbreaks than when 
it is simulated. On these farms, further spread (i.e. an epidemic outbreak) is more 
infrequent than on cattle and pig farms that do not have sheep or goats (Table 42).
Table 42. Simulated outcomes of FMD spread on farms having and not having sheep and goats, 
when sheep or goat-related spread is not taken in account in the simulation.
Production 
sector of  
primary 
infected farm
Mean size 
of epidemic 
outbreak
CV of size 
of epidemic 
outbreaks
P(epidemic 
outbreak)
P(large 
outbreak)
Number of 
infected pig 
farms/cattle 
farms
Pig and cattle 
farms with 
sheep or goats
11.40 1.74 0.48 0.08 0.53/10.87
Pig and cattle 
farms without 
sheep or goats 
11.95 1.69 0.63 0.11 0.73/11.22
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Figure 55. The contribution of different contact types to the further spread of FMD (n = 100 000). 
The definition of contact types is identical to Table 54.
Table 43. The effect of the PVO district of the primary infected farm on the probability of an 
epidemic outbreak, as well as the mean size (number of infected farms) and coefficient of variation 
of an epidemic outbreak in FMD spread simulations.
PVO district P(epidemic) Mean size of epidemic outbreak (SD) CV
Helsinki 0.52 9.34 (16.18) 1.73
Vaasa 0.66 11.11 (18.24) 1.64
Oulu 0.66 12.92 (21.80) 1.69
Rovaniemi 0.60 11.21 (19.65) 1.75
Turku 0.57 7.32 (12.53) 1.71
Maarianhamina 0.35 3.77 (5.22) 1.38
Hämeenlinna 0.59 9.56 (16.68) 1.74
Tampere 0.55 9.43  (17.71) 1.87
Kouvola 0.63 11.85 (18.95) 1.59
Mikkeli 0.60 12.56 (20.36) 1.62
Joensuu 0.65 13.54 (21.85) 1.61
Kuopio 0.71 17.92 (27.41) 1.53
Jyväskylä 0.61 10.79 (19.03) 1.76
*The distributions are not symmetrical and SD cannot therefore be applied directly in confidence 
  limit estimation.
Animal transport
Animal transport vehicles
Other traffic
Spatial spread
The spread of FMD occurs mostly due to animal transport and vehicles. Spatial spread 
accounts for less than 10% of the total spread in FMD simulations (Figure 55). The 
likelihood of an epidemic outbreak is the highest when the primary infected farm is 
located in the Vaasa, Oulu or Kuopio PVO districts (Table 43).
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ASF simulation
Figure 56. The distribution of the number of infected farms in ASF spread simulation (N = 100 000 
iterations).
The simulated outcome of ASF (Figure 56) is substantially less variable than in FMD 
simulations (Figure 54). The grand mean size of an epidemic outbreak was 2.60 farms 
(CV = 0.46) and the probability of an epidemic outbreak was 0.23. The number of in-
fected farms markedly influenced the number of farms in protection and surveillance 
zones: one infected farm caused on average 3 non-infected farms in the protection 
zone and 14 non-infected farms in the surveillance zone (Table 44). The regression 
models have low coefficients of determination, indicating that there are also other 
factors influencing the number of infected farms than those taken into account in the 
estimation. An average-sized epidemic outbreak involved 8 non-infected farms in 
protection zones and 40 non-infected farms in surveillance zones.
The number of infected farms can be used to predict the number of animals on infect-
ed farms and non-infected farms in protection and surveillance zones. The number of 
animals on non-infected farms in protection zones appears to be 3 times higher and 
in surveillance zones 12 times higher than on infected farms on average (Table 45). 
Coefficients of determination indicate that the number of animals is also influenced 
by other things than the number of infected farms (Table 45).
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Table 44. The relationship between the number of ASF-infected farms and the number of non-
infected farms in protection and surveillance zones. The relationship equation is y = a*(number of 
infected farms)+b, where a and b are estimated coefficients. The SE of the coefficient is given in 
parentheses. Models are valid when number of infected farms is >1.
Variable y a b R2
Mean number of farms 
for epidemic outbreaks 
(SD)*
Number of non-
infected farms in 
protection zones
3.248 (0.016) -0.119 (0.026) 0.294 8.4 (7.9)
Number of non-
infected farms in 
surveillance zones
14.139 (0.062) 1.769 (0.102) 0.345 39.7 (30.6)
*Only indicative of variation, as the distribution is highly skewed
Table 45. The relationship between the number of ASF-infected farms and the number of pigs* on 
infected farms, in protection and in surveillance zones. The relationship equation is y = a*(number 
of infected farms)+b, where a and b are estimated coefficients. The SE of the coefficient is given in 
parentheses. Models are valid when number of infected farms is >1.
Variable y a b R2
Mean number of pigs 
for epidemic outbreaks 
(SD)**
Number of pigs on 
infected farms 840.3 (2.6) -429.0 (4.2) 0.520 1 780 (1 622)
Number of pigs in 
protection zones 1 734.4 (10.3) -130.2 (17.0) 0.221 4 448 (4 815)
Number of pigs in 
surveillance zones 7 351.1 (39.0) 807.8 (63.6) 0.262 20 546 (17 079)
*Piglets under 3 months are not included
**Only indicative of variation, as the distribution is highly skewed
The type of the primary infected farm influenced the expected outcome of an 
outbreak. If the outbreak started on a farrowing farm, it had the highest probability 
of ending up as being an epidemic outbreak (Table 46). The expected size of an 
epidemic outbreak was not influenced by the farm type of the primary infected farm.
The spread of ASF was mostly due to animal transport and vehicles (Figure 57). An 
epidemic outbreak was most likely to be initiated when the primary infected farm 
was located in the Vaasa, Turku or Kuopio PVO districts (Table 47).
Table 46. The effect of farm type on the simulated outcomes of ASF outbreaks (Total N = 100 000 
iterations).
Farm type of 
primary infected 
farm
Mean size of 
epidemic 
outbreak
CV of size of  
epidemic 
outbreaks
P(epidemic 
outbreak)
P(large 
outbreak)
N of 
iterations
Farrowing 2.66 0.47 0.33 <0.01 32 748
Farrowing-to-
finishing 2.65 0.54 0.22 <0.01 37 363
Finishing 2.42 0.36 0.13  0.00 29 889
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Figure 57. The contribution of different contact types to the simulated further spread of ASF in 
Finland (N = 100 000 iterations). The definition of contact types is identical to Table 54.
Table 47. The effect of the PVO district of the primary infected farm on the probability of an epidemic 
outbreak, as well as the mean size (number of infected farms) and coefficient of variation of an 
epidemic outbreak in ASF spread simulation.
PVO district P(epidemic) Mean size of epidemic outbreak (SD) CV
Helsinki 0.18 2.47 (0.94) 0.38
Vaasa 0.24 2.64 (1.26) 0.47
Oulu 0.24 2.48 (0.93) 0.38
Rovaniemi 0.04 2.00 (na) na
Turku 0.25 2.66 (1.41) 0.53
Maarianhamina 0.07 2.22 (0.51) 0.22
Hämeenlinna 0.22 2.53 (0.98) 0.39
Tampere 0.22 2.54 (1.05) 0.41
Kouvola 0.19 2.46 (0.86) 0.35
Mikkeli 0.17 2.32 (0.67) 0.29
Joensuu 0.15 2.28 (0.65) 0.28
Kuopio 0.26 2.99 (1.80) 0.60
Jyväskylä 0.19 2.43 (0.87) 0.36
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BT simulation (without sheep and goat production-related spread)
Figure 58. Number of farms infected according to bluetongue spread simulations (N = 100 000 
iterations).
BT was occasionally simulated to spread from the primary infected farm (Figure 58), 
but the size of an outbreak was markedly smaller and the probability of an epidemic 
outbreak was lower than in FMD simulations. The grand mean size of epidemic out-
breaks was 2.80 farms (coefficient of variation (CV) = 0.75) and the probability of an 
epidemic outbreak was 0.24. The number of infected farms significantly influenced 
the number of farms in control, protection and surveillance zones, because for each 
infected farm there were on average 119 non-infected farms in control zones, 875 
non-infected farms in protection zones and 178 non-infected farms in surveillance 
zones (Table 48). In an epidemic outbreak, 331 non-infected farms are located in 
control, 3 637 in protection and 2 538 in surveillance zones on average (Table 48).
Table 48. The relationship between the number of BT-infected cattle farms and the number of non-
infected cattle farms in control, protection and surveillance zones. The relationship equation is y = 
a*(number of infected farms)+b, where a and b are estimated coefficients. The SE of the coefficient 
is given in parentheses. Models are valid when the number of infected farms is >1.
Variable y a b R2
Mean number of 
farms for epidemic 
outbreaks (SD)**
Number of farms in 
control zones 119.044 (0.213) -2.133 (0.409) 0.757 331 (282)
Number of farms in 
protection zones 875.288 (2.369) 1051.762 (4.548) 0.577 3 637 (2 238)
Number of farms in 
surveillance zones 178.323 (2.081) 1814.678 (3.994) 0.068 2 538 (1 029)
*Only indicative of variation, as the distribution is highly skewed
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The number of farms in control, protection and surveillance zones was so high that 
the number of cattle on the farms could be approximated to be the average number 
of animals on Finnish farms. For one farm in the zones, it can be expected that on 
average 19 (SD = 21) dairy and 33 (SD = 50) other cows are involved. These estimates 
do not include cattle under the age of 6 months.
If the primary infected farm was a dairy farm, the probability of an epidemic outbreak 
was almost three times higher than when the primary infected farm was a beef 
cattle or suckler cow farm (Table 49).
Table 49. The effect of the farm type on simulated outcomes of BT outbreaks (Total N = 100 000 
iterations).
Farm type of  
primary 
infected farm
Mean number of 
farms of  
epidemic outbreak
CV of size of 
epidemic 
outbreaks
P(epidemic 
outbreak)
P(large 
outbreak)
N of 
iterations
Dairy 2.75 0.72 0.28 <0.01 74 899
Beef Cattle 3.12 0.86 0.11 <0.01 15 372
Suckler Cow 3.32 0.94 0.10 <0.01 9 729
There were differences in the spread potentiality between PVO districts. If the primary 
farm was located in the Vaasa PVO district, the probability of an epidemic outbreak 
was approximately two times higher than when the primary infected farm was located 
elsewhere. The expected size of an outbreak was larger if the outbreak started in the 
Vaasa PVO district than when it started elsewhere (Table 50).
Table 50. The effect of the location of the primary infected farm on the probability of an epidemic 
outbreak, the expected size of the epidemic outbreak (number of infected farms) and the coefficient 
of variation of size in BT spread simulations.
PVO district P(epidemic) Mean number of farms for epidemic  outbreak (Std) CV
Helsinki 0.20 2.08 (0.27) 0.10
Vaasa 0.42 3.92 (3.22) 0.82
Oulu 0.21 2.27 (0.55) 0.24
Rovaniemi 0.18 2.04(0.22) 0.11
Turku 0.15 2.19 (0.50) 0.23
Maarianhamina 0.14 2.06 (0.27) 0.13
Hämeenlinna 0.19 2.16 (0.63) 0.29
Tampere 0.17 2.26 (0.80) 0.35
Kouvola 0.21 2.07 (0.27) 0.13
Mikkeli 0.16 2.09 (0.29) 0.14
Joensuu 0.17 2.16 (0.38) 0.18
Kuopio 0.21 2.27 (0.47) 0.21
Jyväskylä 0.22 2.25 (0.69) 0.31
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Simulated economic impacts of FMD in year 2009
In the baseline scenario, the total economic losses caused by an FMD outbreak in 
Finland were estimated to range from €11.6 million to €74.4 million in 95% of the 
cases. On average, the losses were estimated at €27.7 million under the farm struc-
ture in the year 2009. In a few individual iterations, losses higher than €100 million 
were also possible (Figures 59 and 60). These results are based on an assumption 
that exports to non-EU countries would be severely disrupted and the disruptions 
would last on average3 as long as it is suggested in the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health 
Code (2008), whereas intra-community exports would be disrupted only temporarily. 
The results are quite sensitive to assumptions regarding trade disruptions. If the trade 
disruptions were 30% more severe than assumed above, the total average losses 
would increase to €31.1 million. The results only include impacts in the pig and cattle 
sectors, because impacts on small ruminants were not estimated. Given small sheep 
and goat population of Finland and the relatively modest production quantity of the 
small ruminant sector4, these impacts were expected to be small on average. However, 
direct costs could be noticeable in a few special cases if a large number of sheep and 
goat farms needed to be controlled.
Direct losses are due to disease eradication measures and measures to prevent the 
disease. Besides measures taken to cull the animals and clean and disinfect premises, 
direct costs are also due to the lost value of animals on infected farms, extra costs to 
acquire replacement animals, officials’ work to reduce the disease outbreak and the 
sampling and surveillance of farms, among other factors. The majority of direct costs 
are covered by public funds, but livestock producers will also face substantial direct 
losses due to disruptions in their business. The costs to public funds caused by an FMD 
outbreak were estimated on average at €3.4 million. In 95% of simulations the costs 
were between €0.2 million and €28.3 million. These costs are heavily dependent on 
the number of infected farms and the number of farms located in surveillance and 
protection zones. Expected losses (thousands of euros) to public funds could be quite 
well approximated by a second-order polynomial function, 382.9x+0.4x2, where x 
refers to the number of infected premises. This equation was estimated for the simu-
lated data with least squares regression.
3 In the simulation model, the duration of trade distortions is a stochastic variable and the duration 
  varies in individual iterations, in addition to the variation caused by the duration of the disease 
  outbreak in the epidemiological model. For sensitivity analysis regarding the duration of trade 
  distortions, see Figure 61.
4 The volume of sheep meat production was approximately 0.2% of the total meat production in 
  Finland in 2009.
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Economic impacts vary according to the stakeholder groups: producers, consumers 
and taxpayers. Producers are expected to suffer the largest losses, amounting on 
average €98.7 million (95% CI €45.4–247.8 million) in the baseline scenario. Producers’ 
losses include losses to agricultural producers and the food industry. These losses 
are mainly caused by assumed trade disruptions, because disruptions in exports can 
quickly result in oversupply in the domestic markets, as livestock products cannot be 
exported to countries that impose trade restrictions. However, the coverage and dura-
tion of imposed restrictions may vary according to the country. Hence, producer prices 
tend to fall, and since production cannot be adjusted instantaneously as much as 
would be needed, producers face quite large losses. On average, a livestock farm 
suffers a loss of €5194 per outbreak, but there are large differences between farms 
and iterations in losses that individual farms face. Variation in losses is also mainly 
due to variation in trade impacts, although the size of an outbreak has an impact and 
it also contributes to trade disruptions. To a smaller extent, producers’ losses are also 
due to impacts of animal movement restrictions, surveillance and protection zones, 
and the eradication of FMD from infected farms. These measures distort production, 
result in idling production capacity, affect slaughter weights and cause additional 
costs to farms. The costs of these effects are of the same magnitude as the costs paid 
by public funds.
Trade disruptions also impact on the manufacturing of dairy products. The results 
suggest that the manufacture of butter and cheese, which are important export 
products when considering the exportation of the fat component of milk. In fact, milk 
product exports are mainly focused on products with a high fat content. The model 
also implicitly takes into account changes in the manufacturing of pig and beef 
products, because, for instance, the exporting and importing of pig meat is focused on 
different cuts of the carcass and their ratios change as exports and imports change. 
The issue of changes in dairy product manufacturing during trade disruptions has 
been discussed further by Niemi and Lehtonen (2014).
Impacts on consumers include effects on consumers and retailers. As opposed to 
producers, impacts on consumers are positive, as they can temporarily benefit from 
falling prices. The impact is large, because as in the event of producers, price changes 
are pertinent to all goods, not just those that would have been destined for export 
markets. On average, the consumers´ benefits amount to €74.3 million (95% CI €34.7–
186.6 million), of which more than half is due to falling dairy product prices. Although 
the impact seems substantial, it is on average less than €15 per citizen in Finland. The 
results above are in line with previous research regarding the cost impacts of FMD in 
Finland (Lyytikäinen et al. 2011).
The largest trade effects were caused by the dairy sector. However, when compared 
to the turnover of pig production, it suffered larger total losses than the dairy sector. 
The result is affected by the structure and volume of both production and external 
trade and by the fact that the adjustment potential of the dairy sector was explicitly 
analysed by optimizing the manufacturing of milk dairy products (see Niemi and 
Lehtonen 2014). Hence, there was an explicit market adjustment mechanism for the 
dairy sector in the model, and the losses were reduced by adjusting the manufac- 
turing quantities of butter and cheese, for instance.
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Figure 59. Histogram of total losses estimated (N = 100 000 iterations) to be caused by an FMD 
outbreak in Finland.
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Figure 60. Simulated economic impacts of an FMD outbreak on livestock producers (farms and allied food industries 
together), consumers (also including retailing), public funds and all losses in total. Blue bars represent average 
effects and black bars represent the range of losses that were simulated to occur in 95% of iterations.
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The duration of a disease outbreak and trade disruptions contribute substantially to 
the simulated losses. On average, €0.43 million in additional total costs was associat-
ed with each infected premise. By contrast, each additional month (in terms of “epi-
demiological duration”) of an outbreak was estimated to increase the total costs by 
€5.5 million. In addition to the epidemiological duration of the outbreak, the losses 
could be magnified by the prolonged duration of trade disruptions. For instance, if the 
expected duration of trade disruptions increased by 3 months, expected losses to pro-
ducers would increase by €67 million and expected total losses by €17 million. This 
impact is highlighted by Figure 61, in which the model has been simulated by alter-
nating the duration of trade disruptions. The impact of prolonged trade disruptions 
on producers is larger than the impact on the total losses. Besides increased average 
losses, the volatility of losses is also estimated to increase with the increased duration 
of disruptions, as then there is more uncertainty in their duration.
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Figure 61. Simulated economic impacts of an FMD outbreak on livestock producers (farms and 
allied food industries together; upper panel) and on all stakeholders (lower panel) according to the 
expected duration of trade disruptions after the disease eradication measures on farms have been 
completed in Finland. Solid lines represent average impacts and black bars represent the range 
of losses that were simulated to occur in 95% of iterations (i.e. variation due to the size of disease 
outbreak and the duration of trade disruptions).
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Impact of the location and type of the primary infected farm
The production type of the primary infected farm affected the results. The total losses 
were the largest, on average €29.2 million (95% CI 11.7–77.8), when a dairy farm 
was the primary infected farm in the country. A finishing beef cattle or suckler cow 
farm as the primary infected farm resulted in lower expected total losses, €25.8 
million (95% CI 11.5–68.28) and €24.0 million (95% CI 11.6–62.5), respectively. A 
farrowing, farrowing-to-finishing or finishing pig farm as the primary infected farm 
resulted on average in €26.1 million (95% CI 11.6–63.4), €25.4 million (95% CI 11.5–
63.2) and €24.6 million (95% CI 11.5–60.5) in total losses.
Figure 62 illustrates how the veterinary region in which the primary infected farm 
is located affects the total losses. The largest average losses as well as the largest 
variation in losses were simulated for outbreaks beginning from Kuopio, Oulu or Vaasa 
provincial veterinary districts. These are quite dairy-intensive regions. The smallest 
losses were simulated for outbreaks beginning from Maarianhamina (i.e. archipelago) 
or Jyväskylä regions. Although average losses vary according to the region, there is 
considerable variation in losses in each region.
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Figure 62. Simulated total economic losses due to an FMD outbreak in the baseline scenario according to the 
veterinary region in which the primary infected farm is located. Blue bars represent average impacts and black bars 
represent the range of losses that were simulated to occur in 95% of iterations.
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Simulated economic impacts of ASF in 2009
In the baseline scenario, economic losses caused by an ASF outbreak to Finnish 
society in total were estimated at €10.5 million (95% CI 4.6–22.7). The proportion of 
public funds used to cover losses was on average only €0.4 million (0.1–1.1). This 
result is due to the low number of infected farms on average. However, producers 
(including slaughterhouse companies and meat processing) suffered on average 
€17.3 million in losses (7.4–38.1) due to trade disruptions and disruptions in their 
businesses. By contrast, consumers were estimated to gain €7.1 million on average 
(3.1–15.8) (Figure 63). Hence, a pig farm in Finland suffered on average about €7400 
in losses and a consumer in Finland gained on average 1–1.5 euros per outbreak due 
to temporary market disruptions.
The duration of an outbreak affected the losses in two ways. Firstly, the epidemio- 
logical duration of the outbreak contributed to the losses. However, this type of 
variation was quite small, because the outbreaks often covered only one or two 
infected farms. Secondly, the duration of trade disruptions could vary because it was 
a stochastic process. Each additional month of increase in the expected duration of 
trade disruptions was simulated to increase the total loss on average by €2.5 million, 
and producer’s losses by €4.2 million (Figure 64).
Figure 63. Simulated economic impacts of an ASF outbreak on livestock producers (farms and allied food industries 
together), consumers (including also retailing), public funds and all losses in total. Blue bars represent average 
effects and black bars represent the range of impacts that were simulated to occur in 95% of iterations.
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Figure 64. Simulated economic impacts of an ASF outbreak on livestock producers (farms and 
allied food industries together; upper panel) and on all stakeholders (lower panel) according to the 
expected duration of trade disruptions after the disease eradication measures on farms have been 
completed in Finland. Solid lines represent average impacts and black bars represent the range of 
losses that were simulated to occur in 95% of iterations (i.e. variation due to the size of the disease 
outbreak and the duration of trade disruptions).
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The type of the primary infected farm also contributed to the losses. Outbreaks in 
which the primary infected farm was a farrowing farm resulted on average in €10.8 
million in losses, whereas losses in outbreaks starting from a farrowing-to-finishing 
farm were €10.5 and outbreaks starting from finishing farms were on average €10.2 
million. The location of the primary infected farm also contributed to the losses. 
Outbreaks starting from some regions of northern or eastern Finland tended to result 
in about €0.5 to €1.0 million higher  losses than outbreaks starting from the most 
densely populated pig production areas of Finland (Figure 65).
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Figure 65. Simulated total economic losses due to an ASF outbreak in the baseline scenario according to the 
veterinary region in which the primary infected farm is located. Blue bars represent average impacts and black bars 
represent the range of losses that were simulated to occur in 95% of iterations.
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Simulated economic impacts of BT in 2009
Unlike FMD and ASF, BT is not expected to cause major disruption in the markets, 
because according to the OIE, countries are not recommended to impose any restric-
tions on the trade of animal products. Foreign trade of animals and also semen is 
likely to be distorted due to BT, but since the exportation of live animals from Finland 
is quite marginal, the disease can be expected to have no significant impact on live-
stock markets in Finland. There is some evidence from the past outbreaks observed 
elsewhere in Europe that, for instance, calf prices may be affected by BT in some 
cases. Live young sheep prices could also be affected. Such effects are, however, 
mainly related to local restrictions in live animal trade or to changes in the supply 
and demand for calves.
In the baseline scenario, economic losses caused by bluetongue were simulated on 
average at €4.8 million per outbreak (95% CI €2.8–9.0 million). However, in the very 
unlikely worst case, the losses could rise to more than €30 million. The costs of 
official measures and surveillance were estimated at €2.9 million and the losses 
due to extra measures taken at farms, reduced productivity and increased mortality 
were estimated at €1.6 million on average. The losses were quite stable across simu- 
lations because of the relatively small number of infected farms and large geographical 
coverage of protection and surveillance zones. The implication of large zones was 
that an additional infection near the primary infected farm contributed only a modest 
amount of additional costs, as it did not have large impacts on the measures taken 
in the field.
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The type of the primary infected farm affected the results. A dairy farm as the 
primary infected farm resulted on average in €4.9 million (2.7–11.3) in economic 
losses, whereas other types of farms as the primary infected farm resulted on 
average in about €0.5 million less in losses. The amount of losses incurred was 
related to the structure and location of farms. There were some differences between 
regions in average losses. Outbreaks beginning from the Vaasa provincial veterinary 
district were on average the most expensive, because €7.1 million in losses were 
associated with outbreaks beginning from this region, and had the largest variation. 
Outbreaks beginning from Kuopio or Oulu PVO regions were also more costly than 
outbreaks beginning from other regions (Figure 66).
The intensity of measures taken by the surveillance and eradication policy 
(“programme”) affected the results. In the current costing, the sampling and testing 
programme was assumed to be proportional to the measures implemented during 
the past years in Finland combined with measures taken in protection and surveil-
lance zones. If all farms located in surveillance and protection zones were to be tested 
with samples either during the year when an outbreak occurred or for three years in a 
row, then the costs could increase, because the number of farms in these regions was 
quite large. The costs would be extrapolated much more if other farms than those 
located in the zones were intensively  tested. If restrictions were imposed on the use 
of production inputs on farms, as has been the case in some other countries (see e.g. 
Velthuis et al. 2010), or if there would be severe restrictions on the collection of milk 
and slaughter animals in the zones, then the losses would also be extrapolated.
Figure 66. Simulated economic losses due to a BT outbreak in the 2009 situation according to the provincial 
veterinary district. Blue bars represent average impacts and black bars represent the range of impacts simulated to 
occur in 95% of iterations.
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Appendix 6: Future projections
Farm register data from the years 1997 and 2009 were used to estimate how likely 
different types of farms were to continue livestock production and how the farm size 
had increased during 1997–2009. The farms were divided into three categories, and 
the categories were determined separately for five animal types:
   pigs (including growing pigs and other pigs),
   sows,
   cattle (including growing cattle and cows),
   dairy cows and
   suckler cows.
A farm could be included in several animal type categories. For each animal type 
category, there were three types of farms (continuation status):
   Farms that had continued their business. This was indicated by a farm having the 
same type of animals in both 1997 and 2009.
   Farms that exited the business. This was indicated by a farm keeping animals in 
1997 but not in 2009. The same farm could have exited, for instance, from the 
dairy business but continued in another type of cattle production.
   Farms (about 900 farms) that had entered the business. This was indicated by a 
farm keeping a certain type of animals in 2009 but not in 1997. A farm could have 
entered, for instance, finishing pig production and exited piglet production (i.e. 
keeping the sows)
Table 51. Number of animals per farm on average on farms that have continued, exited or 
entered the business of keeping a certain type of animals during the years 1997 and 2009, and the 
percentage increase in the average number of animals per farm within the farm category (continue, 
exit or enter category).
Year 1997 Year 2009
Continuation status Continuation status
Continue Exit All farms Continue Enter
All 
farms
Animal 
category
Number 
of 
animal
animals per farm
Number 
animals Change
Number 
animals Change Change
Dairy 
cows 16,2 11,2 15,6 23,7 47 % 23,1 23,7 51 %
Suckler 
cows 16,6 8,5 6,8 27,9 68 % 19,8 23,1 238 %
Other 
cattle 24,2 14,8 23,0 35,1 45 % 43,4 35,5 54 %
Sows 53,2 28,9 47,6 69,1 30 % 205,8 83,4 75 %
Finishing 
pigs 132,6 82,9 102,5 226,5 71 % 328,4 249,6 143 %
Based on the logit model estimated for cattle farms5 , the following characteristics of 
a farm were (among others) found to be associated with an increased likelihood of a 
farm continuing to keep cattle in the future:
   the farm currently had both cattle and pigs
   the farm was not specialized in beef production
   the farm currently had suckler cows
5 Detailed estimates are available from the authors upon request.
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   there were fewer other cattle farms or more pigs farms within a 10-km radius 
around the farm
   there were more cattle on the farm
   the farm was currently located further away from a dairy or a slaughterhouse
Among the farms that continued to have cattle in the future, the following character-
istics were associated with an increased likelihood of a farm continuing to have dairy 
cows in the future:
   the farm was not specialized in beef production or it did not currently have 
suckler cows
   there were more dairy cows or fewer suckler cows on the farm
   the price of arable land in the area had increased
   households located in the same region currently had a higher average income, or 
the unemployment rate in the region had increased, hence reflecting the avail-
ability of non-farm employment options.
Among the farms that continued to have cattle in the future, the following charac-
teristics were associated with an increased likelihood of a farm continuing to have 
suckler cows in the future:
   the farm was specialized in beef production
   there were fewer cattle farms within a 10-km radius around the farm
   the farm currently had fewer dairy cows or more suckler cows
   the price of arable land in the area or unemployment rate in the region had 
decreased.
Based on the logit model estimated for pig farms, the following characteristics of a 
farm were (among others) found to be associated with an increased likelihood of a 
farm continuing to have pigs in the future:
   the farm currently had both cattle and pigs
   the farm currently had sows
   there were more pig farms within a 10-km radius around the farm
   there were more sows and/or more other pigs than sows on the farm
   households located in the same region currently had a lower average income.
Among the farms that continued to have pigs in the future, the following character-
istics were associated with an increased likelihood of a farm continuing to have sows 
in the future:
   the farm currently had both cattle and pigs
   the farm was currently specialized in piglet production (i.e. it was not a finishing 
or farrowing-to-finishing farm)
   the farm currently had more sows
   households located in the same region currently had a lower average income.
   the price of arable land in the region had increased.
Although the above-mentioned factors contributed significantly to the likelihood of 
a farm continuing in livestock farming, it was also evident that farm-specific factors 
were important in determining whether a farm continued in livestock production. By 
contrast, the expansion of farm size was almost completely determined by farm- 
specific factors (other than size, production type, livestock farm density in the re-
gion or region) that our data did not include any information about. Although mixed 
farms (i.e. farms having both pigs and cattle) were more likely to continue livestock 
production than non-mixed farms, the amount of mixed farming decreased by 87% 
during 1997–2009.
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Changes in beef cattle, suckler cow, sow and fattening pig numbers suggest that, in 
relative terms, farm size has increased more on small than on large farms. For 
instance, finishing pig farms belonging to the group of smallest farms (1/3 of all 
farms) have on average more than doubled their size, whereas farms belonging to 
the group of largest farms (1/3 of all farms) have increased their size on average by 
less than 30%. However, among small farms, farm size growth has varied more than 
in other groups. In addition, pig farm size has increased more rapidly in areas where 
the number of pig farms per unit area of land was high. Among dairy farms, it was 
also noted that changes in the number of dairy cattle were positively correlated with 
changes in the number of other cattle.
Farm size was simulated to change on average differently in small, medium-sized 
and large farms, as well as farms belonging to different size classes. Among dairy 
farms, the interaction between farm size growth and initial farm size was smaller 
than among suckler cow, beef cattle or pig farms.
Table 52. Average change in the number of animals per farm over a 12-year period for farms that 
were initially in one of three classes according to their size and in one of three classes according 
the number of other farms within a radius of 10 km around the farm.
Animal type Farm density class2)
Farm size class in 19971)
Small farm Average-sized farm Large farm
Dairy cows
Small density 41 44 42
Medium density 51 47 44
Large density 33 55 52
Suckler cows
Small density 557 134 57
Medium density 1023 188 49
Large density 438 194 69
Beef cattle, 
excluding cows
Small density 444 74 37
Medium density 143 139 37
Large density 298 66 57
Sows
Small density 62 22 14
Medium density 141 33 27
Large density 292 70 29
Finishing pigs 
Small density 110 72 13
Medium density 650 43 10
Large density 930 97 29
1) Each size class contains 33% of farms that operated in 1997. Some of them exited business by 
  2009. Percentage changes have been calculated for the subset of farms which continued 
   business until 2009.
2) Farms were categorized into farm size classes by first calculating the number of other pig and 
   poultry farms within 10 km radius around the farm and thereafter segragating the farms into three 
  classes according the number of these other farms. Each class contained 33% of farms that 
  operatedin 1997. Percentage changes have been calculated for the subset of farms which 
   continued until 2009.
Numbers in each cell indicate percentage change in farm size during 12-year period when 
compared to the number of animals in 1997. Black bars visualize the percentage changes.
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The change in the total number of animals in Finland was simulated with the 
DREMFIA sectorial model for Finnish agriculture (Lehtonen 2001). According to this 
projection, the number of animals would decrease in all other categories except in 
the category of suckler cows (Figure BB). If the future exit rate of farms was similar to 
the years 1997–2009, then our models which were applied to farm registry data for 
the year 2009 suggest that a little more than 20% of pig farms would continue 
production until 2033. Approximately 30% of dairy farms and a little more than 30% 
of suckler cow farms would continue production until 2033. If the farm size growth 
was similar to that of 1997–2009, then the size of farms with sows would increase 
the most. The number of finishing pigs and suckler cows would also increase quite 
rapidly, whereas the number of dairy cows per farm was projected to increase less 
rapidly.
The results suggest only small differences between regions regarding the change in 
the number of farms. Farm size is anticipated to grow relatively more rapidly among 
small than large pig and beef cattle farms, whereas the size of dairy farms is esti-
mated to increase quite steadily across farm size classes. Since small farms are more 
likely to exit than large farms, farms continue to grow less rapidly than the increase 
in the average farm size, i.e. the increase in the average farm size is partly due to 
small farms exiting the farming business. However, it is possible that the increase 
in the pig farm size will be smaller and the increase in the cattle farm size will be 
larger than in 1997–2009, because the abolition of milk quotas and rapid structural 
change observed previously in the pig sector may have an effect on the future struc-
tural change.
Development of production costs in the 2000s
As a part of our analysis, we examined how production costs change over time and 
as farm size increases. The goal of this analysis was to project potential economic 
benefits, i.e. changes in production costs of livestock farms, associated with structural 
change.
Price indices (2000–2013, OSF 2014a) show that the prices of goods and services cur-
rently consumed in agriculture (+57%) and goods and services contributing to agri-
cultural investments (+46%) have increased faster than the Consumer Price Index 
that is used to measure the general inflation rate (+26%) (OSF 2014b). Among goods 
and services that are targeted at animal and especially dairy production, only the 
price of veterinary expenses (+23%) and compound feeds for calves (+22%) have 
risen less than the general inflation rate. Prices for farm machinery and installations 
used in animal production have increased by 44% and farm buildings by 46% from 
2000 to 2013. The prices for energy and lubricants (+106%) have increased substan-
tially, mainly due to crude oil prices (BP, 2013). (Figure 67).
The effects of structural change in agriculture on the spread of animal disease in Finland
151
The production costs of farms have increased. In dairy farming, the production costs 
increased from 2000 to 2013 by 160% (from €110 300 to €287 300). The production 
costs have also increased in suckler cow farming (123%), sheep production (211%), 
piglet production (377%), pork production (199%) and in combined pig production 
(161%). (Figure 68).
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Figure 67. Development of costs 2000–2011 (OSF 2014a).
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Figure 68. Production costs in animal farming 2000—2013 (MTT Economydoctor 2015b).
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The production costs of livestock farms have increased not only due to increased 
input costs, but also due to the fact that the average farm size has grown over time. 
The structure of production costs in farming has also changed. The most significant 
change has been the decrease in the wages cost. In turn, machinery and material 
costs have increased. In pig farming, the changes have been larger than in cow 
farming. Hence, the primary economic benefit from structural change has been that 
the use of labour input has become more efficient and the use of more efficient 
production technology has increased (Table 53).
The above-mentioned changes are based on the Finnish bookkeeping data. Because 
the time period under study differs from farm-specific projections, we present 
information on structural changes for this period. During the period 2000–2013, the 
number of dairy farms decreased by 57% (from 19 750 farms to 8 497 farms), the 
number of cattle farms by 50% (7 971 to 3 986) and the number of pig farms by 67% 
(3 006 to 913). Conversely, the number of sheep and goat farms increased by 31% 
(697 to 999). The number of farms is forecast to decrease in the future (Figure 69). 
The number of animals in Finland decreased during 2000–2013 (Figure 70), and the 
average farm size increased.
Table 53. Specification of production costs according to farm type and accounting year (2000 and 2013) (MTT 
Economydoctor 2015b).
Material Farm use Livestock Machinery Buildings Other Wages Interest
2000 2013 2000 2013 2000 2013 2000 2013 2000 2013 2000 2013 2000 2013 2000 2013
Dairy farms 18% 22% 11% 12% 5% 5% 12% 15% 5% 5% 9% 11% 32% 23% 9% 8%
Suckler cow 
farms 13% 14% 15% 13% 2% 4% 16% 17% 6% 7% 14% 15% 21% 20% 13% 10%
Sheep 
production 16% 16% 9% 13% 2% 2% 11% 13% 3% 6% 9% 17% 43% 25% 7% 8%
Piglet 
production 26% 31% 6% 9% 6% 17% 13% 9% 8% 5% 9% 8% 21% 15% 10% 7%
Pig finishing 
production 22% 26% 5% 10% 38% 32% 7% 10% 6% 4% 6% 6% 10% 6% 7% 6%
Farrowing-to- 
finishing 
production
28% 37% 7% 9% 5% 10% 12% 8% 7% 6% 11% 9% 19% 13% 12% 8%
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Figure 70. Number of cattle (on the left) and pigs (on the right) in 2000–2013 (OSF2015).
According to descriptive statistics based on MTT Profitability bookkeeping farm-level 
data for the years 2000–2011, the production costs per unit of the farm’s main product 
have remained quite stable since 2000. For example, the costs in dairy farming have 
been on average €1.08 per litre of milk produced (Figure 72). The costs of a finishing 
pig farm have also remained quite stable, on average €2 per kg pig meat produced 
(range €2–3/kg). In addition, the average costs of a piglet producing farm have 
remained quite stable, approximately €91 per piglet produced. Although these 
numbers include all the costs incurred by the farm (i.e. also costs other than those 
related to the main output), the impact of other products than the main produce of 
a farm does not seem to have any major impact on the results. Especially in crop 
production, subsidies provide a major share of revenues. Hence, the inclusion of 
unsubsidized costs of crop and feed production is one of the factors increasing the 
costs of production.
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Figure 72. The development of unit production costs (cents per milk litre) of dairy farms according 
to farm size (number of cows) between 2000–2011 (Data: MTT Profitability bookkeeping farm-level 
data).
Figure 71. The development of the production cost of a dairy farm when all production costs of 
the farm are divided by the amount of milk produced each year between 2000–2011 (Data: MTT 
Profitability bookkeeping farm-level data).
The variation in unit costs between farms may be extremely large. Larger farms have 
smaller unit costs and the variation between farms is smaller. As an example, Figure 
72 shows the production costs per unit of output costs of different sized dairy farms. 
Smaller farms have higher unit costs and the variation is larger. Medium-sized and 
large farms have small differences that are not statistically significant.
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Structural development and economies of scale
The data show that wages and materials are the main cost items in livestock produc-
tion (Table 53). Work on farms is still mainly conducted by the producer and his/her 
family (on average 95%), because the share of paid labour is typically small (on 
average 5%). Producers have invested in technology (machinery and buildings), 
which has resulted in wages costs remaining relatively unchanged or decreasing 
during 2000—2011. By contrast, the share of costs incurred due to materials, machinery 
and buildings has increased.
Previous research suggests that as farm size increases, the most significant change is 
related to the decreased share of wage costs (Ala-Mantila 1998). The biggest share 
of production costs in dairy farming is wage costs. Other costs (animals, other animal 
expenses, insurances, electricity and fuels) also form a significant share of production 
costs. The unit production cost of milk decreases as the farm size (number of cows) 
increases. In pig meat production, the largest costs are associated with the purchasing 
of piglets and purchased feeds. In pig meat production the unit cost also decreases as 
more pig meat is produced.
Ovaska and Heikkilä (2013) have studied the structural development and competi-
tiveness of Finnish dairy farms. They found that for a typical Finnish farm, the most 
significant disadvantages were machinery, wages and other costs. The proportion of 
wage costs decreases as the farm size class increases. Latukka (2013) observed that 
small farms have clearly the highest unit production costs, and as the number of cows 
increases the unit costs decrease.
Production costs per unit of output were studied by using a linear mixed effect 
model and farm-level data for the years 2000–2011. The results indicate that the unit 
production cost increases every year, but the rate of increase varies between farms 
and different types of production. An increase in the number of animals and farm size 
decreases the unit costs. Small farms (standard output less than €50 000) have 
significantly higher unit costs than medium-sized (€50 000-100 000) and large farms 
(more than €100 000). This may be due to the quite rapid farm size increase in 
Finland during the 2000s, as large farms have not yet reached the optimum in 
production and input use. The variation between farms and years was also large for 
small farms. Regionwise, there were insignificant differences in unit costs. The 
correlation between years in unit costs is high, and the unit costs of farms change at 
a different pace over time.
Economies of scale due to the increasing farm size were estimated by using 
Finnish bookkeeping data. Multivariate regression models were estimated to explain 
the production costs of a farm per unit of the main output (milk, meat or piglets). 
The estimation results were then applied in the future projected farm size to assess 
how farm size growth could affect production costs in each scenario. All changes were 
compared to the farm size and production costs of the year 2009. Price levels for the 
years 2009–2011 were used in the analysis.
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Appendix 7: Spread simulation of future projections
Simulation of spread in the future
Future scenarios of pig and cattle production were described as farm-level projections 
(Appendix 6). The projections focused on how likely a farm was to continue producing 
animals of a certain type and how many animals the farm would be likely to have. 
Simulation of disease spread in the future by our model is possible after a projection 
is transformed into a realisation. A realisation comprises:
   an updated farm database that contains the farms assumed to be operational in 
the future and updated characteristics of those farms corresponding to the year 
2033 (Figure 74);
   an updated animal transportation database that contains animal transports 
between operational farms in a realisation;
   an updated slaughterhouse transportation database that contains transports of 
animals only from farms that operate in a realisation;
   an updated AI technician movement database containing only visits to operational 
dairy farms; and
   an updated dairy tanker database containing only visits to operational dairy farms.
A simulation proceeds after the realisation is built as described in Appendix 3. Contact 
types and relevant production sectors vary and depend on the simulated disease 
(Table 54). Only spread in the cattle and pig sectors was simulated, as future projec-
tions of sheep/goat production were not available.
Table 54. Relevant sectors and contacts in simulations of various diseases based on future 
projections.
FMD BT ASF
Pig sector X X
Cattle sector X X
Animal transport X X X
Animal transportation vehicle X X
Other traffic X** X***
Spatial spread* X X
* Spatial spread refers here to neighbourhood, vector and airborne spread
** Included advisors, AI technicians, dairy tankers, veterinarians, substitute workers and cadaver 
    collection vehicles
*** Included advisors, cadaver collection vehicles, substitute workers, veterinarians
Building a realisation from a projection
A projection for the number of farms and the number of animals on the farms in the 
future was produced. The model predicts the number and probability of animals in 
2033: sows, finishing pigs, dairy cows, suckler cows and beef cattle on the farm. A 
projection is a matrix that contains estimates regarding the continuation of livestock 
farming separately for each animal type and a conditional number of animals that is 
valid if the probability is true in reality for every farm operating in 2009, respectively.
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Figure 73. Illustration of how projected future scenarios are related to the individual realisations of 
a projection required for epidemiologic simulation. To handle the uncertainty related to realisation, 
20 realisations per projection were simulated.
In order to make a realisation of a projection, several steps were performed:
1) Simulation of what types of animals a farm continues to produce in 2033
The simulation was executed hierarchically and depended on the production sector:
Pig production: 
a) The continuation of keeping sows was sampled from a farm-specific probability.
b) Farms that continued to keep sows and had also had finishing pigs were 
    assumed to also continue pig finishing.
c) For farms that did not have sows, the continuation of keeping finishing pigs was 
    sampled from a farm-specific probability
Cattle production:
a) The likelihood for a farm to continue keeping dairy or suckler cows was sampled 
    from farm-specific probabilities of dairy and suckler cow farming.
b) Farms that continued to keep dairy cows, suckler cows or both and which also had 
    beef cattle were assumed to continue beef cattle production.
c) For farms that did not have dairy or suckler cows, the continuation of keeping beef 
   cattle was sampled from a farm-specific probability.
If a farm did not continue to keep any type of animals in an individual realization, it 
was regarded to exit livestock farming before 2033 and thus removed from the farm 
database of an individual realisation.
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2) The number of animals on farms that continued livestock production was 
adjusted to correspond to the total number of animals
The number of animals on a farm was adjusted by the following coefficients:
Coefficient for animal type X =  The sum of all animals of type X on realised farms   
    Projected total number of animals of type X
The adjusted number of animals on the farm was then calculated:
The number of animals of type X on a certain farm = 
rnd( realised number of animals of type X in a certain farm 
 coefficient for animal type X   )
X is either a sow, finisher pig, dairy cow, suckler cow or beef cattle farm, rnd = value 
is rounded to the nearest integer. The adjusting ensured that the number of animals 
in the country stayed the same in each realisation of a projection.
3) Farm types of continuing farms were estimated 
The farm types were classified as in the 2009 model using information on different 
types of animals on the farm:
Farrowing farm = sows and less than 2 finishers per sow
Farrowing-to-finishing farm = sows and at least two finishers per sow
Finishing farm = finishers only; no sows
Dairy farm = dairy cows (minimum one dairy cow), suckler cows, beef cattle 
Suckler cow farm = suckler cows and beef cattle only; no dairy cows
Beef cattle farm = beef cattle only; no dairy cows, no suckler cows
4) A standardized size of the continuing farms was estimated (number of animals)
Farm size was transformed to correspond with the standardised farm size of 2006, as 
parts of the predictive functions were developed for a standardised farm size of 2006 
within each farm type (Lyytikäinen et al. 2011):
Transformed farm size = a*farm size +b, where farm size = number of sows + number 
of finishers + number of dairy cows + number of other cattle. Farm size information is 
based on the 2009 farm database (Table 55).
Table 55. Linear transformation functions applied to scale farm size to correspond with the stand-
ardised farm size in 2006 within each farm type*.
Farm type Transformation function
Farrowing 0.003436*farm size -0.573813
Farrowing-to-finishing 0.002278*farm size -0.888383
Finishing 0.002058*farm size -0.925926
Dairy 0.038462*farm size -1.192308
Beef cattle 0.010989*farm size -0.714286
Suckler cow 0.017544*farm size -0.912281
* These are complete transformations and the coefficient of determination is 100% in every function.
5) Contact-related databases were updated
The simulation of animal transports between farms was originally based on the 
animal transport database of 2009. When the database was updated to the year 
2033, part of the database was changed: either the source or the destination farm, 
or both, for an animal transport may have disappeared because they had been simu-
lated to have discontinued livestock production. This required contacts, their sources 
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Figure 74. Schematic illustration of the impact when a proportion of the farms have exited livestock 
production and the animal transport database is updated to take into account the exits. Part of the 
database is to be re-linked in order to maintain the operation of animal transports at the country 
level in a possible and logical manner.
Re-linking was applied by using the following logic: if the source farm had disap-
peared, a new source farm was sampled randomly from the animal movement data-
base. The sampling was performed among source farms of the same animal kind (pig 
or cattle) still operating in that realisation and of the same farm type as the original 
source farm. Similar logic applied if the destination farm was missing in a realisation. 
Spatial spread was taken into account so that farms <10 km and within 10–20 km of the 
source or target farm had the same share of contacts as in 2009 if that was possible. 
In some parts of the country, the number of farms in the future became so small that 
there were no suitable farms within this region. If both the source and the target farm 
disappeared, the transport was excluded from the database in that realisation.
6) Other contact types
The animal transportation database also contained vehicle identification information 
for the pig sector. This information remained in a realisation, even if the movement 
was re-linked.  The number of farms a pig transporting vehicle can visit a day was 
therefore a simulated variable that was defined separately in each realisation. The 
number of visited farms per vehicle in a day was assumed to decrease by 50% in the 
cattle sector due to the increased distance between farms and increased batch size.
The slaughterhouse transportation database was updated. All records referring to 
farms that did not exist in a realisation were removed from the database. Daily 
visits of a vehicle were assumed to decrease by 50% due to the increased distance 
between farms and increased batch size.
The AI technician movement database and dairy tanker database were updated and 
farms that did not operate in dairy production in 2033 were removed from the data-
bases of a realisation.
or destinations, to be re-estimated. The key question was to what extent this re- 
estimation was to be performed: should we re-estimate all the contacts or only part 
of them? Because there was no clear evidence-based answer to the question, we 
applied different levels of re-linking.
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